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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
ESSAYS ON TRANSFER-PROGRAM INTERACTIONS AMONG
LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS
This dissertation consists of three essays examining the role of transfer-program
interactions for families and households who participate in the social safety net. The
safety net is comprised of many different programs, run by different agencies, governed
by different rules, and often administered by disparate and secluded entities. However,
many households participate in multiple programs, subjecting them to the milieu of
administrative hurdles. In this dissertation, I try to untangle some of the intended
and unintended effects of program participation that may be experienced by these
households.
In Essay 1, I examine the effect of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
of 2010 (ACA) on food hardship in US households, utilizing food security information
from the Food Security Supplement of the Current Population Survey. Because states
adopted the Medicaid expansions provided under the ACA at different times begin-
ning in 2014, the cross-state, over time variation allows me to separate the impact of
the ACA on food hardship using triple difference specifications. The richness of ques-
tions in the Food Security Supplement allows me to examine the effect of the ACA
across different measures of food hardship, and also examine differential response for
households participating in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP).
Examining the mechanisms through which the ACA could affect food insecurity, I find
the ACA not only increased average weekly food expenditure, but also the probability
a household participates in SNAP. I employ a two-stage, control function approach
to address reverse causality between SNAP and food insecurity. I find that the ACA
reduced the probability that a household participating in SNAP falls into the two
lowest food security categories by 6.5 percentage points and reduced the probability
of being food insecure by 14.2 percentage points. Across specifications, I find strong
evidence for increasing returns to program participation, and evidence of a differential
impact of the ACA across the distribution of food hardship.
In Essay 2, I examine how grant funding and fiscal structure affect program re-
sponse over the business cycle. I compare child enrollment in Medicaid, a matching
grant funding program, with enrollment the State Children’s Health Insurance Pro-
gram, a block grant funded program, utilizing the similarities in beneficiaries, program
benefits, and administration to isolate the impact of fiscal structure. I utilize admin-
istrative enrollment records, along with individual level participation data, and find
a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate leads to a 7.6% decrease in
the number of beneficiaries per person enrolled in block grant funded programs, and a
10% decrease in state expenditure per person decreases the probability of enrollment
in a block grant program by 0.58 percentage points. I also find that enrollment is
much more persistent among matching grant funded programs, and being enrolled
in a block grant funded program the previous period increases the probability of en-
rolling in a matching grant program this period 75% more than remaining enrolled
in the block grant funded program.
Finally, in Essay 3 I explore the effect of the minimum wage on the self-reported
value of public assistance program benefits, and the joint effect of the minimum wage
and public assistance programs on the income to poverty ratio using data from the
1995-2016 Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement. In
the first stage, I estimate a Tobit model controlling for the censoring of received ben-
efits from below at zero, and examine the effect of changes in the minimum wage on
the self-reported dollar value of benefits received for food stamps/ the Supplemen-
tal Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC)/Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), Supplemental Security
Income (SSI), and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), as well as the total sum of
benefits. I find that the minimum wage reduces the value of means-tested benefits,
but that this effect is strongest for programs with strong work requirements. Utilizing
the residuals from the first stage, I employ a control function approach to estimate
the joint effect of the minimum wage and program benefits on the income to poverty
ratio. I find the own-effect of the minimum wage provides a small increase in the
income to poverty ratio, but that the total effect, accounting for changes in benefits,
attenuates by approximately 30%.
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ticipation; Poverty; Welfare
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The social safety net is a complex web of rules, regulations, eligibility require-
ments, benefits, agencies, and exceptions that often makes analysis, even from policy
experts, difficult. These programs are run by different institutions with different pol-
icy objectives, and which may or may not communicate and coordinate among the
separate program administrators. Individuals, families, and households participating
in the safety net are often not experts, and are constrained by more than a lack
of information or estimation techniques. These low-income individuals face financial
burdens that make navigating the tangle of programs difficult even in the best circum-
stances. If policy experts and researchers struggle to understand the multiple facets
of the safety net, how are those individuals who receive safety net benefits supposed
to understand how to best utilize these programs to meet their needs?
There are many stories told in public debates about the role of transfer program
policy. With the passage and attempted repeal of the Patient Protection and Afford-
able Care Act of 2010 (ACA), policy makers and pundits on one side extol the virtues
of expanded healthcare coverage, while those on the other side lament the growing
burden of the “welfare state” and the negative consequences program participation
has on households and communities. In Congress, serious discussion has been given
to the role of programs like the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)
and Medicaid, how these programs are funded, and how they should be administered
moving forward.
The following essays attempt to disentangle some of these connections between
programs and policy objectives, analyzing not only the own effect of programs on
given outcomes, but also how the interactions between the programs may bolster or
curb their effectiveness, or produce unintended consequences for policy makers or
participants. Transfer program interaction, the unifying concept of this dissertation,
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is often not fully explored in the broader literature, perhaps due to the difficulty of
identifying further effects outside of the direct effects of typical program evaluation.
However, the policy implications of this program interaction can be significant in the
design, reformulation, and implementation of safety net policy.
In Essay 1, I examine the effect of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act of 2010 on food hardship in US households. Much of the debate surrounding the
ACA has, justifiably, concerned its effect on health insurance coverage in the US. Very
little has been done to examine the effect of the ACA on other policy goals. SNAP,
the largest food assistance program in the US, primarily occupies the conversation
surrounding food insecurity. However, both the lack of healthcare coverage present
before the implementation of the ACA, as well as the persistently high rates of food
insecurity after the Great Recession of the late 2000s, are public health issues. Thus, I
examine any potential spillovers from the ACA, the largest expansion of public health
benefits in recent years, into food insecurity.
Using food security information from the Food Security Supplement of the Cur-
rent Population Survey from 2001-2016, I find that the ACA reduced the probability a
household participating in SNAP falls into the two lowest food security categories by
6.5 percentage points, and reduced the probability of being food insecure by 14.2 per-
centage points. I find no effects for households not participating in SNAP, suggesting
these positive spillovers are largely due to increasing returns to program participation.
Moreover, I find that these gains are concentrated in the high end of the food hard-
ship distribution, suggesting that the ACA affected individuals differentially based
on their food security status. These results warrant more research into both the out-
side consequences of the ACA, as well as the role of healthcare in addressing food
insecurity.
In Essay 2, I examine how the method in which programs are funded affects the
provision of program benefits. Many transfer programs are funded either through a
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matching grant, where state funds are matched at some rate by the federal govern-
ment, or through a block grant, where the federal government appropriates a specified
amount of funding for a state, and does not provide any additional resources. These
separate fiscal structures promote very different incentives to states providing trans-
fer program benefits, especially during recessionary periods where there may be both
increased demand for program benefits and lower levels of state resources.
I examine the role of fiscal structure and program response over the business cycle
by examining how enrollment in Medicaid, a matching grant funded program, and
enrollment in the State Children’s Health Insurance Program, a block grant funded
program, changed from 1999 to 2015. Using both administrative enrollment records,
as well as individual level two-year matched panels from the Current Population
Survey, I find that enrollment in block grant funded programs is much more volatile
over the business cycle than enrollment in matching grant funded programs. I also find
that enrollment is much more persistent among matching grant funded programs, and
being enrolled in a block grant funded program last period increases the probability of
enrolling in a matching grant program this period 75% more than remaining enrolled
in the block grant funded program.
Lastly, in Essay 3, I explore the effect of the minimum wage on the value of public
assistance programs, and the joint effect of the minimum wage and public assistance
programs on the income to poverty ratio. Much of the literature on the minimum
wage has examined its influence on employment and poverty, finding ambiguous effects
on both. However, a mechanical relationship exists between the minimum wage and
means-tested transfer programs, which has been relatively understudied. Any increase
in the wages of low-income families directly reduces the value of means tested benefits.
This, coupled with ambiguously negative employment effects of the minimum wage,
may complicate the minimum wage’s role as an antipoverty tool.
Using data from the 1995-2016 Current Population Survey Annual Social and
3
Economic Supplement, I estimate the effect of changes in the minimum wage on
the self-reported value of transfer program benefits for food stamps or SNAP, Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)/Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
(TANF), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
benefits, as well as the total sum of benefits. I find that the minimum wage reduces
the value of means-tested benefits, but that this effect is strongest for programs with
strong work requirements. I then use these results to estimate the joint effect of
the minimum wage and program benefits on the income to poverty ratio. I find the
own effect of the minimum wage provides a small increase in the income to poverty
ratio, but that the total effect, accounting for changes in benefits, attenuates by
approximately 30%.
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Chapter 2: Healthcare and Hunger: Impacts of the Affordable Care Act
on Food Insecurity in America
2.1 Introduction
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010 enacted broad
reform for healthcare in the United States. The number of Americans lacking health
insurance has been a public health issue for policy makers, with 17.5% of non-elderly
individuals uninsured in 2009. The ACA implemented large expansions in Medicaid
that provided subsidized health insurance coverage for individuals less than 133% of
the federal poverty line. However, 19 states chose not to expand Medicaid, leaving
residents who did not qualify for Medicaid under previous rules ineligible for increased
benefits provided by the ACA.
Alongside the lack of health insurance, food insecurity has emerged as a persistent
public health concern facing the nation. From 2008 through 2016, between 12% and
15% of households were food insecure. While food insecurity has been declining in
recent years, in 2016 12.3% percent of US households were still defined as food insecure
by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, implying 15.6 million households did not have
adequate access to the quantity nor quality of food necessary for a healthy lifestyle.
Moreover, 6.1 million households experienced very low food security, a severe category
of food insecurity that often results in families not eating for entire days (Coleman-
Jensen et al., 2017).
The health consequences of food insecurity can be dire. Food insecurity has detri-
mental effects on adult health, and is associated with poor nutritional outcomes, both
obesity and low body mass index, less healthy diets, poor mental health outcomes,
and various other serious conditions (Cook et al., 2013; Heflin and Ziliak, 2008; Bhat-
tacharya et al., 2004). Children living in food insecure households have also been
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shown to be negatively affected by food insecurity, being more likely to have poor
health (Gundersen et al., 2011; Meyerhoefer and Yang, 2011; Almond et al., 2011;
Gundersen and Kreider, 2009; Cook et al., 2004), have poor BMI (Gundersen and
Kreider, 2009), experience behavioral issues (Howard, 2011), and experience a host of
specific health problems (Chi et al., 2014; Gundersen and Ziliak, 2014). Gundersen
and Ziliak (2015) show that these poor outcomes are evident across studies, countries,
data sets, and time periods.
Policy makers have many traditional methods of combating food insecurity such as
the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), one of the largest public as-
sistance programs in the US (5th by expenditure, 3rd by recipients), the Special Sup-
plemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), and school
breakfast and lunch programs. As noted by Moffitt (2015), nearly 80% of SNAP re-
cipients also receive Medicaid benefits, however, we know little about how healthcare
policy, acting alone or in concert with other food programs, may affect food inse-
curity. Despite the proliferation of literature on both food insecurity and the ACA,
few studies, if any, have yet examined potential links between public healthcare and
food insecurity. Public healthcare provides in-kind benefits to at-risk individuals,
and while these benefits do not directly address food insecurity, they may free up
household income to be redirected toward alleviating food hardship.
I fill this gap in the literature using data from the Current Population Survey
(CPS) Food Security Supplement for years 2001-2016 to present the first evidence on
the effect of the ACA on food insecurity in America. I contribute to the literature
examining the effect of non-food programs on food insecurity, and I extend these stud-
ies by analyzing the interaction between the traditional food support system (SNAP)
and Medicaid. For my purposes, I limit the impact of the ACA to families with in-
comes less than 185% of the federal poverty line, capturing not only the population
most served by Medicaid expansion, but also households who are likely to receive food
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benefits. I utilize variation across time in the roll-out of Medicaid expansion through
the ACA, as well as cross-state variation in Medicaid expansion, to identify the effect
of the ACA. This allows me to employ a quasi-experimental design, examining the
impact of the ACA across many food insecurity thresholds and varying definitions of
food hardship. As many studies have shown (Gregory et al., 2015; Gundersen et al.,
2011), reverse causality between SNAP and food insecurity results in the endogeneity
of SNAP benefits. Thus, I use a two stage control function approach to address the
endogeneity of SNAP and its interaction with Medicaid expansions. I find that the
ACA had the largest impact for households already participating in SNAP, reducing
the probability that these households fall into the two lowest categories of food secu-
rity by 6.5 percentage points. I also find the ACA reduced the probability households
participating in SNAP are food insecure by 14.2 percentage points. I find the ACA
increased average household weekly food expenditure, as well as the probability the
household participates in SNAP, providing two avenues through which the ACA could
influence food hardship.
These results suggest that while the safety net does affect food insecurity, it does
not do so uniformly across the distribution of food hardship. I show that the largest
mitigating factor for those experiencing very low, low, or marginal food security is
SNAP. However, spillovers from the ACA increase gains in food security by roughly
50% at all thresholds, with larger total gains at the low end of the food security
spectrum. I show large, increasing returns to program participation, of particular im-
portance for policy makers and researchers studying safety net programs. By ignoring
the positive spillovers from the ACA and SNAP, we risk drastically understating the
efficacy of both programs in addressing food insecurity.
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2.2 Background and Motivation
Official food insecurity statistics are reported by the United States Department
of Agriculture (USDA) and come from the Food Security Supplement (FSS) in the
December Current Population Survey (CPS). Coleman-Jensen et al. (2017) catego-
rize food security as all individuals in a household having enough food for an active,
healthy lifestyle. Households are placed into categories of food hardship based on
their responses to 18 questions in the FSS, with affirmative responses indicating in-
creased food hardship for the family. The module includes three questions about food
conditions of the entire household, seven questions about food security conditions of
adults in the household, and eight questions about food conditions of children if they
are present.
I use the nomenclature of the USDA and consider four categories of food security—
fully food secure, marginally food secure, low food secure, and very low food secure.
Households are fully food secure if they report no food insecure conditions, marginally
food secure if they report one or two food insecure conditions, low food secure if
they report three to five food insecure conditions with no children (three to seven
with children), and very low food secure if they report six or more food insecure
conditions (8 or more with children). For some of my analyses, I instead focus on
the nonmutually exclusive categories of marginally food insecure, food insecure, and
very low food secure. Households are marginally food insecure if they report at least
one food insecure condition, food insecure if they report at least three food insecure
conditions, and are very low food secure if they report six or more food insecure
conditions (eight or more if children are present in the household). Note that all
households that are very low food secure will also be food insecure and marginally
food insecure, and all households that are food insecure will also be marginally food
insecure.
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The questions that characterize food hardship are summarized in table 2.1. Ex-
amples of questions include “We worried whether our food would run out before we
got money to buy more.” (the least severe); “In the last 12 months, did you lose
weight because there wasn’t enough money for food?”; or the most severe, “In the
last 12 months did any of the children ever not eat for a whole day because there
wasn’t enough money for food?” These questions are designed to assess a spectrum of
food hardship ranging from stress about the adequacy of food, to monetary concerns
associated with food costs, to the lack of meals for members of the family. Each of
these questions is also qualified by the stipulation that the food insecure condition
be a result of lack of funds, rather than some other reason for the reported hardship.
The questions are designed to assess the impact of household financial conditions on
the general adequacy of food.
Figure 2.1 shows response rates to these questions over time. What is immediately
apparent is that response rates to questions indicating food hardship for adults are
much higher than those indicating food hardship among children. The first panel of
figure 2.1 demonstrates that many households worried about their ability to maintain
adequate food in the household (questions 1-3). From 2008 onward, between 16-20
percent of households worried they would run out of money for food, while roughly
15% of households ran out of money for food or could not afford to eat balanced
meals. A smaller portion of households had to reduce their food intake due to lack of
sufficient funds for food (questions 4-10).
The second panel of figure 2.1 shows that less than 1% of households with children
were forced to reduce food intake for children (questions 14-18). However, children
were not completely insulated from food hardship, with around 4-6% of households
with children forced to reduce the quality of meals for children, and 3-4% of house-
holds with children unable to feed the children balanced meals. Taken together,
these questions show that many households experience many different kinds of food
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hardship.
The reforms of the ACA were not designed to directly address food hardship,
rather, they focused on decreasing the population of uninsured individuals through
the expansion of Medicaid to those below 133% of the federal poverty line (FPL),
decreasing the cost of healthcare through additional subsidies, and improving the
continuity and quality of care received through new regulations. Health insurance
exchanges were established in order to provide a statewide marketplace where con-
sumers could compare competing health plans. Individual mandates required that all
individuals obtain a minimum standard of health insurance, and employer mandates
required employers with more than 50 employees offer insurance coverage that meets
minimum requirements. New regulations were put into place that addressed the price
and types of services insurance plans covered, as well as changing how insurance
companies delivered and charged for care.
States that expanded Medicaid coverage received additional subsidies from the
federal government for doing so, and also had more control over the operation of
the state-run health exchanges. Prior to the ACA, the income limit for Medicaid
eligibility was 100% FPL. The ACA mandated that those less than 133% FPL1 be
eligible for Medicaid, expanding the population of potential beneficiaries. However,
the Supreme Court ruled in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius
in 2012 that mandated Medicaid expansions were unconstitutional, and allowed states
to opt out of the expansions. Twenty four states and the District of Columbia enacted
Medicaid expansion on January 1, 2014. Subsequently, 7 states expanded Medicaid
1The law also proposes a 5% income disregard, making the effective income eligibility limit 138%
FPL. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services classify the limit as 133% FPL, which I will
follow in this paper.
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in later years.2 Figure 2.2 shows the cross-state and over time variation in Medicaid
expansion. Many states on the East and West Coast, as well as Midwestern states,
chose to expand Medicaid, while many Southern states did not. However, some
Southern states like Kentucky, West Virginia, Arkansas, and Louisiana did choose to
expand Medicaid, while some coastal states, like Maine, chose not to, showing the
expansion decision was not exclusively regional. These reforms all attempt to reduce
the burden of healthcare costs by moderating the price of healthcare and increasing
healthcare coverage.
Evidence suggests that the ACA has increased coverage, and benefited individuals
who were targeted by the ACA. Black and Cohen (2015) find that not only has
the number of uninsured decreased after the implementation of the ACA, but also
states that expanded Medicaid saw larger decreases in the uninsured population.
Courtemanche et al. (2017) also find that the ACA increased coverage, and note that
coverage increased through both public and private markets. Some evidence suggests
that the expansion of Medicaid may have crowded out private insurance (Wagner,
2015). Still, the broad impact seems to be that the ACA increased coverage across
the population, not only amongst low-income individuals, with overall improvements
in health and access (Antwi et al., 2015; Sommers et al., 2012). Hu et al. (2016)
have shown the ACA contributed to the financial security of individuals in Medicaid
expansion states, decreasing levels of debt and enabling individuals to meet other
financial obligations. With evidence suggesting small (if any) negative impacts on
employment (Garrett and Kaestner, 2014), and overall decreases in the amount of
resources individuals need to devote to healthcare, the ACA could have a potentially
large impact on food insecurity by changing the consumer’s budget set.
2Michigan (4/1/2014), New Hampshire (8/15/2014), Pennsylvania (1/1/2015), Indiana
(2/1/2015), Alaska (9/1/2015), Montana (1/1/2016), and Louisiana (7/1/2016). The election of
Matt Bevin as governor of Kentucky has prompted the state to discuss dismantling the Medicaid
expansion in place.
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Figure 2.3 shows average food insecurity across states in 2012-2013 and 2014-
2015, immediately before and after the ACA Medicaid expansions. In 2013, no states
had expanded Medicaid, while by 2015, all but two states that ultimately expanded
Medicaid had done so. After expanding Medicaid, four states worsened with regard to
food insecurity (Alaska, Indiana, New Jersey, and New Mexico), while many others
improved. Many states that did not expand Medicaid saw improvements in food
insecurity; however, states like Alabama, Nebraska, Maine, and South Carolina saw
increases in food insecurity, while others such as Louisiana (which did not expand
Medicaid until 2016), Mississippi, and Georgia, saw no change in food insecurity,
leaving many residents without access to sufficient food. While the maps are far from
definitive regarding the relationship between public healthcare and food insecurity,
they do provide some context for further analysis of how healthcare subsidies may
affect food insecurity.
Figures 2.5-2.7 present a simple budget constraint analysis to provide intuition
about the effect of Medicaid subsidies on food consumption, and how participation in
SNAP may affect these outcomes. I assume convex preferences that can be well repre-
sented by a generic utility curve. Figure 2.5 shows how consumption of both food and
all other goods (which includes medical care) responds to Medicaid benefits. In the
absence of subsidized medical care, a representative consumer would consume some
mix of both food and other goods, here represented by (F0, G0). The introduction of
public health insurance guarantees some base level of medical care, creating a kink
in the budget set represented by point D. This causes an outward shift in the budget
set, resulting in an increase in consumption of both food and other goods. Figure 2.6
shows the analogous shift in the budget set from the introduction of SNAP benefits.
Once again, we see that the SNAP subsidy increases consumption of both food and
other goods.
Figure 2.7 depicts an individual receiving both Medicaid and SNAP subsidies.
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In the depicted scenario, consumption of both food and other goods increase from
(F0, G0) to (F3, G3). These three figures show how the introduction of Medicaid ben-
efits may increase consumption of food, thereby reducing food insecurity. However, I
also show that the increase in consumption may not be the same for all Medicaid ben-
eficiaries. If an individual does not receive SNAP benefits, they consume the bundle
(F1, G1) after the expansion of benefits. Individuals participating in SNAP consume
(F3, G3), which is not necessarily, or likely, equal to (F1, G1).
In each of these scenarios, it may be possible that the subsidies do not increase
the consumption of either other goods or food. For example, Medicaid or SNAP
subsidies may simply result in an increase in other goods consumed, with no change in
food consumption. If subsidies do not increase food consumption, this suggests that
the individual does not desire additional food, and that the individual in unlikely
to be food insecure. This is unlikely to be the case for SNAP recipients; Hoynes
et al. (2015) show that, in the case of SNAP, most consumers are inframarginal,
consuming more than the cash value of benefits, indicating consumption at any point
Fj < F0 (including point E) unlikely after receiving the SNAP subsidy. Moreover,
Beatty and Tuttle (2014) show that increases in SNAP benefits from the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 resulted in more spending than even typical
theory suggests. Medicaid subsidies have been shown to increase the consumption
of medical care (Wherry and Miller, 2016), however, the link between Medicaid and
food consumption is not as clear, thus, I will explore whether the ACA has increased
the consumption of food. Finally, it may be the case that the addition of subsidies
changes preferences for food or other goods, resulting in a change in the marginal
rate of substitution and the shape of the indifference curves, which could also result
in no increase in food consumption.
The goal of this paper is to disentangle the effect of ACA Medicaid expansion
alone and the effect of ACA Medicaid expansion for individuals also participating in
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SNAP. This paper fits into the small literature examining the issues associated with
the interaction of non-food programs and food insecurity, alongside Borjas (2004) who
examines the impact of welfare reform on food insecurity, and Schmidt et al. (2015),
who simulate eligibility for many programs, including Medicaid, to determine the
effect of cash benefits on food insecurity. Identifying this interaction is difficult. There
is a large literature on the effect of nutrition programs on food insecurity; however,
reverse causality between SNAP and food insecurity can often severely bias estimates.
Overall, after controlling for the endogeneity associated with reverse causality, results
suggest that SNAP reduces food insecurity and improves the health outcomes of
recipients (Hoynes et al., 2016; Gregory et al., 2015; Hoynes and Schanzenbach, 2015;
Gundersen and Ziliak, 2014; Yen, 2010). To understand how the ACA interacts with
traditional food programs, I control for the the endogeneity of SNAP. Similar to
Borjas (2004), I employ a two stage control function strategy that accounts for the
endogeneity of all interactions of the ACA and SNAP.
2.3 Model
2.3.1 Ordered Probit
Most studies that examine food hardship consider only the most widely reported
category, food insecurity. However, it is not immediately apparent that the ACA
should have similar effects across the distribution of food insecure households. More-
over, figure 2.3 suggests differential food insecurity rates across states that expanded
Medicaid, with some states showing much larger decreases in food insecurity than
others. Thus, I begin by analyzing how the ACA affected the probability a household
falls within the mutually exclusive categories of marginally food secure, low food se-
cure, and very low food secure. By establishing an ordering, I’m able to see how the
ACA might move families along the distribution of food insecurity.
These categories represent increased levels of food hardship, with very low food
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security being more severe than low food security, both of which are more severe
than being marginally food secure. I employ an ordered probit model that uses these
categories as thresholds. My primary specification is
Food Rank∗ijt = β1ACAjt + β2SNAPijt + β3(ACA× SNAP)ijt
+X ′ijtβ4 + δt + δj + ηijt
(2.1)
where, Food Rank∗ijt is a latent variable representing where a household falls on the
food security spectrum. As Food Rank∗ijt crosses some unknown thresholds αl, food
hardship increases such that for Food Rank∗ijt < α0 the household is fully food secure,
α0 < Food Rank∗ijt ≤ α1 the household is marginally food secure, and so on. I let
Food Rank∗ijt ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, and define Food Rank∗ijt below.
Food Rank∗ijt =

0 if Fully Food Secure
1 if Marginally Food Secure
2 if Low Food Secure
3 if Very Low Food Secure
(2.2)
Thus, Food Rank∗ijt describes household i’s food security status in state j at time
t, δj, δt are state and year fixed effects, and Xijt is a vector of state and household
demographic characteristics shown to impact food insecurity, including gender, house-
hold size, number of children, marital status, age, age squared, disability status, race,
education, urban/rural status, number of Medicaid beneficiaries in the state, gover-
nor party affiliation, the natural log of the 50/10 income ratio, the 25th percentile
of income, and the unemployment rate (Ziliak, 2015; Gundersen and Ribar, 2011;
Bartfeld and Dunifon, 2006; Bhattacharya et al., 2004).
Since implementation of the ACA took place at different times across different
states, I estimate a continuous measure of the proportion of the year a state had
Medicaid reform implemented (ACAjt). This variable holds at zero for states such as
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South Carolina which never implement Medicaid reform, is a 1 for 2014 onward for
states such as Kentucky who implement Medicaid reform at the beginning of 2014,
and is some positive fraction for the remaining states. To more accurately capture
the treatment population, I limit the impact of the ACA to only those less than 185%
of the federal poverty line (FPL). While the ACA extends coverage to those less than
133% of the FPL, special SNAP eligibility requirements for the elderly and disabled,
along with provisions for broad based categorical eligibility, make this threshold less
clear.3 This results in an intention to treat estimate, with identification coming from
cross-state and over time variation of Medicaid expansion, framed as a triple difference
specification.
SNAPijt is a dichotomous measure of SNAP participation, equal to one if the
household participates in SNAP and zero otherwise. Reverse causality between SNAP
and food insecurity is a significant issue. Bitler (2015) notes that SNAP use is corre-
lated with observable characteristics regarding health, but also unobserved character-
istics such as innate health, health habits, and general self-care that researchers may
not observe in the data. Prima facie evidence often seems to suggest that SNAP ac-
tually increases food insecurity, a result of significantly biased estimates. It is highly
unlikely that there is some underlying propensity for food insecurity amongst SNAP
recipients, rather, it is more likely that those with strong needs seek food assistance.
There have been a variety of approaches to control for this reverse causality (Gre-
gory et al., 2015; Schmeiser, 2012; Gundersen et al., 2011; Meyerhoefer and Yang,
2011; Yen, 2010; Borjas, 2004). Any method employing matching estimators relies
crucially on matching on only observed characteristics, which does not address un-
observed health conditions. Moreover, the health stock evolves dynamically. This
3The binned income data of the December CPS also makes identifying the 133% FPL threshold
difficult. 185% of the FPL corresponds to the variable hrpoor in the CPS data, and is a more precise
threshold.
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presents challenges in panel settings when trying to account for unobserved selection
via a fixed effects approach, which will be insufficient for addressing time variant
unobserved heterogeneity.
To address the endogeneity of SNAP as a result of this reverse causality, I use
measures of SNAP access and state level measures of benefit generosity to exoge-
nously identify SNAP participation, employing a control function approach. I use
measures of broad based categorical eligibility, fingerprinting requirements, the pres-
ence of online applications (and the ability to sign these applications online), the
presence of vehicle exclusions, non-citizen eligibility requirements, the family specific
SNAP benefit, and the log of the prevailing minimum wage as exogenous identifying
variation. Ziliak (2015) discusses many of these state level SNAP eligibility and policy
parameters, and how they influence SNAP take-up, while Gregory et al. (2015) and
Borjas (2004) use many of these variables (specifically the eligibility of non-citizens)
as key identifying parameters. Letting Zjt be the set of exogenous variables, the re-
quirements for the validity of this control function strategy are that E[Zjtηijt] = 0 and
E[ZjtSNAPijt] 6= 0, or that the policy instruments are both orthogonal to individual
level health investment decisions and correlated with participation in SNAP. Since
these policy variables are set at the state level, it is unlikely that they are determined
by individual level health based decisions, lending credence to the exogeneity of the
policy variables.
I include the interaction of the ACA and SNAP to examine whether the im-
pact of the marginal benefit dollar will differentially affect SNAP beneficiaries vs
non-participants. In this model, (ACA × SNAP)ijt will be endogenous through the
endogeneity of SNAP. I instrument for this interaction with the product of the ex-
ogenous variables and the measure of the ACA. Thus, my first stage regressions take
the form
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SNAPijt = γ1ACAjt + Z ′jtΘ1 + ACAjtZ ′jtΓ1 +X ′ijtΩ1 + δ1t + δ1j + aijt
(2.3)
ACAjt × SNAPijt = γ2ACAjt + Z ′jtΘ2 + ACAjtZ ′jtΓ2 +X ′ijtΩ2 + δ2t + δ2j + eijt
(2.4)
where all variables are defined as above. As noted by Heckman and Robb Jr (1985);
Wooldridge (2002), and Blundell and Powell (2004), to consistently estimate β1, β2,
and β3 in the second stage, the control function methodology also requires the inde-
pendence of Zjt and the first stage error terms, or Zjt ⊥ aijt and Zjt ⊥ eijt. While
the conditions for the consistency of the control function approach are less well es-
tablished for my model, they are likely to follow through. I then save the residuals,
âijt, êijt, and include them in my second stage specification. Thus, the final functional
form of the ordered probit model is
Food Rank∗ijt = β1ACAjt + β2SNAPijt + β3(ACA× SNAP)ijt
+X ′ijtβ4 + âijt + êijt + δt + δj + ηijt
= X˜ψ + ηijt
(2.5)
where the model is simplified to X˜ψ+ ηijt for notational convenience. The functional
form of the ordered probit model implies that the probability a household falls into
food security category l is defined by
Pr[Food Rankijt = l] = Pr[αl−1 < Food Rank∗ijt ≤ αl]
= Φ(αl − X˜ψ)− Φ(αl−1 − X˜ψ)
where Φ() is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The regression
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parameters are obtained by maximizing the likelihood for the ordered probit, which
involves maximizing the product of the probabilities associated with each discrete
outcome. The marginal effects for each associated outcome are defined by
∂Pr[Food Rankijt = l]
∂X˜
= [φ(αl−1 − X˜ψ)− φ(αl − X˜ψ)]ψ (2.6)
where φ() = Φ′().
There may be additional concern about the endogeneity of Medicaid expansion
through the ACA in equation (2.5), however, this concern should be of second order
importance. First, by controlling for governor party affiliation as well as state and
year fixed effects, the endogeneity must enter through time varying, state specific
means that remain un-captured by the changing political climate as controlled for
by gubernatorial party. Next, the large literature on food insecurity establishes the
large biases associated with the endogeneity of SNAP, requiring that addressing this
endogeneity be of primary importance for any estimates of policy on food insecurity.
Since I already instrument ACAjt × SNAPijt with ACAjt × Zjt, β3 is biased only if
E[(ACAjt×Zjt)ηijt] 6= 0, or the interaction of state level SNAP eligibility parameters
and Medicaid expansion must be correlated with both some unobserved propensity
for healthcare expansion and food insecurity. Food insecurity was not the primary
concern of the ACA; the topic is not even mentioned in the text of the bill. For β1
to be biased, Medicaid expansion must be correlated with some unobserved hetero-
geneity that is also correlated with food insecurity. By the arguments above, food
insecurity was not only not a driving force in Medicaid expansion, but any political
characteristics that might affect both expansion and food insecurity would be cap-
tured through controls for governor party affiliation as well as the control function
approach taken with food policy. Finally, the intention-to-treat framework mitigates
endogeneity through Medicaid take-up since all individuals in Medicaid expansion
states are given the same “treatment” value, regardless of actual participation. Thus,
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bias in β1 and β3 resulting from the endogeneity of Medicaid expansion is likely to be
small.
2.3.2 Linear Probability Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences
While the ordered probit model is useful in determining how a household moves
from one mutually exclusive food security category to another, a large portion of the
literature examines the non-mutually exclusive categories of marginally food insecure,
food insecure, and very low food secure. Thus, I also employ linear probability triple
difference (difference-in-difference-in-differences) models, which have the benefit of
relaxing the functional form assumptions of the ordered probit framework. Similar
to the models above, I establish
food insecureijt = τ1ACAjt + τ2SNAPijt + τ3(ACAjt × SNAPijt)
+X ′ijtβ + µt + µj + νijt
(2.7)
where food insecureijt ∈{food marginally food insecure, food insecure, very low food
secure} is an indicator measure of household i’s food insecurity status in state j at
time t, µt is a state fixed effect, µj is a time fixed effect, and all other variables are
defined as above.
The same caveats about the reverse causality between SNAP and food insecurity
hold in this model. Thus, I employ an analogous IV approach as above, instrumenting
for both SNAPijt and ACAjt × SNAPijt. Triple difference specifications also allow
me to examine the effect of the ACA across the distribution of food insecurity, and
allow me to directly interpret the effect of the ACA on falling in to a given food
insecurity category. However, they do not take into account the inherent ordering
of food insecurity outcomes. For example, suppose the marginal effect of the ACA
on marginal food insecurity in a triple difference model is κ > 0. This tells us that
individuals living in states that enacted Medicaid reform are κ percentage points more
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likely to be marginally food insecure.
This result could have two possible interpretations. The first is that the ACA ac-
tually increased food hardship, resulting in more families describing at least one food
insecure condition. The other possibility is that the ACA increased the probability a
household is marginally food insecure by reducing more severe food deprivation con-
ditions, but not completely alleviating food hardship all together. Thus, care must
be employed when interpreting the coefficients in the linear probability models.
2.3.3 Mechanisms
I will consider two separate mechanisms through which the ACA could influence
food hardship. The first, as discussed previously, is increased food expenditure. If
the ACA allows households to reallocate food away from medical expenditure, to-
ward food expenditure, then households may be able to reduce their degree of food
hardship. To estimate this mechanism, I will employ the same instrumental variable
strategy as before, with
Food Expend.ijt = ψ1ACAjt + ψ2SNAPijt + ψ3(ACA× SNAP)ijt
+X ′ijtψ4 + ρ1t + ρ1j + ζijt
(2.8)
where Food Expend.ijt is weekly food expenditure, in dollars, for household i in state
j at time t, ρ1t and ρ1j are the year and state fixed effects, and all other variables
are defined as before. Here, the one exception will be the addition of the bin of
household income in Xijt. Since I am estimating a model of expenditure in (2.8),
failing to control for income could greatly bias results. This model allows me to
directly estimate the change in expenditure due to both Medicaid expansion in the
ACA as well as the receipt of SNAP benefits.
The second mechanism I will consider is the influence of the ACA on SNAP take-
up. Moffitt (2015) notes a large degree of multiple program participation in SNAP and
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Medicaid. Furthermore, Keane and Moffitt (1998) show that there are many costs
associated with participating in safety-net programs. The expansions of Medicaid
through the ACA may induce households to pay some of these costs, such as stigma
and information costs, thereby making participation in SNAP less costly. The receipt
of SNAP benefits, in turn, could reduce food hardship. Thus, I will estimate
SNAPijt = ι1ACAjt +X ′ijtι2 + ρ2t + ρ2j + ϑijt (2.9)
through both a probit and linear probability models, where all variables are defined
as before. Since SNAPijt enters on the left hand side of the equation, I do not have
to employ an instrumental variables strategy, and equation (2.9) takes the form of a
simple difference in differences model where ACAjt is identified through cross state,
over time variation in Medicaid expansion.
2.3.4 Alternative Measures of Food Hardship
All previously described measures of food insecurity estimate the probability a
household falls into a certain category of food insecurity, but fail to take into account
the variability of food deprivation within a given category, and fail to fully utilize
the richness of the 18 question food security supplement. Dutta and Gundersen
(2007) propose new measures that more strongly weight households that experience
severe food deprivation. I consider two measures the authors propose—the food
insecurity gap and the square of the food insecurity gap, which are based on similar
measures utilized in the income poverty literature. These measures are also utilized
in Gundersen (2008).
To compute the food insecurity gap, affirmative answers to the 18 question food
security supplement are converted into a single indicator by the Rasch scoring method,
which measures the probability a household answers in the affirmative depending on
the degree of food insecurity experienced by the household and the extent of food
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insecurity captured by the question. Using this Rasch score, one can create an index
that measures how far a food insecure household is from the food security threshold
relative to the maximum distance from the food security threshold (i.e. answering
in the affirmative to all 18 questions in the food security supplement.) Letting dijt
be the normalized distance from the food security threshold, the normalized food
insecurity gap is measured as:
dijt =

sijt−e
z−e if si > e
0 if si ≤ e
(2.10)
where sijt is the Rasch scoring indicator, which depends not only on the number
of questions an individual answers affirmatively, but also on family structure. The
maxima of the Rasch scores are represented by z, and are 13.03 for a household with
children, and 11.05 for a household without children. e is the minimum value for a
household to be food insecure, and is 3.10 for a household with children, and 2.56
for a household without children. Thus, all food secure households obtain a value of
zero, and all food insecure households obtain a value between zero and one based on
the severity of their food insecurity. The food insecurity gap squared is simply d2ijt.
Since the food insecurity gap measure is directly dependent on the number of
children, including IVs that are dependent on the number of children (EITC rates
and the family specific SNAP benefit), along with the number of children directly,
violates exclusion restrictions. Thus, when modeling the food insecurity gap, I do
not include the number of children in the household as an independent variable. The
regression framework takes the form
dijt = pi1ACAjt + pi2SNAPijt + pi3(ACA× SNAP)ijt
+X ′ijtpi4 + ω1t + ω1j + εijt
(2.11)
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where ω1t, ω1j are year and state fixed effects, εijt is the error term, and all other
variables are defined as above. I also address the endogeneity of SNAP in the same
manner as before.
The final measure of food deprivation that I consider is the additional amount of
money a household would need to spend each week to purchase enough food to meet
household needs, which I term the income gap. This measure directly monetizes
the severity of food deprivation, providing a continuous scale of income to needs.
However, this is also a subjective measure, requiring both accurate assessment and
reporting of the money needed to meet food needs. I model the income gap as
Iijt = λ1ACAjt + λ2SNAPijt + λ3(ACA× SNAP)ijt
+X ′ijtλ4 + ω2t + ω2j + ξijt
(2.12)
where ξijt is the error term, and the definition of variables and the description of the
endogeneity of SNAP are defined as before.
2.4 Data
Individual characteristics, along with food security information, come from the
2001-2016 waves of the Current Population Survey Food Security Supplement, also
known as the December CPS. The December CPS asks all 18 questions in the food
security module, which determines the household’s food security status, with house-
holds placed into varying categories of food hardship depending on the number of
affirmative responses to the questionnaire. These categories are defined above, and
represent a spectrum of food hardship, with marginal food security being the least
severe, and having very low food security being the most severe.
Figure 2.8 depicts rates of food security statistics over time, including marginal
food security, low food security, and very low food security. In 2007, coinciding
with the Great Recession, we see a large uptick in all categories of food hardship.
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All categories of food hardship remain persistently high until approximately 2013,
with around 8.5% of households experiencing marginal food security, 8.5% of house-
holds experiencing low food security, and 5% of households experiencing very low
food security. These rates begin to trend downward after 2013, coinciding with the
implementation of the ACA. Figure A.1 in the appendix details the commonly re-
ported, nonmutually exclusive categories of food insecurity over time, showing similar
patterns as figure 2.8.
Figure 2.9 shows rates of food security by Medicaid expansion status. One of
the requirements for a difference in differences methodology is the parallel trend
assumption for both treatment and comparison groups. Figure 2.9 shows generally
uniform trends for both Medicaid expansion and non-expansion states, validating the
assumption of parallel trends. While it seems that food hardship is generally higher
in non-expansion states, there does seem to be some divergence, especially in low and
very low food security, between the groups in later years.
The December CPS reports the household’s Rasch score, which I use to construct
the food insecurity gap (and squared gap) as defined in equation (2.11). The mean of
the food insecurity gap (squared food insecurity gap) is 0.13 (0.98) for the population
as a whole. Figure 2.10 depicts the mean of the food insecurity gap for different
subsets of households. We see that poorer households have larger gaps, and that
households receiving SNAP benefits and households headed by single mothers have
larger gaps than average. Interestingly, households in Medicaid expansion states have
slightly lower gaps than the national average.
The December CPS also asks questions about average weekly food expenditure,
and about how much more income a household would need to spend each week to
purchase enough food to meet household needs, which I term the income gap. Prior
to 2011, average weekly food expenditure was top-coded at $1,000, while from 2011
onward, the top values range from $400-530. To account for such a large discrepancy,
25
I use only the years from 2011 onward for average weekly expenditure. While this
limits the scope of the analysis, the time frame accounts for a sizable “pre” period prior
to ACA Medicaid expansions, as well as the years post expansion. The income gap
changes top-coding more frequently than average weekly food expenditure, however,
I top-code the entire series at $200 for consistency. In each year, the dollar amounts
range from $1 to the top value. The mean of the income gap is $3.99 per week for the
population as a whole. Figure 2.11 breaks out the income gap by sub-category. Here,
we see SNAP recipients have large income gaps, around $17 per week, with poorer
households and single mothers also experiencing larger income gaps.
Table 2.2 presents weighted summary statistics from the December CPS by Medi-
caid expansion status as well as SNAP receipt. Medicaid expansion states are similar
to states that did not expand Medicaid with regard to poverty, age, education, and
household composition. Individuals in Medicaid expansion states are more likely to
be black, live in a metro area, and experience higher unemployment rates. They
also have higher 50/10 income ratios and the 25th percentile of earnings is higher,
suggesting that middle-income inequality is greater in Medicaid expansion states.
Individuals receiving SNAP are more likely to be black or Hispanic, female, and un-
married. SNAP recipients are also younger, have more children, and have lower levels
of education on average.
To address endogeneity in equation (2.7), I identify SNAP participation with
measures of SNAP access and generosity from the USDA Economic Research Service
SNAP policy database, along with other state level measures of benefit generosity.
The SNAP policy database documents state policy options for SNAP, and provides
these data at a monthly level. While the majority of the data are up to date, the most
recent version of the SNAP policy database contains missing data for some variables
for 2013-2016. I assume missing values take on the value in the previous year, and
if the policy was in effect for a portion of the year, that fraction is represented in
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the policy variable. Means for these instruments are presented in table 2.3. Data
from the University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research are used for state level
economic data, and data on SNAP benefits. SNAP benefits are calculated at the
national level and adjusted for family size and income, resulting in family size specific
SNAP benefits. I use weighted estimates from the Current Population Survey Annual
Social and Economic Supplement (CPS ASEC) to construct the 50/10 income ratio
and the 25th percentile of income for each state and year.
2.5 Results
I begin by presenting the ordered probit results examining the mutually exclusive
categories of food security, using a two stage control function approach to control for
the endogeneity of SNAP. I then present linear probability specifications for the non-
mutually exclusive food insecurity categories while instrumenting for the endogeneity
of SNAP. Next, I present evidence for the mechanisms through which the ACA might
influence food hardship, including both expenditure and SNAP take-up. Finally, I
present other measures of food hardship to assess the robustness of the impact of the
ACA on food insecurity. All models control for state and year fixed effects, individual
characteristics, and all standard errors are clustered at the state level.
2.5.1 Main Results
Table 2.4 presents first stage results from the two stage ordered probit model. Not
all of the exogenous, state level policy variables are statistically significant individ-
ually, but the policy variables are strongly jointly significant, with large F statistics
and p-values for F statistics of 0. Moreover, these policy variables have been shown
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to be predictive in other contexts, as noted in Ziliak (2015).4 This suggests the policy
variables have predictive power for SNAP receipt.
Table 2.5 presents the ordered probit results from estimating equation (2.5), em-
ploying a control function approach. I present coefficients, as well as marginal effects
(at means) for the three mutually exclusive categories of households experiencing food
hardship. Using an ordered probit framework allows me to examine how both SNAP
and the ACA move households from more severe food insecurity categories to less
severe categories. The primary benefit from this framework is that there is no ambi-
guity in the transition from threshold to threshold, with each cut point representing
transition from less severe food insecurity to more severe food insecurity. While not
presented in the table, the coefficients on the first stage residuals are strongly signifi-
cant, with p-values <0.001, confirming the validity of the control function approach.
Column (1) from table 2.5 presents the coefficients from the model. Here, we see
that SNAP reduced food hardship in U.S. households, however, the own effect of the
ACA is positive, small in magnitude, and statistically insignificant, suggesting rela-
tively little impact from the ACA alone. If individuals live in ACA expansion states,
but do not meet the criteria for subsidies, they will be required to pay some form of
premium. This could result in the positive, but small and insignificant own-effects in
the first row. While magnitudes are not directly interpretable from coefficients, we
are able to see that not only did SNAP reduce the probability a household experi-
enced food hardship, but also that this reduction in probability increased for families
living in Medicaid expansion states. This suggests some positive spillover from the
ACA, with households participating in both programs experiencing more gains than
4While these state level policy variables have been used extensively in other contexts, I am
also able to examine them one by one for the validity of their inclusion in the instrument set. For
example, the p-values for the C-statistic for the natural log of the minimum wage are above 0.05 for
all triple difference models except those marginal food insecurity, suggesting it’s inclusion in the set
of exogenous policy variables is valid.
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households treated by SNAP or the ACA alone.
Columns (2)-(4) show the marginal effects at each threshold of food security. These
marginal effects have the same implications as above. SNAP reduced the probabil-
ity a household was very low food secure by 15 percentage points, the probability a
household was low food secure by 16 percentage points, and the probability a house-
hold was marginally food secure by 6.4 percentage points (all statistically significant
at the 1% level). These results also suggest that the impact of SNAP is strongest
for those households experiencing more severe food insecurity, but further suggest
that SNAP alleviates all levels of food hardship, moving households towards full food
security. However, households in each of these food secure categories saw additional
gains from the ACA. The marginal effects of the interaction between the ACA and
SNAP suggest that households participating in SNAP and in Medicaid expansion
states saw an additional reduction of 6.4 percentage points in the probability of being
very low food secure, an additional 6.8 percentage point reduction in the probabil-
ity of being low food secure, and an additional reduction in the probability of being
marginally food secure of 2.7 percentage points. All marginal effects for SNAP and
the interaction of the ACA and SNAP are statistically significant at the 1% level,
and while the marginal effects at the low food secure and very low food secure levels
are not statistically different from one another, both are statistically different from
the marginal effect at the marginally food secure level.
These results suggest large, increasing returns to program participation. Schmidt
et al. (2015) found that $1,000 in additional non-food benefits reduced the incidence
of food insecurity by roughly 0.9 percentage points. While low food security and food
insecurity measure slightly different types of food hardship, a 6.5 percentage point
reduction in the probability of being low food secure is roughly equivalent to $6,500
in additional non-food benefits. The average spending per enrollee in Medicaid was
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$5,7365 in 2014, suggesting that the Medicaid expansions more than doubled the value
of the benefit for SNAP recipients.
Table A.1 in the appendix shows results from a standard ordered probit for refer-
ence. The ordered probit results that do not control for reverse causality with SNAP
show large, negative values for the impact of the ACA, but also large positive values
for the impact of SNAP on food hardship. The two stage control function approach
presented in table 2.5 removes the bias stemming from economic circumstances and
participation in SNAP.
Table 2.6 presents the results of estimating equation (2.7) at different, nonmutu-
ally exclusive food insecurity thresholds. For reference, I present results from OLS
regressions that estimate the impact of the ACA where the endogeneity of SNAP is
not accounted for in table A.2 in the appendix, once again demonstrating the reverse
causality associated with SNAP.
Column (1) shows the impact of the ACA on the commonly reported summary
category of food insecurity. Here, we see no statistical relationship between Medicaid
expansion alone and food insecurity. However, for households who also participate
in SNAP, the ACA further reduced the probability they are food insecure by 14.2
percentage points. In my sample, 53% of households participating in SNAP are food
insecure. This 14.2 percentage point reduction translates into a 26.8% decrease in
the probability a household is food insecure. Thus, program interaction matters, with
increasing returns to program participation for reductions in food insecurity.
Column (2) examines the effect of the ACA on marginal food insecurity. Here, we
still see the impact of multiple program participation as well as increasing returns to
program participation, with SNAP households seeing a reduction in the probability
5http://www.kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/medicaid-spending-per-
enrollee/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,
%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D
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of being marginally food insecure of 28 percentage points on a basis of 74%, or a 38%
reduction in the probability of being marginally food insecure.
This is strongly contrasted with results in column (3), where we see no impact of
the ACA on the probability of experiencing very low food security, regardless of SNAP
participation. However, we see the own effect from SNAP reduces the probability
a household experiences very low food security by 74 percentage points. The large
coefficient suggests that SNAP strongly reduces the probability individuals experience
extreme food hardship, although individuals who leave this category may still be food
insecure. This suggests that at the low end of the food security distribution, SNAP
does most of the work in alleviating food hardship, with little effect from healthcare
programs. These results suggest that the ACA and SNAP assist those at different
ends of the food insecurity spectrum, and also present the first IV estimates of SNAP
on very low food security of which I am aware.
I also report first stage statistics to assess the performance of the instruments. The
Kleibergen under-identification statistics reject the null hypothesis that the SNAP
access measures and state policy variables are only weakly correlated with SNAP
participation. Since I have more instruments than endogenous regressors, I also report
the Hansen J statistic as a test of overidentifying restrictions. Here, the large p-values
result in failing to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated
with the error term at any standard threshold, giving greater confidence in the validity
of the instrument set.
While the results in column (1) coincide with the notions of program interaction,
some of the results from columns (2) and (3), specifically the coefficients on SNAP,
are surprising in sign and magnitude. Taken at face value, the coefficient on SNAP
in column (2) suggests participating in SNAP increases the probability an individual
is marginally food insecure by 33.2 percentage points, even when instrumenting for
SNAP participation. In column (3), the large, negative coefficient on SNAP suggests
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a surprisingly large decrease in very low food insecurity. However, the findings in table
2.5 provide the needed context. Here, it seems that SNAP reduces food hardship at all
levels, but does not completely alleviate it, suggesting SNAP increases the probability
of being higher on the food security distribution (more food secure), and decreases
the probability of being lower on the food insecurity distribution (less food secure).
The key finding of this paper is that the ACA reduces the probability a house-
hold experiences food insecurity, but that these reductions are not uniform across
the distribution of food insecurity, nor are they uniform across the SNAP benefit
population. Tables 2.5 and 2.6 together show the interplay of Medicaid expansion
through the ACA and SNAP. The ACA complemented the traditional food support
system, further reducing food insecurity for those already receiving SNAP benefits.
Furthermore, I show that SNAP moves people up the food security distribution at all
levels.
2.5.2 Evidence on Mechanisms
Previously, I discussed the intuition behind how the ACA might influence food
hardship. In this section, I provide evidence detailing two mechanisms through which
the ACA might increase household access to food. In the background section, I
presented budget constraint analysis that graphically depicts the income effect of
receiving both Medicaid and SNAP subsidies, with the general idea being that re-
ceiving subsidized public health care allows households to reallocate resources away
from medical expenditure and towards food expenditure. Thus, I directly estimate
the effect of the ACA on food expenditure.
When estimating food expenditure models, I limit the analysis to the years 2011-
2016. The reason for this is twofold. First, as discussed previously, the wide discrep-
ancy in the top-coding of food expenditure in the CPS makes comparison with earlier
years difficult. Second, this provides a tighter window around Medicaid expansion to
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analyze expenditure. When estimating food expenditure, I also further control for
the income bin provided by the CPS. While I do not have exact data on household
income, attempting to estimate expenditure without controlling for income in some
fashion could bias estimates. Column (1) of table 2.7 shows instrumental variables
results examining how both SNAP and the ACA influence average real average weekly
food expenditure using the same instrument set described above.
Here, we see that participation in SNAP increases weekly food expenditure by
$164.32, which I consider to be an upper bound on the effect of SNAP on food ex-
penditure. From 2011-2016, the nominal value of the maximum weekly benefit for
a family of four is approximately $160, which is roughly equivalent to the estimate
presented above. The average family size for SNAP recipients in my sample is 3, with
an average maximum weekly benefit of $105.34. Average weekly food expenditure is
$115.93. Thus, the estimated return to SNAP participation is large compared with
sample baselines. However, the instrumental variables strategy results in a local av-
erage treatment effect, meaning the effect may be larger than otherwise estimated.
Beatty and Tuttle (2014) find that the actual food share of the budget changes in re-
sponse to changes in SNAP benefits, resulting in greater increases in food expenditure
than otherwise predicted, consistent with the results presented here.
Column (1) also shows that households in Medicaid expansion states see larger
increases than other households. I find that average weekly food expenditure is $21.63
lower in ACA states on average, however, for households that reside in expansion
states and participate in SNAP, food expenditure is $38.24 higher. This is once
again consistent with requiring premiums for those who do not meet Medicaid income
cutoffs. These individuals may reduce food expenditure to cover premiums (which will
be required for all due to the individual mandate). For those who also receive SNAP
benefits, any income lost due to income will be mitigated through food subsidies.
The increase in food expenditure for SNAP recipients in Medicaid expansion states
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is direct evidence for the mechanism described previously—households residing in
Medicaid expansion states see an additional return to program participation, once
again detailing the complementarities between Medicaid and SNAP. Thus, it seems
that subsidized public healthcare does act as an income shock for SNAP households,
increasing their access to food.
Another potential avenue for the ACA to influence food hardship comes through
the reduction in information and/or stigma costs associated with participating in the
safety net. Columns (2) and (3) of table 2.7 examine whether the Medicaid expansions
through the ACA brought new households into the safety net. For these households,
participation in SNAP (if they were not already participating) may become easier.
Perhaps by participating in public healthcare, these households have learned some-
thing about navigating the safety net, making it subsequently easier to apply for, and
obtain, SNAP benefits. These households might also pay some fixed portion of the
stigma costs, as noted by Keane and Moffitt (1998), making it less costly for them to
participate in SNAP. Columns (2) and (3) show that the ACA increased SNAP take-
up, regardless of using a linear probability or probit model to estimate the impact on
take-up. Together with the evidence from spending, I show two means by which the
ACA might cause the results presented above.
2.5.3 Additional Measures of Food Hardship
I now turn to other measures of food hardship. Table 2.8 presents IV results
estimating the impact of the ACA on the food insecurity gap, the square of the food
insecurity gap, and the income gap as defined in equations (2.11) and (2.12). OLS
results are available in table A.3 in the appendix. Here, I attempt to more fully
utilize the entirety of the food security supplement in the December CPS. Regardless
of whether we consider only the food insecurity gap (dijt) in column (1), or the square
of the gap (d2ijt) in column (2), the results are the same. I find that the own effect
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of the ACA is positive, suggesting that households in Medicaid expansion states are
more likely to be farther from the food security threshold. However, for households
participating in SNAP, the ACA reduces the distance to the food security threshold
by 9.2-10.1 percentage points. I also show that SNAP participation greatly reduces
the distance to the food security threshold by approximately 33-42 percentage points
in both columns (1) and (2). While less conclusive than the results from tables 2.5 and
2.6, these results still suggest there are increasing returns to program participation,
with the ACA and SNAP acting in concert to reduce food hardship.
The income gap provides the benefit of directly monetizing the amount of food
hardship experienced by the household, at the expense of potential increases in mea-
surement error. The question as posed by the CPS asks individuals to opine on the
amount of money that they would require to meet food needs. The hypothetical na-
ture of the question inherently poses uncertainty in the measure. However, in column
(3) I (imprecisely) estimate that the ACA reduces the amount of money a house-
hold needs to meet food needs by approximately $5 per week. I once again show
increasing returns to program participation, with the magnitude of the effect larger
for households participating in SNAP. The coefficient on SNAP is positive. Taken
at face value, this suggests SNAP increases the amount of money a household needs
to meet food requirements; however, the coefficients on the ACA suggest beneficial
effects of Medicaid expansion.
These additional measures are less commonly reported in both the food insecurity
literature and policy debates. However, they still suggest that the Medicaid expan-
sions from the ACA and SNAP work together to reduce food insecurity, and are more
effective as a pair than either alone. While precise identification of these parameters
is difficult, they compliment earlier, more ubiquitous measures of food insecurity.
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2.6 Conclusion
The focus of the Affordable Care Act was to overhaul the American healthcare
system through mandated coverage, subsidized private coverage, reforms in Medi-
care taxes and spending, and significant expansions in the Medicaid program to low
income populations. Gruber (2011) provides an overview of the aims and predicted
consequences of the ACA, documenting many of the challenges associated with assess-
ing the impact of the law. However, he does not consider the impact that expanded
Medicaid coverage might have on food insecurity, one of the largest public health
concerns facing the nation.
Participating in multiple safety net programs is one way households may increase
total resources available to alleviate food hardship. This paper examines the effect
of the Affordable Care Act, one of the largest increases in Medicaid coverage, on
food insecurity. While the primary goal of Medicaid expansion through the ACA
was to increase healthcare coverage across America, I find strong evidence that the
ACA also reduced food hardship across the spectrum of food security, but that these
gains were concentrated among those who also participated in SNAP. I find the ACA
reduced the probability a household participating in SNAP falls into the two lowest
food security categories by about 6.5 percentage points, and reduced the probability
these households were classified as food insecure by 14.2 percentage points.
One consistent implication of the results implies that the ACA had a differential
impact depending on whether the household received SNAP benefits. Despite the
reverse causality between SNAP and food security, demonstrated in this work and
elsewhere, I show that households that both reside in Medicaid expansion states and
receive SNAP benefits experience larger gains in food security than households ben-
efiting from either program alone. Households in Medicaid expansion states see a
45% greater reduction in the probability of being very low food secure or low food
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secure than households participating in SNAP alone. Households that participate
in SNAP and live in Medicaid expansion states see a decrease in the probability of
being food insecure, nearly doubling the impact from SNAP alone. Even under alter-
native measures of food hardship, I consistently find evidence for increasing returns
to food security from program participation; living in a Medicaid expansion state
and participating in SNAP have larger benefits for food security than either program
alone.
Increasing returns to program participation shows that by analyzing these pro-
grams separately, we risk mischaracterizing the benefits of the safety net. Rarely do
families participate in only one safety net program. By receiving multiple types of
benefits, households may be able to redirect resources in ways that compound gains
in resources from a single program. As this study shows, by including multiple benefit
types in our analyses, we may be able to get a more complete picture of where policy
actually bites. This is especially relevant for researchers studying the impact of the
safety net on poverty related issues. By limiting the scope of analysis for safety net
issues, researchers narrow the spectrum of results that might otherwise be present.
Ultimately, this paper shows that public health insurance has benefits beyond health-
care coverage. While access to quality medical care is crucial for the health of all
families, so too is access to food. As many studies have shown, food insecurity can
have large, detrimental effects on health. I show that public healthcare can make
large strides in alleviating health risks posed by food insecurity.
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Figure 2.1: Response Rates to FI Questions
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Figure 2.2: State Medicaid Expansion
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Figure 2.3: Food Insecurity Rates: 2013
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Figure 2.4: Food Insecurity Rates: 2015
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Figure 2.5: Medicaid Subsidy
Food
Other Goods
U0
U1
A
B
C
D
G0
G1
F0 F1
Medicaid Subsidy
Figure 2.6: SNAP Subsidy
Food
Other Goods
U0
U2
A
B
E
F
G0
G2
F0 F2
SNAP Subsidy
42
Figure 2.7: SNAP & Medicaid Subsidies
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Figure 2.8: Household Food Security
44
Figure 2.9: Household Food Security by Medicaid Expansion
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Figure 2.10: Mean of FI Gap
Figure 2.11: Mean of Income Gap
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Table 2.1: Food Insecurity Questions
1 “We worried whether our food would run out before we got money to buy more.” Was that
often, sometimes, or never true for you in the last 12 months?
2 “The food that we bought just didn’t last and we didn’t have money to get more.” Was
that often, sometimes, or never true for you in the last 12 months?
3 “We couldn’t afford to eat balanced meals.” Was that often, sometimes, or never true for
you in the last 12 months?
4 In the last 12 months, did you or other adults in the household ever cut the size of your
meals or skip meals because there wasn’t enough money for food? (Yes/No)
5 (If yes to question 4) How often did this happen—almost every month, some months but
not every month, or in only 1 or 2 months?
6 In the last 12 months, did you ever eat less than you felt you should because there wasn’t
enough money for food? (Yes/No)
7 In the last 12 months, were you ever hungry, but didn’t eat, because there wasn’t enough
money for food? (Yes/No)
8 In the last 12 months, did you lose weight because there wasn’t enough money for food?
(Yes/No)
9 In the last 12 months did you or other adults in your household ever not eat for a whole
day because there wasn’t enough money for food? (Yes/No)
10 (If yes to question 9) How often did this happen—almost every month, some months but
not every month, or in only 1 or 2 months?
Questions 11-18 were asked only if the household included children age 0-17
11 “We relied on only a few kinds of low-cost food to feed our children because we were running
out of money to buy food.” Was that often, sometimes, or never true for you in the last 12
months?
12 “We couldn’t feed our children a balanced meal, because we couldn’t afford that.” Was that
often, sometimes, or never true for you in the last 12 months?
13 “The children were not eating enough because we just couldn’t afford enough food.” Was
that often, sometimes, or never true for you in the last 12 months?
14 In the last 12 months, did you ever cut the size of any of the children’s meals because there
wasn’t enough money for food? (Yes/No)
15 In the last 12 months, were the children ever hungry but you just couldn’t afford more food?
(Yes/No)
16 In the last 12 months, did any of the children ever skip a meal because there wasn’t enough
money for food? (Yes/No)
17 (If yes to question 16) How often did this happen—almost every month, some months but
not every month, or in only 1 or 2 months?
18 In the last 12 months did any of the children ever not eat for a whole day because there
wasn’t enough money for food? (Yes/No)
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics by Medicaid Expansion and SNAP Receipt
ACA No ACA
SNAP No SNAP SNAP No SNAP
<130% Pov. Line 0.75 0.13 0.76 0.15
<185% Pov. Line 0.85 0.22 0.87 0.26
<200% Pov. Line 0.88 0.24 0.90 0.28
WIC 0.29 0.08 0.27 0.08
Free Lunch 0.82 0.36 0.83 0.36
Free Break. 0.81 0.69 0.87 0.77
Age 44.15 50.44 43.99 49.95
High School 0.36 0.28 0.36 0.29
Some College 0.27 0.28 0.26 0.29
College 0.06 0.34 0.05 0.30
Hisp 0.21 0.11 0.19 0.11
White 0.67 0.83 0.61 0.82
Black 0.26 0.10 0.35 0.14
Unemp. 6.86 6.55 6.43 6.05
ln(50/10) 1.63 1.65 1.53 1.54
25th pctile 17010.58 17153.87 16145.02 16252.44
Emp./Pop. 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.46
Num. in HH 3.04 2.48 3.07 2.43
Num. Child 1.06 0.52 1.05 0.50
Female 0.68 0.48 0.69 0.47
Married 0.26 0.53 0.27 0.54
Metro 0.82 0.87 0.74 0.80
Obs. 34,057 422,632 21,365 231,340
Note: Household survey weights used.
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Table 2.3: IV Summary by Medicaid Expansion
Medicaid Expansion Non-Expansion
Broad Based Categorical Eligibility 0.56 0.50
(0.49) (0.49)
Excl. All Vehicles 0.72 0.57
(0.43) (0.49)
Higher Vehicle Exemption 0.03 0.29
(0.15) (0.45)
Requires Fingerprinting 0.23 0.13
(0.42) (0.33)
Child Non-Cit. Elig 0.89 0.86
(0.30) (0.33)
Adult Non-Cit. Elig 0.27 0.06
(0.44) (0.23)
Online Application 0.57 0.55
(0.48) (0.48)
Digital Signiture 0.41 0.49
(0.48) (0.49)
Max SNAP Benefit 3.60 3.56
(1.55) (1.50)
ln(Min. Wage) 1.95 1.87
(0.12) (0.09)
Note: Household survey weights used.
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Table 2.4: First Stage Results, Food Rank Second Stage Dependent Variable
SNAP
(1)
ACA × SNAP
(2)
Broad Based Categorical Eligibility 0.008 −0.004∗∗
(0.006) (0.002)
Excl. All Vehicles 0.002 −0.001
(0.006) (0.002)
Higher Vehicle Exemption −0.002 0.001
(0.012) (0.002)
Requires Fingerprinting −0.003 0.009
(0.008) (0.006)
Child Non-Cit. Elig 0.012 −0.003
(0.012) (0.002)
Adult Non-Cit. Elig −0.002 0.001
(0.014) (0.002)
Online Application −0.001 −0.003∗
(0.006) (0.002)
Digital Signiture 0.007 0.001
(0.007) (0.002)
Max SNAP Benefit 0.017∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.000)
ln(Min. Wage) −0.032 −0.008
(0.027) (0.011)
ACA × BBCE −0.004 0.042∗
(0.010) (0.021)
ACA × Excl. All Vehicles 0.003 −0.016
(0.014) (0.021)
ACA × Fingerprint 0.004 −0.053∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.012)
ACA × Online App. 0.024 −0.083
(0.048) (0.068)
ACA × Adult Non-Cit. Elig 0.051∗∗ −0.084∗∗
(0.021) (0.033)
ACA × Digital Sig. 0.005 0.024
(0.016) (0.019)
ACA × Max SNAP Benefit −0.026∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.005)
ACA × ln(Min. Wage) −0.039 0.212∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.066)
F Stat. 75.4488 3, 145.5295
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Obs. 290,707 290,707
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Household survey weights used. Controls include gender, household size, number of children,
marital status, age, age squared, disability status, race, education, urban/rural status,
number of medicaid beneficiaries in the state, governor party affiliation, the 50/10 income
ratio, the 25th percentile of income, and the unemployment rate. F statistic p-value in
parentheses.
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Table 2.5: Ordered Probit Coefficients and Marginal Effects: Two-Stage
Coeffs.
(1)
Marginal FS
(2)
Low FS
(3)
Very Low FS
(4)
ACA 0.082 0.006 0.014 0.013
(0.051) (0.003) (0.009) (0.008)
SNAP −0.940∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗∗ −0.160∗∗∗ −0.150∗∗∗
(0.230) (0.016) (0.039) (0.037)
ACA × SNAP −0.481∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗∗ −0.077∗∗∗
(0.165) (0.011) (0.028) (0.026)
Obs. 284,804 284,804 284,804 284,804
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Ordering for probit is 0—fully food secure, 1—marginal food security, 2—low food secu-
rity, 3—very low food security. Household survey weights used. Controls include gender,
household size, number of children, marital status, age, age squared, disability status, race,
education, urban/rural status, number of medicaid beneficiaries in the state, governor party
affiliation, the 50/10 income ratio, the 25th percentile of income, and the unemployment
rate
Table 2.6: Triple Difference LPM: IV
Food Insecure
(1)
Marginal FI
(2)
Very Low FI
(3)
ACA 0.030 −0.015 0.058
(0.038) (0.035) (0.038)
SNAP −0.184∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗ −0.743∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.081) (0.079)
ACA × SNAP −0.172∗∗ −0.265∗∗∗ −0.044
(0.086) (0.088) (0.103)
Under ID Kleibergen 27.4528 27.4528 27.4528
(0.0518) (0.0518) (0.0518)
Hansen J 20.9529 23.7661 14.8943
(0.1803) (0.0947) (0.5324)
Obs. 284,804 284,804 284,804
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
P-values in parentheses for first stage statistics. Household survey weights used. Controls
include gender, household size, number of children, marital status, age, age squared, dis-
ability status, race, education, urban/rural status, number of medicaid beneficiaries in the
state, governor party affiliation, the 50/10 income ratio, the 25th percentile of income, and
the unemployment rate
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Table 2.7: ACA Mechanisms
Avg. Weekly Spending
(1)
SNAP Take-Up LPM
(2)
SNAP Take-Up Probit
(3)
ACA −21.628∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗
(10.144) (0.009) (0.033)
SNAP 164.315∗∗∗
(26.972)
ACA × SNAP 59.863∗
(31.171)
Obs. 96,522 290,707 290,707
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Household survey weights used. Controls include gender, household size, number of children,
marital status, age, age squared, disability status, race, education, urban/rural status,
number of medicaid beneficiaries in the state, governor party affiliation, family income
(spending), the 50/10 income ration, the 25th percentile of income, and the unemployment
rate. Years for spending 2011-2016.
Table 2.8: Alternative Measures of Food Hardship
FI Gap
(1)
FI Gap Squared
(2)
Inc. Gap
(3)
ACA 0.069∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.181
(0.030) (0.027) (1.596)
SNAP −0.423∗∗∗ −0.327∗∗∗ 16.683∗∗
(0.060) (0.052) (7.995)
ACA × SNAP −0.161∗∗ −0.173∗∗ −6.921
(0.079) (0.074) (5.005)
Under ID Kleibergen 28.0890 28.0890 27.7125
(0.0439) (0.0439) (0.0484)
Hansen J 17.8778 17.3594 13.6181
(0.3311) (0.3627) (0.6271)
Obs. 194,565 194,565 264,521
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
P-values in parentheses for first stage statistics. Household survey weights used. Controls
include gender, household size, number of children, marital status, age, age squared, dis-
ability status, race, education, urban/rural status, number of medicaid beneficiaries in the
state, governor party affiliation, the 50/10 income ratio, the 25th percentile of income, and
the unemployment rate
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Chapter 3: Fiscal Structure and Program Response Over the Business
Cycle
3.1 Introduction
The funding and administration of the social safety net requires the coordination
and cooperation of many layers of government. The structure of this decentralized
federal system is rarely a topic of popular concern. However, there has been a large
resurgence in interest in how both states and the federal government fund programs
like Medicaid, SNAP (the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, also known
as food stamps), and SSDI (Social Security Disability Insurance). While ultimately
not adopted, President Donald Trump’s proposed budget for 2018 included massive
redesigns of the funding mechanisms for both Medicaid and SNAP, converting open-
ended matching grants, where each dollar of state spending is matched by federal
spending, into fixed federal allotments to states, known as block grants. This desire
to change fiscal structure is reiterated in the Welfare Reform and Upward Mobility
Act proposed by Congressman Jim Jordan and Senator Mike Lee. These large scale
funding reforms echo back to the Clinton era welfare reforms of the Personal Re-
sponsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), where
cash welfare was reformulated from the matching grant entitlement program, Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) to the block grant program, Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).
Fiscal structure is a crucial component of program design, and has a direct impact
on the provision of benefits. Safety net programs provide support to low-income
families, and act as a buffer against the consequences of economic downturns. The
Great Recession of 2008 put unprecedented strain on the modern safety net, with the
national unemployment rate reaching double digits, and millions of jobs lost. These
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lost jobs cost many families their access to medical care and caused enrollment in
publicly provided health insurance and other programs to greatly increase. Cawley
et al. (2015) note that enrollment in Medicaid, which is funded through a matching
grant, increased by 12.6 million, or 33.1% between 2005 and 2011. For SNAP, a
federally funded program with administrative costs shared equally at the state and
federal level, the increase was 9.8 million caseloads, or approximately 88%.1 The total
number of families enrolled in TANF actually decreased by 152,488 families, or about
7%, showing large differences in the responsiveness of programs to business cycles.
In this paper, I explain these disparities in responsiveness by analyzing the role of
fiscal structure. I examine two programs—Medicaid, a matching grant funded pro-
gram, and the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), a block grant
funded program. I examine two specific types of program response. The first is the
overall change in the number of beneficiaries due to a change in economic conditions.
The second is the degree of cross-program substitution due to a change in business
cycle indicators. The first type of response is relatively straightforward. If economic
conditions worsen, demand for program benefits may increase. Moreover, in economic
downturns, states may face pressure to decrease expenditure due to diminished fund-
ing. Block grants provide a set amount for program funding, with a marginal price of
1 to states for every dollar spent above some pre-specified allotment. If the increase
in demand for benefits is enough for states to exceed this allotment, or if states are
trying to reduce overall expenditure, it becomes more expensive to provide benefits
to the marginal beneficiary in a block grant funded program.
The second type of response is a direct consequence of the first type. If provid-
ing benefits through the block grant funded program is more expensive, states may
substitute generosity toward relatively cheaper programs, i.e. matching grant funded
1https://www.fns.usda.gov/pd/supplemental-nutrition-assistance-program-snap
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programs. Since the number of beneficiaries can be affected not only through the
amount of funds provided for benefits, but also from increased demand for benefits
due to poor economic conditions, I estimate both the impact of state expenditure and
the impact of economic conditions (through the unemployment rate) on the proba-
bility an individual receives benefits.
First, I use administrative enrollment data at the state-year level for fiscal years
1999 to 2015 to examine effect of business cycles on program Medicaid and SCHIP
enrollment. I find that block grant funding decreases the ability of public assistance
programs to respond to economic downturns. A one percentage point increase in the
unemployment rate leads to an 8% decrease in the number of beneficiaries per person
enrolled in block grant funded programs, and no change in the number of beneficiaries
per person enrolled in a matching grant program.
Next, I use two-year matched panels from the 2000-2015 Current Population Sur-
vey Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) to examine how business cycles
and state funding affect the probability of enrollment for a given individual. I find
a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate leads to a 0.4 percentage
point increase in the overall probability of being enrolled in a matching grant funded
program, with no change in enrollment probability for block grant funded programs.
I find that a 10% decrease in state expenditure per person decreases the probabil-
ity of enrollment in a block grant program by 0.5 percentage points, and decreases
the probability of remaining enrolled in the block grant program by 1.4 percentage
points. I find little evidence for cross-program substitution due to increased demand
for program benefits, with the unemployment rate not increasing the probability of
transitioning from a block grant program to a matching grant program. However, I
find that enrollment is much more persistent among matching grant funded programs,
and being enrolled in a block grant funded program last period increases the proba-
bility of enrolling in a matching grant program this period 70% more than remaining
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enrolled in the block grant funded program.
These two data sources jointly suggest an important role to be played by fiscal
structure. I find evidence that block grant funded programs struggle to respond in
economic downturns, and that decreases in state expenditure lead to large decreases
in enrollment. I also find that enrollment in block grant programs is uniformly more
variable than enrollment in matching grant programs. This suggests that funding
structure can play an important role in the accessibility and stability of the safety
net over the business cycle.
3.2 Background
I focus on Medicaid and SCHIP as the exemplary cases of fiscal structure. In 2016,
federal Medicaid spending was $350 billion, state spending was $200 billion, with total
spending ($550 billion) equivalent to 3% of national GDP. As of April 2017, 75 million
individuals were enrolled in Medicaid and SCHIP. These programs play enormous
roles in the financing of state governments and the provision of benefits to low income
individuals. Medicaid and SCHIP provide subsidized health insurance to low income
adults and children, especially in times of economic distress. Moreover, Republican
policy makers have been increasingly calling for the reformulation of Medicaid into a
block grant funded program.
Recent policy proposals have placed Medicaid benefits and expenditure in the
public spotlight. While these proposals have called for the reformulation of Medicaid
into a block grant, the idea is far from new. Lambrew (2005) notes that the first call for
reformulation came in 1981 during the Reagan administration, and was re-proposed
by then Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich in 1995, and again by President George
W. Bush in 2003. The primary concern during current and previous debates centers
on the need for guaranteed provision of healthcare to needy populations, such as low
income children, pregnant mothers, the disabled, and the elderly. Lambrew (2005)
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notes two primary reasons for the support of block grant funding, the first being
the federalist structure of block grants, which gives states greater control in program
administration. The second is the ability of block grants to limit the “uncontrollable”
aspects of entitlement programs.
Medicaid is currently jointly financed by federal and state governments through
the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP), which is defined as
FMAP = 1− [ (State Per Capita Income)
2
(National Per Capita Income)2 × 0.45] (3.1)
where income is calculated as a lagged 3 year moving average. Through this matching
grant structure, the federal government finances a minimum of 50% of Medicaid
expenditures, with some states having matching rates of near 3:1.2 If the state has
a severe income shock (as during a recession) relative to the rest of the nation, the
matching rate will increase in response, acting as counter-cyclical funding mechanism.
However, the moving average of income often makes this response slow.
While there have been calls to reformulate Medicaid into a block grant program,
the State Children’s Health Insurance Program was designed with a block grant struc-
ture. SCHIP was created as part of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997; the program
can act independently or as a form of Medicaid expansion, and covers low income
children whose family income puts their family over the income limit for Medicaid
eligibility. State funds spent on SCHIP are matched by federal funds at a higher rate
than Medicaid through a formula known as the Enhanced Federal Medical Assistance
Percentage (EFMAP), which is a monotonic transformation of the FMAP.3 In 2015,
8 states, 5 territories, and the District of Columbia operated Medicaid expansion
2While the legislated ceiling is 83%, matching rates have stayed well below this threshold in
recent years.
3The EFMAP covers an additional 30 percent of the gap between the FMAP reimbursement
rate and a 100 percent reimbursement rate, but may not exceed 85 percent. EFMAP = FMAP +
.3(1− FMAP )
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SCHIP programs, 29 states operated combination standalone and Medicaid expan-
sion programs which combine SCHIP and Medicaid funds, and 13 states operated
standalone programs.4
However, unlike Medicaid, the total funds available for SCHIP are capped through
a block grant, with funding set at only $5 billion per year until 2009. While a
redistribution formula exists to reallocate funds from low spending states to high
spending states, once funds are exhausted, new funds can only be raised through
new legislative action. Thus, while SCHIP is not a standard block grant due to its
matching component, the low level of capped funding coupled with the overall level
of state expenditure guarantees that, at least in recent years, states hit the federal
allotment. For example, in 2016, the federal budget allotment was $14,426 million for
SCHIP,5 but federal spending was $14,445.1 million,6 requiring the federal government
to utilize the Child Enrollment Contingency Fund, a fund created to address funding
shortfalls for SCHIP.
Much of the literature on SCHIP has focused on how the introduction of SCHIP,
or SCHIP expansions, have affected healthcare coverage. Lo Sasso and Buchmueller
(2004) find that SCHIP expansions increase coverage, at the expense of private crowd
out. Crowd out is corroborated by Buchmueller et al. (2005). Leininger et al. (2010)
find that, although there may be crowd out, SCHIP improves material well-being of
near-poor households.
The program parameters are similar between Medicaid and SCHIP, with income
limits and fiscal federalism playing a large role. Table 3.1 shows income eligibility
levels for all states in 2016. Income limits for SCHIP were lowest in North Dakota at
170% of the federal poverty line (FPL), and highest in New York at 400% FPL. In
4https://www.medicaid.gov/chip/downloads/chip-map.pdf
5https://www.hhs.gov/about/budget/fy2017/budget-in-brief/cms/chip/index.html
6https://www.macpac.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/EXHIBIT-32.-CHIP-Spending-by-
State-FY-2016-millions.pdf
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comparison, Medicaid has a mandated minimum eligibility of 133% FPL, and Iowa
had the highest income limits at 375% FPL. Some states have very similar thresholds
for Medicaid and SCHIP, such as Louisiana where the Medicaid threshold is 212%
FPL for all children, and 250% FPL for separate SCHIP coverage. Some states have
a wide gap in coverage thresholds, such as New Jersey, where the Medicaid threshold
is 142% FPL for children above 1 year of age, and 350% for SCHIP.
Cawley and Simon (2005) and Cawley et al. (2015) study how insurance, both
public and private, respond to business cycles, finding children were actually more
likely to enroll in Medicaid as the unemployment rate increased during the Great
Recession, and that Medicaid provided a buffer against declining employer coverage
during a contraction. Buchmueller et al. (2014) find that insurance coverage stability
plays a large part in healthcare utilization among children, and that those children
who transition to public insurance have higher rates of utilization than those who
transition to no insurance, suggesting the counter cyclicality of Medicaid provides
much needed stability for children.
Determining the cause of responsiveness (or lack thereof) can be difficult. Many
have noted that some programs are more responsive to business cycles than others.
Bitler and Hoynes (2015) and Bitler and Hoynes (2010) both note that non-cash
programs are more responsive than cash programs like AFDC/TANF. McGuire and
Merriman (2006), Ziliak et al. (2000), and Figlio and Ziliak (1999) all examine the
role of business cycles and various policies that might impact the responsiveness of
AFDC/TANF. These papers note that some components of program administration
determine sensitivity to business cycles, but the large differences that exist across
these programs make it difficult to pin down the exact mechanism driving respon-
siveness.
Fiscal structure could potentially explain a large degree of the disparity in program
response, with the difference in fiscal structure between Medicaid and SCHIP creating
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two important differences in the way programs respond to business cycles. The first
is the difference in the provision of benefits during economic downturn. Ribar and
Wilhelm (1999) examine the implications of block grants for cash benefits, and find
only small changes in the overall level of benefits. In contrast, Marton and Wildasin
(2007a) and Chernick (1998) predict large changes in overall benefits resulting from
fiscal structure. Chernick (1998) estimates that the change in fiscal structure could
reduce overall benefits from 15-30%.
States can change Medicaid and SCHIP benefits in a few ways. States are federally
required to cover “mandatory benefits” to qualify for federal support, with some
leeway in the type, amount, duration, and scope of services.7 Cardwell et al. (2014)
provide an overview of different state SCHIP programs, and note that 38 states and
the District of Columbia provided similar benefits to Medicaid. States can change
the types of services that are covered and rates of publicly provided coinsurance to
alter the bundle of medical goods recipients consume.
States can also change the level of benefits by adjusting the number of bene-
ficiaries through program parameters. For SCHIP, states can limit the number of
recipients by introducing waiting periods for benefits, enrollment caps, or requiring
premiums. While waiting periods have become increasingly uncommon, 37 states
imposed waiting periods for SCHIP benefits in 2013.8 Hill et al. (2007) note that
seven states introduced enrollment caps during the recession of the early 2000s, but
maintenance of effort requirements do not allow the implementation of new SCHIP
enrollment caps. While waiting periods and enrollment caps are not permitted in
Medicaid without a waiver, states can limit the number of recipients through restric-
tions in the eligibility thresholds (states can do this for SCHIP as well). However,
7https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-information/by-topics/benefits/medicaid-
benefits.html
8https://www.macpac.gov/subtopic/key-design-features/
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this makes it more difficult for states to directly impact the number of Medicaid re-
cipients. States cannot require premiums in Medicaid without a waiver, however, in
2013, 33 states required SCHIP premiums, often tied to family income, ranging from
around $10-$30 per month.9 Recently, states have been permitted to request waivers
for work requirements for Medicaid benefits. CMS has approved a work requirement
waiver for Kentucky, with nine other states submitting work requirement proposals.10
The second difference in the way provision of program benefits could change due
to fiscal structure and business cycle pressure is cross-program substitution. Mar-
ton and Wildasin (2007b) predict that the additional constraints placed on states by
block grant funding might give rise to cross-program substitution, substituting toward
greater generosity in programs funded through a matching component. Schmidt and
Sevak (2004) find empirical evidence of cross-program substitution for cash welfare
and Supplemental Security Income due to the reformulation of cash welfare. Cal-
samiglia et al. (2013) suggest that the way states respond to fixed levels of federal
funding could have a large impact on overall social welfare.
Cross-program substitution has already been shown with Medicaid and SCHIP in
other contexts. Kenney et al. (2006) and Marton (2007) thoroughly document how
the introduction of premiums in SCHIP programs not only reduced enrollment in
SCHIP, but also encouraged transition into Medicaid. The introduction of premiums
in SCHIP increased the probability of subsequent Medicaid take-up ranging from
0.68% to 7% (Kenney et al., 2007; Marton and Talbert, 2010; Marton et al., 2010).
Clemens and Ippolito (2017) provide a modern exploration of the effect of fiscal
structure on the state financing of Medicaid, explicitly examining how block grant
funding might impact public health insurance. The authors compare the current
9https://www.macpac.gov/subtopic/key-design-features/
10AR, AZ, IN, KS, ME, NH, UT, and WI. https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/medicaid-
and-work-requirements-new-guidance-state-waiver-details-and-key-issues/
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matching grant fiscal structure with three different block grant style financing struc-
tures: a status-quo block grant, a uniform need-based grant, and per-beneficiary
allotments. The latter two differ from traditional block grants by incorporating mech-
anisms to increase program responsiveness during recessions. With the uniform need-
based grant, funds can be redistributed across states based on a need-based income
scaling factor (this is similar to the redistribution formula used in SCHIP). The per-
beneficiary allotment has a counter-cyclical mechanism by its very nature; the level
of funding increases as the number of beneficiaries increases. The authors simulate
Medicaid responsiveness to business cycles across regimes, and even incorporate addi-
tional federal intervention to provide additional counter-cyclical support in the form
of a scaling factor based on deviations from the natural rate of unemployment. They
find that without additional counter-cyclical mechanisms, many states would require
large increases in state expenditure to maintain current levels of overall spending.
Even with the additional scaling factor, overall federal funding decreases, requiring
additional state level expenditure.
Clemens and Ippolito (2017) make two especially relevant points about the im-
plications of switching Medicaid from a matching grant to a block grant. (1) The
overall level of federal funding decreases, and (2) that many states face large funding
shortfalls that must be made up from own-revenue sources. The authors, however,
place relatively little emphasis on the impact on beneficiaries, leaving the question
of the effect on overall benefits unanswered. Moreover, much of their analysis hinges
on the idea that the federal government would consider additional counter-cyclical
mechanisms to support Medicaid. If 20 years of evidence from TANF financing is
any indication, not only is additional support highly unlikely (although funding did
increase during the Great Recession), even inflation-adjusted increases in expenditure
are off the table. Taken together, these facts suggest that there might be large, nega-
tive consequences for beneficiaries, especially in states where budgetary pressures are
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strongest.
This paper then answers the other question suggested by Clemens and Ippolito
(2017); if state budgets are sensitive to the fiscal structure of assistance programs,
what is the overall impact for beneficiaries? This question builds on the literature
describing the effect of business cycles on the safety net by examining a specific mech-
anism that determines program responsiveness—fiscal structure. Thus, it also con-
tributes to the literature examining the role of fiscal structure for safety net programs,
and provides one of only a few modern empirical assessments. Finally, by utilizing
public health insurance as the demonstrative programs, this paper also contributes to
the literature describing the implications surrounding the provision of public health
insurance during recessions.
3.3 Model
3.3.1 A Simple Model of State Health Care Expenditures
I examine the differential response of block grant and matching grant programs by
comparing SCHIP and Medicaid. Ideally, I would be able to compare all safety net
programs while controlling for funding structure, or look within a given program for
quasi-experimental variation that would allow me to identify the impact of funding.
Practically, the large differences in program benefits, administration, and benefit
populations make this comparison infeasible. The second alternative is to compare
individuals across programs with differing funding structures, which has been done
in some theoretical applications. Empirically, the difficulty in identifying the impact
is much the same as looking within a program. Vast differences exist not only in the
type of benefits provided by different programs, but also among recipients and the
reasons they apply for assistance in the first place. Thus, an empirical comparison of
a block grant funded program like TANF with a matching grant funded program like
Medicaid would fail to adequately control for these differences. Utilizing SCHIP and
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Medicaid allows me to mitigate some of these concerns due to the similarity of the
programs.
I present a simple model to provide intuition for differential response, derived
from Gramlich et al. (1982). The state chooses taxes and expenditure on Medicaid
and SCHIP to maximize the utility of the representative voter subject to the state’s
budget constraint.
max
t,Em,Es
U((1− t)y, α(Em + Es)) (3.2)
s.t.
Gs + tY = (1− FMAP )Em + Es (3.3)
Where the voter derives utility from disposable income, (1 − t)y, and the overall
level of benefits provided for public healthcare, represented by total expenditure on
Medicaid and SCHIP, (Em+Es) (with utility weight α). The state’s budget constraint
is defined by Y , state income, t, a proportional tax rate encompassing federal and
state taxes, and Gs, a block grant for SCHIP benefits. Here, I simplify the model so
that the state pays some fixed fraction of healthcare costs Ei for both Medicaid and
SCHIP recipients. Taxpayers pay the unmatched portion of expenditure on Medicaid,
(1− FMAP )Em, but also finance the federal share through taxes t.
Rather than explicitly modeling the nature of program benefits, I simplify the
model with the state choosing program expenditure, which approximates how states
allocate resources across programs. This term should be viewed as average expendi-
ture across program beneficiaries. Ultimately, the state chooses some average level of
expenditure as a function of benefits and recipients and pays the unmatched portion.
This expenditure term captures not only average expenditure, but average generosity
as well. In this formulation, the state has no incentive to spend less than the block
grant on SCHIP since U(·)Es > 0, thus Es ≥ Gs. After the state has reached the
block grant allotment, the state will spend the marginal dollar on SCHIP if
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U((1− t)y, α(Em + Es + ))− (1− FMAP )Em −  >
U((1− t)y, α(Em + + Es))− (1− FMAP )(Em + )
(3.4)
meaning the utility, less costs for additional expenditure, , on SCHIP outweighs the
utility, less costs, for expenditure on Medicaid. Since the utility weights are the same
for both SCHIP and Medicaid in (3.2), (3.4) simplifies to
−(1− FMAP )Em −  > −(1− FMAP )(Em + )
implying
FMAP < 0 (3.5)
or that the federal government charges states to provide Medicaid benefits rather
than subsidizing them. Thus, the state ends up at a corner solution, where the full
allotment of the block grant for SCHIP is spent, and each additional dollar the state
spends is directed toward Medicaid rather than SCHIP.
Suppose then that the state receives an economic shock, such that the demand
for public health care benefits increases. As the block grant for SCHIP financing is
exhausted, the state has the incentive to reduce expenditure on SCHIP such that
Es = Gs. This implies that there is increased pressure to reduce the number of
enrollees in SCHIP, and increase the number of enrollees in Medicaid, with potential
for cross-program substitution, where children leave SCHIP rolls for Medicaid rolls.
This result is the key theoretical prediction of this paper. Since the marginal cost
of providing benefits is lower for matching grant programs (assuming block grant
programs have exhausted the pre-allotted funding), states prefer to provide benefits
through matching grant programs during tough economic conditions.
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3.3.2 Empirical Model
I will utilize two classes of models to analyze fiscal structure. The first set examine
outcomes at the state level, looking at overall levels of enrollment across states. These
models have the benefit of analyzing aggregate trends, and avoid attenuation bias that
may result from individual under-reporting. However, I am limited in the number
of factors I am able to control for that might determine benefit take-up. I examine
the responsiveness of SCHIP and Medicaid to the unemployment rate. Here, an
increase in the unemployment rate represents a negative economic shock, and has
been shown to be predictive of insurance status (Cawley and Simon, 2005). I estimate
two equations of the form
ln
( Medicaidjt
Populationjt
)
= β1Unempjt +Xβ2 + µ1j + µ1t + ηjt (3.6)
ln
( SCHIPjt
Populationjt
)
= δ1Unempjt +Xδ2 + µ2j + µ2t + εjt (3.7)
where Medicaidjt is child enrollment in Medicaid in state j at time t, SCHIPjt is
enrollment in SCHIP in state j at time t, Unempjt is the unemployment rate, and
X is a vector of state characteristics, including the FMAP, governor party affiliation,
and the growth rate of employment per capita, µj is a state fixed effect, and µt is
a time fixed effect. I also include the number of National School Lunch Program
(NSLP) and National School Breakfast Program (NSBP) recipients per person in
X. Many states use NSLP and NSBP rolls to reach out to families about potential
eligibility for either SCHIP or Medicaid benefits. The state fixed effect controls
for time invariant differences in states such as economic infrastructure that affects
program participation, while the time effect controls for macroeconomic and policy
changes that affect all states equally, such as changes to federal SCHIP or Medicaid
policy. This analysis is similar to estimates on the cyclicality of safety net programs
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(Figlio and Ziliak, 1999; Ziliak et al., 2000; Blank, 2001; Bitler and Hoynes, 2010,
2016).
Where this analysis differs from previous estimates is in the interpretation of the
comparison of the coefficients on the unemployment rate. Equation (3.4) suggests that
the level of benefits for Medicaid should increase relative to the benefits of SCHIP,
implying β1 > δ1 as a direct result of the fiscal structure of these programs. By
using a logarithmic transformation, these coefficients are interpretable as the percent
change in enrollment per capita resulting from a one percentage point change in the
unemployment rate.
The second set of models I consider examine how individuals respond to state
level macroeconomic shocks. These models allow me not only to control for more
covariates, but also allow me to examine the transition patterns of individuals after
they are exposed to these shocks. While equation (3.4) suggests that enrollment in
block grant programs should decrease relative to enrollment in matching grant pro-
gram, it is agnostic about whether these individuals will lose benefits all together,
or whether they will transfer from the block grant program to the matching grant
program. However, there is theoretical and empirical evidence suggesting that some
form of cross-program substitution could result from changing fiscal structure. As
mentioned previously, Marton and Wildasin (2007b) suggest, specifically in the con-
text of public health care, that a change from a matching grant structure to a block
grant structure could result in increased generosity and participation in a matching
grant program. Schmidt and Sevak (2004) examine the impact of welfare reform,
and find that mothers in states that implemented major waivers as part of welfare
reform (which included reformulation into a block grant structure) were more likely
than other mothers to receive SSI benefits. While Schmidt and Sevak (2004) are
unable to directly attribute this increase to fiscal structure, their results suggest that
cross-program substitution may be a result of the way programs are funded. I adapt
67
this approach to an analogous difference-in-differences style framework.
Medicaidijt = κ1SCHIPij(t−1) + φ1Econ Indjt
+ ρ1SCHIPij(t−1) × Econ Indjt +Xξ1 + µ3j + µ3t + ν1ijt
(3.8)
SCHIPijt = κ2SCHIPij(t−1) + φ2Econ Indjt
+ ρ2SCHIPij(t−1) × Econ Indjt +Xξ2 + µ4j + µ4t + ν2ijt
(3.9)
Uninsuranceijt = κ3SCHIPij(t−1) + φ3Econ Indjt
+ ρ3SCHIPij(t−1) × Econ Indjt +Xξ3 + µ5j + µ5t + ν3ijt
(3.10)
Medicaidijt = ω1Medicaidij(t−1) + ψ1Econ Indjt
+ γ1Medicaidij(t−1) × Econ Indjt +Xζ1 + µ6j + µ6t + e1ijt
(3.11)
SCHIPijt = ω2Medicaidij(t−1) + ψ2Econ Indjt
+ γ2Medicaidij(t−1) × Econ Indjt +Xζ2 + µ7j + µ7t + e2ijt
(3.12)
Uninsuranceijt = ω3Medicaidij(t−1) + ψ3Econ Indjt
+ γ3Medicaidij(t−1) × Econ Indjt +Xζ3 + µ8j + µ8t + e3ijt
(3.13)
In equations (8)-(13), I consider transitions between three insurance states, being
enrolled in Medicaid, being enrolled in SCHIP, and being uninsured. Since I am no
longer estimating the impact of the economy on overall enrollment, I am able to use
the negative of the natural log of state expenditure per capita (-ln(Exp/Pop)) as an
additional measure of economic hardship,11 as well as the unemployment rate. Using
the negative of ln(Exp/Pop) allows for direct comparison of the coefficient on the
unemployment rate, describing what happens to the probability a child is enrolled in
11In equations (3.6) and (3.7), enrollment is essentially price×quantity, and state expenditure is
essentially price, using expenditure would result in endogeneity issues.
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a given insurance scheme due to a negative economic shock. This analysis extends
on the framework utilized by Schmidt and Sevak (2004).
A priori, the signs of κ2 and ω1 are unclear. These coefficients are measures of
program persistence. If the cost of switching programs is high, one would expect
these coefficients to be positive. κ1 and ω2 are measures of churn. While the direc-
tion of these is indeterminate as well, if one thinks block grant funding might make
participation more tenuous regardless of economic conditions, one might expect the
magnitude of κ1 to be significantly higher than the magnitude of ω2, suggesting sig-
nificantly more churn associated with block grant funding. Program churn has been
shown to not only be costly for states, but also stressful for families that are unable
to rely on the stability of benefits (Mills et al., 2014).
Equation (3.4), along with results from Marton and Wildasin (2007b) and Schmidt
and Sevak (2004), provide predictions about the directions of φ1, φ2, ψ1, ψ2, ρ1, ρ2,
γ1 and γ2. From equation (3.4), a negative economic shock should reduce enrollment
SCHIP relative to Medicaid. Thus φ1 > φ2 and ψ1 > ψ2. If cross-program substitu-
tion exists, ρ1 and γ2 should be less than zero, and ρ2 and γ1 should be greater than
zero.
Cawley and Simon (2005) and Cawley et al. (2015) show that enrollment in public
health insurance should buffer a child from economic hardship. This suggests that
κ3, ρ3, ω3, and γ3 should all be negative. As economic conditions worsen, individuals
already receiving public health insurance should be relatively insulated with regard to
healthcare. Thus, while direction of the coefficients on the direct impact of business
cycles, φ3 and ψ3 are indeterminate, the coefficients should play a small role in the
probability of being uninsured.
Finally, I simplify the transitions framework into a switching model, which ex-
amines only how children switch between Medicaid and SCHIP in times of economic
hardship.
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∆Pijt = pi1Medicaidij(t−1) + pi2SCHIPij(t−1) + pi3Econ Indjt
+ pi4Medicaidij(t−1) × Econ Indjt + pi5SCHIPij(t−1) × Econ Indjt
+Xpi6 + µ9j + µ9t + ωijt
(3.14)
The switching model defines the dependent variable, ∆Pijt, as 1 for an individual who
is in Medicaid in year 1 and SCHIP in year 2, or vice versa. ωijt is the error term,
and all other variables are defined as above. This framework is similar to Ziliak and
Gundersen (2016).
The switching model directly analyzes cross-program substitution due to macroe-
conomic shocks. Similar to the transitions models above, the simple theory and
previous literature on cross-program substitution predicts pi4 < 0 and pi5 > 0, with
the sign of pi1 and pi2 dependent on the innate variability of Medicaid and SCHIP.
The sign of pi3 will be dependent on how the macroeconomy affects public health
insurance as a whole.
The models presented above are useful in that I am able to test aspects of theory
previously inaccessible empirically. I am able to provide a direct comparison between
the implications of block grant funding, which is important due to the difficulty in
isolating the impact of funding empirically. Moreover, by using both the unemploy-
ment rate and state expenditure, I am able to distinguish between increased demand
for benefits due to poor economic conditions, and reduced supply of benefits resulting
from lower expenditure during economic downturns.
3.4 Data
I utilize two primary data sources in this paper. The first is state level adminis-
trative data. Administrative data has the benefit of being the most reliable reporting
of child Medicaid and SCHIP enrollment. While measurement error certainly exists
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in enrollment numbers, they are the official data used by CMS, and have been thor-
oughly vetted. The drawback to these data are that they are aggregated to the state
year level, which does not allow me to control for individual characteristics. Thus, I
also use individual level, self-reported enrollment data. These data are much more
likely to suffer from measurement error, but include demographic characteristics that
allow me to control for variables that might influence enrollment. Moreover, these
data allow me to examine individual transitions into and out of programs.
State level administrative enrollment data for SCHIP and Medicaid come from the
SCHIP Statistical Enrollment Data Systems (SEDS), collected through the Medicaid
Budget and Expenditure System (MBES), the Medicaid Statistical Information Sys-
tem (MSIS), and various reports through CMS. These data characterize the number
of children ever enrolled in either SCHIP or Medicaid for fiscal years 1999-2015 for
all 50 states and the District of Columbia. CMS compiles these data from reports is-
sued by individual states on forms CMS-21E, CMS-64, and CMS-64.EC. Some states
report either no enrollment in SCHIP or no children enrolled in Medicaid. For ex-
ample, in 2003, Tennessee eliminated its Medicaid-expansion SCHIP program, and
re-implemented the program as a Medicaid-expansion standalone combination pro-
gram in 2006. In other cases, the state may have just failed to report enrollment
through SEDS. Some states also fail to report child Medicaid enrollment. States
where either child Medicaid or SCHIP enrollment are not reported are available in
table A.6 in the appendix.
To examine the role of business cycles, I collect monthly, seasonally adjusted un-
employment data, as well as employment and population data, from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics Local Area Unemployment Statistics collapsed to the fiscal year level.
This allows me to match the timing of reporting from CMS to concurrent economic
and labor market conditions in the state. In all specifications, I control for FMAP
rates, which come from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, and vary
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annually by state. By controlling for the FMAP, I isolate the impact of the macroe-
conomy separate from the level of funding. I use data on the number of NSLP and
NSBP participants per capita, as well as party affiliation of the state’s governor from
the University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research National Welfare Database
to adjust for any program characteristics that might be associated with state level
political climate, ensuring I am not simply capturing the effect of overall state level
generosity over and above a fixed effect.
These state level, administrative data provide the most reliable estimates of en-
rollment. Figure 3.2 shows trends in child enrollment for both Medicaid and SCHIP
over a 16 year period. The early years of SCHIP are characterized by low enrollment,
however, by the early 2000s, increased program demand coupled with the state redis-
tribution formula saw a gradual increase in enrollment, with overall enrollment stable
from 2008 onward.
The series for Medicaid seems more dynamic. The early 2000s demonstrate a
strong upward trend in enrollment for children, flattening prior to the Great Recession
(indicated by the vertical line), with the upward trend resuming in the late 2000s.
However, much of the disparity in trend may be explained by the large difference in
the levels of program participation. Figure 3.3 shows that the growth rate of SCHIP
exceeded that of Medicaid prior to the Great Recession, with only a slightly larger
growth rate for Medicaid after the Great Recession.
Figure 3.4 examines raw correlations between the unemployment rate and enroll-
ment in SCHIP and Medicaid. The vertical axis represents the number of children
enrolled in the program as a fraction of the state’s population, while states are ordered
on the horizontal axis by the unemployment rate. Correlations are presented for fiscal
years 2004, 2007, and 2010 in order to demonstrate the lead up to, and peak of, the
Great Recession. No attempt is made to discern cause and effect, with the correla-
tions intended to motivate and anchor further estimates. As noted by McGuire and
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Merriman (2006), examining the variation in macroeconomic conditions will help to
identify the overall impact of block grant funding. The U.S. unemployment rate was
roughly 5.5% during 2004. While December 2007 marks the beginning of the great
recession, the national unemployment rate was roughly 5%, comparable to the early
2000s. February 2010 marks the end of the Great Recession, where the unemployment
rate hovered around 10%.
The top left panel of figure 3.4 shows a strong positive correlation between child
Medicaid enrollment and the unemployment rate in 2004. This suggests that the
matching structure of Medicaid allowed states to meet the demand for public health
insurance in states facing tougher economic climates. The bottom left panel suggests
that SCHIP enrollment was also positively correlated with the unemployment rate,
however, here the relationship is much weaker. The middle panels show a similar
relationship between program enrollment and the unemployment rate in 2007 at the
onset of the Great Recession.
The final two panels show the relationship during the height of the economic
downturn. Here, we can see that the correlation for both Medicaid and SCHIP has
attenuated somewhat. However, while there is still a discernible positive relationship
between the matching grant funded program, Medicaid, the same cannot be said of
the block grant funded program, SCHIP. The final panel seems to suggest that SCHIP
was unresponsive to business cycles during the height of the great recession, where
demand for benefits would arguably be strongest.
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 examine rates of change of enrollment as a fraction of the
population. What is immediately apparent is that SCHIP is, overall, more variable
than Medicaid. This could be a result of the relative youth of the SCHIP program,
which had only been operating since the late 1990s, and had only firmly established
rules for the redistribution of funds in 2000. While figures 3.5 and 3.6 do not speak
to the causes of this variability, large changes in enrollment in SCHIP, both positive
73
and negative, occur much more frequently than large changes in Medicaid enrollment.
However, while states experiencing low unemployment relative to others have multiple
instances of large increases and decreases in SCHIP enrollment, states with high
unemployment rates show very few large increases in SCHIP enrollment. The final
panel of figure 3.6 demonstrates this well. For the 10 states with the highest levels of
unemployment (AZ-NV), 9 saw increases in the number of child Medicaid enrollees,
while only 2 saw increases in the number of SCHIP enrollees.
The second primary data source I use is the 2000-2015 Current Population Survey
(CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement, also known as the ASEC. The ASEC
is also one of the few data sources to distinguish SCHIP enrollment from Medicaid
enrollment. I limit my sample to only children, comparing only those 18 years of age
or younger, since enrollment in SCHIP is limited to children. The ASEC provides in-
formation on age, sex, race, the marital status of adults in the family, the educational
attainment of adults in the family, family size, and family structure. In 2002, the
ASEC incorporated a large expansion in the sample in order to better gauge SCHIP
enrollment. In 2014, the ASEC redesigned income and health insurance questions
or more accurately measure household income and healthcare coverage, breaking the
sample into a traditional representative sub-sample and a redesigned representative
sub-sample. Based on CPS recommendations, for any weighted estimates, such as
levels of enrollment or summary statistics, I only include the sample asked the re-
designed questions to provide continuity with future estimates.
The sample design of the ASEC also allows for some individuals to be tracked over
time. Madrian and Lefgren (2000) document the panel structure of the ASEC. House-
holds are divided into 8 representative rotation groups, where they are interviewed for
4 consecutive months, followed by an 8 month break, and then interviewed again for
4 consecutive months. Since the ASEC is fielded every March, it is possible to match
households interviewed in their first four months in sample in the subsequent year.
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Following the recommended Census procedure, I first match individuals on the basis
of month in sample (months 1-4 for year 1, months 5-8 for year 2), sex, household
identifier, household number, and line number of the individual in the household. I
then check for consistency in race, age, and state of residence. If the race or state
of residence changes, or the age attributed to the record changes by more than two
years (as a result of the staggered timing of the initial and final interviews) I consider
those records unique individuals. This procedure is also used in Hardy et al. (2017),
Burns and Ziliak (2017), Ziliak and Gundersen (2016), and others. This results in
approximately one-half of individuals being observed in multiple years. By observing
individuals across time, I am able to analyze cross-program substitution and conti-
nuity of enrollment in either SCHIP or Medicaid. I drop all children from the sample
who have imputed values for either SCHIP or Medicaid enrollment.
Table 3.2 describes simple transition probabilities across different insurance states
from the matched CPS panels. The rows of the table show what type of insurance a
child had in their first year of the survey, while the columns show the type of insurance
in year two conditional on year one. This means the probabilities in each row sum to
one.
The diagonal of table 3.2 shows a large degree of persistence in all types of insur-
ance, with private insurance being the most persistent. Given that they were enrolled
in private insurance in year 1, children have a 92% probability of being enrolled in pri-
vate insurance in year two. The Medicaid-Medicaid and SCHIP-SCHIP probabilities
are 66% and 43% respectively, with Medicaid being the second most stable insurance
state after private insurance. What is striking is that SCHIP is not only the least
stable insurance state, but SCHIP-Medicaid transitions occur with a probability of
34%, more than any other type of cross insurance type transition. This suggests that
the block grant program is highly variable, and that transitions from the block grant
program to the matching grant program happen with regularity.
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Figure 3.8 shows the weighted number of child recipients for both SCHIP and
Medicaid by year. The weighted number of Medicaid child recipients in the ASEC is
consistently lower than administrative records by approximately 10 million children
per year. This suggests significant under-reporting of Medicaid receipt throughout
the sample frame. This under-reporting is also demonstrated in SCHIP receipt prior
to 2007. In 2007, reported enrollment increases to levels that match administrative
records, but reporting decreases again in 2013. Davern et al. (2009) note that in 2007,
the CPS changed the survey skip pattern for Medicaid and SCHIP questions. Prior
to 2007, people who indicated they were enrolled in Medicaid were not asked about
their enrollment in SCHIP. Beginning in 2007, individuals were allowed to answer
both the Medicaid and SCHIP question. Census documentation seems to suggest
that this skip pattern was re-introduced following the redesign in survey year 2014
(calendar year 2013)12. The nature of the survey questions likely accounts for the
increase in SCHIP response from 2007-2013. This misclassification could potentially
attenuate any results derived from the ASEC (Meyer and Mittag, 2017; Bollinger and
David, 1997).
Table 3.3 presents summary statistics from the entire sample of children in the
ASEC, separated by insurance type. The impetus behind using Medicaid and SCHIP
as the reference example for examining fiscal structure relies on the similarity of
recipients. Columns (1) and (2) of table 4.1 show that children receiving SCHIP are
quite similar to children receiving Medicaid in terms of age, race, ethnicity, sex, and
health status. However, children enrolled in SCHIP are more likely to be in a family
where a family member is married or has a college degree, and are more likely to be
slightly higher in the income distribution. These facts are not surprising, since the
income thresholds for SCHIP are slightly higher than those for Medicaid. Children
12https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/topics/health/health-
insurance/guidance/hlthinsseq.pdf
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enrolled in either public health program are much more similar than children who are
uninsured or insured through some other program, such as private health insurance
or military health insurance. Uninsured children are, on average, older, more likely
to be Hispanic, less likely to live in a family where an adult has a college degree, and
less likely to be below 130% or 200% FPL. Children insured through other means are
more likely to be white, live in a family with an adult who has a college degree, and
live in a lower unemployment state.
One striking difference in Table 4.1 is the disparity in the number of children who
participate in both SCHIP and Medicaid. Children currently enrolled in Medicaid are
20 percentage points less likely to receive both SCHIP and Medicaid during the sample
frame than children currently enrolled in SCHIP. Figure 3.9 shows this relationship
is consistent across years, with only 3% of children enrolled in Medicaid in 2014
switching between programs, compared with 16% of children enrolled in SCHIP. Thus,
while the samples seem to be relatively similar between the two health insurance
programs, the program dynamics are very different.
3.5 Results
In presenting results, I begin with administrative caseload analysis, and then
expand the scope to include individual level participation decisions. I establish a
differential relationship between each program (SCHIP, Medicaid) and the macroe-
conomy. I then establish both unconditional enrollment patterns, as well as transition
patterns between the programs in order to discuss the implications of cross-program
substitution. I also examine individual enrollment decisions in the context of both the
unemployment rate, which serves to measure increased demand for program benefits
due to economic downturns, as well as state level expenditure, which measures the
decreased supply of benefits due to state budget constraints. All models include state
and year fixed effects, and all standard errors for all models are clustered at the state
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level.
3.5.1 Administrative Data
I begin by using administrative data to estimate equations (3.6) and (3.7), with
results presented in table 3.4. Columns (1) and (2) are the year over year correlations
between Medicaid child enrollment (MC) and SCHIP enrollment (SC), similar to
the results in figure 3.4. These correlations show a positive relationship between
both Medicaid and SCHIP enrollment, with a one percentage point increase in the
unemployment rate increasing the number of Medicaid child beneficiaries per person
by 6% and the number of SCHIP beneficiaries per person by 10%. As these coefficients
are not statistically different from one another, this suggests that block grant funding
has no negative consequences for program responsiveness.
However, the inclusion of state and year fixed effects demonstrates a very different
relationship. The fixed effects estimate for Medicaid in column (2) is 0.008 (se=0.010),
and the fixed effect estimate for SCHIP in column (3) is -0.079 (se=0.032), mean-
ing that if the unemployment rate increases by one percentage point, enrollment in
Medicaid is stable, but the number of SCHIP beneficiaries per person decreases by
approximately 8% (column (4)). The inclusion of control variables, including the
FMAP, governor party affiliation, the percent change in employment per person,
NSLP recipients per capita, and NSBP recipients per capita in columns (5) and (6)
does little to change these estimates.
These results are consistent with the implications from equation (3.4). Here, dur-
ing economic downturn, there is no response in Medicaid child enrollment, but a
decrease in enrollment in SCHIP. These results are economically significant, although
only one half the magnitude predicted by Chernick (1998). If I consider SCHIP as
the missing counterfactual for Medicaid child enrollment, I can back out the num-
ber of children that would lose health insurance from converting Medicaid to a block
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grant during times of economic distress. In 2010, approximately 33 million children
were enrolled in Medicaid. An 8% decrease in enrollment resulting from a one per-
centage point change in the unemployment rate would result in approximately 500
thousand children losing Medicaid coverage. Table A.7 in the appendix demonstrates
the sensitivity of these estimates to the inclusion of varying combinations of fixed
effects. Year fixed effects seem to negate all counter-cyclical properties of SCHIP,
while leaving Medicaid strongly counter-cyclical.
3.5.2 Individual Probabilities and Transitions
While administrative data are the most accurate measure of enrollment, they do
not directly address the characteristics of benefit populations for the two programs,
nor do they allow me to characterize the path individuals might take in enrollment
patterns. For example, with administrative data, I cannot differentiate changes in
enrollment from cross-program substitution. Thus, I utilize matched person level
data from the CPS ASEC. All models include controls for race, education, and family
structure, as well as state level variables such as the FMAP, population, minimum
wage, and governor party affiliation, and are evaluated only for children 18 years of
age or less.
Table 3.5 estimates the analog of equations (3.6) and (3.7) at the individual level,
examining the effect of the unemployment rate on the probability a child is enrolled
in Medicaid or SCHIP. Columns (1) and (2) include the entire sample of individuals,
utilizing the data as a repeated cross section and evaluating pooled linear probability
models.
The coefficient on the unemployment rate is 0.004 (se=0.002) for Medicaid, and
0.002 (se=0.003) for SCHIP, meaning that a one percentage point increase in the
unemployment rate increases the probability a child enrolls in Medicaid by 0.4 per-
centage points, and has no statistically significant impact on the probability a child
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enrolls in SCHIP. I consider table 3.5 the individual analog to the results in table 3.4,
showing higher levels of responsiveness for the matching grant program.
To examine the economic impact of fiscal structure, it is useful to contextualize
these estimates. In 2010, 44.5% of all children received Medicaid. This implies the
0.4 percentage point change in Medicaid enrollment translates to a 9% increase in
the number of children enrolled in Medicaid, or 2.97 million children. Thus, the
opportunity cost of block grant funding is approximately 3 million children. Once
again, these results are approximately half the magnitude predicted by Chernick
(1998), but closely mirror the results from the administrative analysis, and confirm
the implications of equation (3.4). These results also provide nuance to the results of
Cawley et al. (2015) and Cawley and Simon (2005), suggesting that the responsiveness
of public health insurance for children to the unemployment rate is driven primarily
by Medicaid, the matching grant program.
Next, I estimate equations (8)-(13) to assess the extent of cross-program substi-
tution. Here, I use the unemployment rate as the economic indicator, with results
presented in table 3.6. Using the unemployment rate measures the increased demand
for public health insurance benefits from economic downturns. Table 3.6 employs
a framework similar to that of Schmidt and Sevak (2004); in columns (1)-(3), en-
rollment transitions are analyzed from SCHIP, the block grant program, to either
Medicaid, the matching grant program, or uninsurance, representing the loss of bene-
fits. The variable SCHIPij(t−1) represents the baseline probability of enrollment churn
(in column (1)) or stability (in column (2)), with SCHIPij(t−1)× Unemp representing
the differential impact of the unemployment rate based on previous enrollment, or
cross-program substitution.
The coefficient on SCHIPij(t−1)× Unemp is -0.002 (se=0.003) for Medicaid, and
0.014 (se=0.005) for SCHIP. This means that a one percentage point increase in the
unemployment rate increases the probability a child remains enrolled in SCHIP by 1.4
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percentage points, and has no effect on the probability a child switches from SCHIP
to Medicaid. Columns (4) and (5) support this conclusion, showing analogous results
for previous enrollment in Medicaid, with a one percentage point increase in the
unemployment rate increasing the probability of transition from Medicaid to SCHIP.
Thus, contrary to the predictions in Marton and Wildasin (2007b), I find no evidence
of cross-program substitution from block grant programs to matching grant programs
as a result of higher levels of unemployment. If anything, I show increased demand
for benefits improves the stability of block grant programs.
However, while I do not find evidence of cross-program substitution, I do find
evidence that the matching grant program is much more stable than the block grant
program, with SCHIP experiencing much higher levels of churn than Medicaid. The
coefficient on SCHIPij(t−1) in columns (1) and (2) suggests that being enrolled in
SCHIP last year increases the probability a child is enrolled in Medicaid this year by
48 percentage points compared to other children (such as children receiving private
insurance, uninsured children, and children on Medicaid). Compare this to the co-
efficient in column (2) which suggests a child enrolled in SCHIP last period is only
28 percentage points more likely to be enrolled in SCHIP this period compared with
other children. This implies being enrolled in a block grant funded program last pe-
riod increases the probability of enrolling in a matching grant program this period
75% more than remaining enrolled in the block grant funded program.
The unemployment rate is the primary metric used in caseload analysis (Figlio
and Ziliak, 1999; Ziliak et al., 2000; Blank, 2001; Bitler and Hoynes, 2010, 2015, 2016;
Clemens and Ippolito, 2017), as well as analysis examining how the macroeconomy
affects participation (Schmidt and Sevak, 2004; Cawley and Simon, 2005; Cawley
et al., 2015). The unemployment rate represents a demand side shock; as the unem-
ployment rate rises, individuals will pursue more safety net benefits to compensate
for lost income. Other demand side shocks include shocks to per capita income and
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the poverty rate. Supply side shocks capture the impact the macroeconomy has on
the ability of states to fund and supply benefits. To measure the effect of state fi-
nances, I re-estimate equations (3.6), (3.7), and (8)-(13) using the (negative) natural
log of state expenditure per person as my economic indicator. I use the negative of
the natural log to facilitate comparisons with the unemployment rate—both sets of
coefficients measure the response to a negative macroeconomic shock.
Table 3.7 shows the impact of both expenditure and the unemployment rate on
the probability a child is enrolled in Medicaid or SCHIP. In column (1), the coeffi-
cient for -ln(Exp/Pop) is -0.028 (se=0.026) and the coefficient for the unemployment
rate is 0.005 (0.002), meaning the probability of enrollment in Medicaid is relatively
insensitive to changes in expenditure, but increases by 0.5 percentage points for a
1 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate. Column (2) shows a very
different relationship for SCHIP. The coefficient for -ln(Exp/Pop) is -0.058 (0.022),
while the coefficient on the unemployment rate is 0.003 (0.003). This implies a 10%
decrease in expenditure per person decreases the probability an individual is enrolled
in SCHIP by 0.5 percentage points.
Comparing these results with those in table 3.5 suggests that Medicaid has counter-
cyclical response to increases in demand for benefits, while SCHIP has a comparable
pro-cyclical response to changes in state expenditure. Thus, not only do block grant
programs fail to respond to increased demand for program benefits, they are also
much more sensitive to changes in funding.
Table 3.8 examines cross-program substitution as a result of changing state expen-
diture. Similar to the results in 3.6, the coefficient on SCHIPij(t−1) in column (1) and
the coefficient on Medicaidij(t−1) in column (5) suggests a high level of churn from
SCHIP to Medicaid, implying higher levels of volatility for block grant programs.
Enrollment in Medicaid is highly persistent and comparable to previous results.
The real distinction between demand and supply side shocks come through the
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coefficients on SCHIPij(t−1)× -ln(Exp/Pop) and Medicaidij(t−1)× -ln(Exp/Pop). In
columns (1)-(3), we see a 10% decrease in expenditure per person decreases the prob-
ability a child enrolled in SCHIP last period is enrolled in SCHIP this period by 1.4
percentage points with no change in the probability a child enrolls in Medicaid, but
increases the probability a child is uninsured by 0.4 percentage points. While this
still does not provide evidence of cross-program substitution, it does imply larger de-
creases in enrollment for block grant funded programs vs. matching grant programs.
It also does not rule out the possibility that these benefits are being substituted for
program benefits outside the model. Columns (4)-(6) suggest a 10% decrease in state
expenditure also decreases the probability a child remains enrolled in Medicaid by 0.6
percentage points, decreases the probability they enroll in SCHIP by 2.0 percentage
points, and increases the probability they are uninsured by 0.3 percentage points.
To address the misclassification bias from the survey skip pattern of the CPS,
I present adjusted estimates for tables 3.5, 3.7, 3.6, and 3.8 in the appendix. The
adjustment process, which controls for the probability of false positives and false
negatives when responding to public health insurance questions, is also detailed in
the appendix. While the adjusted estimates suggest that the results in the main
specification might be slightly attenuated, any bias is likely to be small.
Tables 3.9 and 3.10 estimate the switching regressions from equation (3.14). These
switching regressions are looking only at children who transition between (or remain
enrolled in) Medicaid and SCHIP for two years. Table 3.9 estimates the impact of
the unemployment rate on the probability of switching. These results are similar to
the results above; we see that SCHIP is drastically more variable than Medicaid, with
the probability of transitioning out of SCHIP three times greater than the probability
of transitioning out of Medicaid. I once again find no evidence of cross-program
substitution from demand side shocks.
Table 3.10 does show some evidence of cross-program substitution, and re-affirms
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the volatile nature of SCHIP enrollment. Column (1) shows that the probability of
switching decreases by 20 percentage points for children previously enrolled in Med-
icaid, and further decreases by 2.6 percentage points for a 10% decrease in state
expenditure per person. Column (2) suggests that while SCHIP enrollment is more
volatile than Medicaid enrollment, negative expenditure shocks stabilize the program.
However, when I combine the measures into a single regression in column (3), this
increased stability disappears, suggesting that for negative macroeconomic supply
shocks, Medicaid provides much more stability for children than SCHIP. These re-
sults suggest that block grant funding increases the sensitivity of benefits to state
funding. This follows exactly from the theory. If the marginal cost of benefits is $1
for block grant funded programs, a loss of funds will result in the decrease of block
grant benefits, especially if the states can provide benefits through a matching grant
program where the marginal cost of benefits is less than $1.
3.6 Conclusion
Recent proposals by policymakers have put a strong emphasis on the desire to
reform the fiscal structure of many programs, most prominently Medicaid, by con-
verting them from matching grant funded programs to block grant funded programs.
This desire seems to be a potential answer to increases in program expenditure experi-
enced in recent years, however, it often fails to account for the effect of this reform on
beneficiaries. I present new estimates of the impact of fiscal structure on beneficiary
enrollment, utilizing the similarities in benefits and beneficiaries between SCHIP and
Medicaid to empirically isolate the effect of fiscal structure, something not typically
achievable in previous studies. I present both state-level enrollment analysis, as well
as individual level analysis to examine the transition patterns among beneficiaries.
I find that matching grant funding is associated with much stronger counter cycli-
cal response than block grant funding. Enrollment level analysis suggests that a one
84
percentage point increase in the unemployment rate is associated with an 7.6% de-
crease in enrollment for block grant programs. From fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year
2010, child enrollment in Medicaid increased by about 4 million children. During the
same time period, the unemployment rate increased by approximately 5 percentage
points. Were Medicaid funded through a block grant, this suggests enrollment would
have decreased by approximately 6 million children over this time period, a stark
difference. Individual level analysis suggests a one percentage point increase in the
unemployment rate results in a 0.4 percentage point increase in the probability a
child is enrolled in matching grant funded programs, implying matching grant funded
programs provide strong counter-cyclical support against economic downturns. I find
that block grant funded programs have significantly more churn, and are inherently
more volatile than matching grant funded programs.
I also find that block grant funded programs are highly sensitive to changes in state
expenditure, with a 10% decrease in state expenditure per person resulting in a 0.58
percentage point decrease in the probability an individual is enrolled in a block grant
program. Using estimates from Clemens and Ippolito (2017), switching Medicaid
from a matching grant program to a block grant program would likely result in a 4%
revenue shortfall for states. This would imply a 0.23 percentage point decrease in the
probability a child is enrolled in Medicaid. In 2011, 46% of children were enrolled
in Medicaid (34 million). If Medicaid were converted to a block grant, enrollment
would decrease to 45.77% of children, resulting in approximately 170,000 children
losing Medicaid coverage.
It is also important to contextualize these results within overall policy proposals.
Many of the bills introduced that would convert Medicaid funding to block grant
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funding are also packaged with decreases in the overall level of funding for Medicaid.13
The results in this paper speak only to the impact of the change in fiscal structure,
thus, accompanied by large budget decreases, one should expect the overall impact
of this policy to be much larger in magnitude.
Implicit in the discussion of fiscal structure reform is the desire to curtail spending
on public assistance. While block grant funding mechanically limits federal spending,
it also limits the ability of the safety net to respond to business cycle fluctuations.
The question then is whether, after fiscal structure reform, the safety net is flexible
enough to accommodate potential enrollees during economic downturns, or able to
adjust to decreases in expenditure from state level fiscal shocks. This analysis makes
clear that the discussion around program reform needs to be broadened to consider
how programs are funded, not only overall funding levels.
13Recent proposals by the Trump administration propose cutting Medicaid spending by
$800 billion over the next 10 years (http://www.cnn.com/2017/05/22/politics/medicaid-budget-
cuts/index.html)
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Figure 3.2: Administrative Enrollment by Year
Figure 3.3: Percent Change in Enrollment by Year
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Figure 3.4: Enrollment vs. Unemployment by Year
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Figure 3.5: Change in Enrollment
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Figure 3.6: Change in Enrollment
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Figure 3.7: Change in Enrollment vs. Change in Unemployment
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Figure 3.8: CPS Beneficiaries by Year
Figure 3.9: CPS Switchers by Year
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Table 3.1: State Medicaid and SCHIP Income Eligibility Standards
Children Pregnant Women
Medicaid Medicaid Medicaid Separate SCHIP Medicaid SCHIP
Ages 0-1 Ages 1-5 Ages6-18
Alabama 141% 141% 141% 312% 141% N/A
Alaska 203% 203% 203% N/A 200% N/A
Arizona 147% 141% 133% 200% 156% N/A
Arkansas 142% 142% 142% 211% 209% N/A
California 261% 261% 261% 317% 208% N/A
Colorado 142% 142% 142% 260% 195% 260%
Conn. 196% 196% 196% 318% 258% N/A
Delaware 212% 142% 133% 212% 212% N/A
D.C. 319% 319% 319% N/A 319% N/A
Florida 206% 140% 133% 210% 191% N/A
Georgia 205% 149% 133% 247% 220% N/A
Hawaii 308% 308% 308% N/A 191% N/A
Idaho 142% 142% 133% 185% 133% N/A
Illinois 142% 142% 142% 313% 208% N/A
Indiana 208% 158% 158% 250% 208% N/A
Iowa 375% 167% 167% 302% 375% N/A
Kansas 166% 149% 133% 238% 166% N/A
Kentucky 195% 159% 159% 213% 195% N/A
Louisiana 212% 212% 212% 250% 133% N/A
Maine 191% 157% 157% 208% 209% N/A
Maryland 317% 317% 317% N/A 259% N/A
Mass. 200% 150% 150% 300% 200% N/A
Michigan 212% 212% 212% N/A 195% N/A
Minnesota 283% 275% 275% N/A 278% N/A
Mississippi 194% 143% 133% 209% 194% N/A
Missouri 196% 150% 150% 300% 196% 300%
Montana 143% 143% 143% 261% 157% N/A
Nebraska 213% 213% 213% N/A 194% N/A
Nevada 160% 160% 133% 200% 160% N/A
New Hamp. 318% 318% 318% N/A 196% N/A
New Jersey 194% 142% 142% 350% 194% 200%
New Mex. 300% 300% 240% N/A 250% N/A
New York 218% 149% 149% 400% 218% N/A
N. Carolina 210% 210% 133% 211% 196% N/A
N. Dakota 147% 147% 133% 170% 147% N/A
Ohio 206% 206% 206% N/A 200% N/A
Oklahoma 205% 205% 205% N/A 133% N/A
Oregon 185% 133% 133% 300% 185% N/A
Penn. 215% 157% 133% 314% 215% N/A
Rhode Isl. 261% 261% 261% N/A 190% 253%
S. Carolina 208% 208% 208% N/A 194% N/A
S. Dakota 182% 182% 182% 204% 133% N/A
Tennessee 195% 142% 133% 250% 195% N/A
Texas 198% 144% 133% 201% 198% N/A
Utah 139% 139% 133% 200% 139% N/A
Vermont 312% 312% 312% N/A 208% N/A
Virginia 143% 143% 143% 200% 143% 200%
Washington 210% 210% 210% 312% 193% N/A
W. Virginia 158% 141% 133% 300% 158% N/A
Wisconsin 301% 186% 151% 301% 301% N/A
Wyoming 154% 154% 133% 200% 154% N/A
As of June 1, 2016. Source: https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/program-information/
medicaid-and-chip-eligibility-levels/index.html
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Table 3.2: Insurance Transition Matrix
Medicaidt SCHIPt Uninsurancet Privatet Othert
Medicaidt−1 0.66 0.14 0.08 0.11 0.01
SCHIPt−1 0.34 0.43 0.09 0.14 0.01
Uninsurancet−1 0.19 0.10 0.45 0.26 0.01
Privatet−1 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.92 0.01
Othert−1 0.12 0.05 0.04 0.30 0.50
Note: columns will not sum to one since not all individuals are present in the data for two
years.
Table 3.3: Summary Statistics by Insurance Type
Medicaid (1) SCHIP (2) Uninsured (3) Other (4)
Age 8.10 8.31 9.74 9.38
Black 0.24 0.22 0.15 0.10
Other Race 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.09
Hisp 0.35 0.33 0.43 0.18
Female 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.49
Wic 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
Good Health 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01
Fam Married Flag 0.76 0.83 0.82 0.89
Fam HS Flag 0.85 0.88 0.85 0.84
Fam Col Flag 0.67 0.73 0.69 0.90
# <18 in Fam 2.48 2.38 2.17 2.12
<130 Pov 0.54 0.50 0.44 0.07
<200 Pov 0.69 0.72 0.63 0.17
Unemp 6.66 7.08 6.29 6.23
FMAP 58.11 57.77 58.30 57.28
Pop (Mil.) 14.33 13.79 15.36 12.93
St. Min. Wg. 6.71 6.80 6.35 6.49
Gov. Dem. 0.45 0.46 0.39 0.47
Cont. Enrolled 0.22 0.24
Recieved MC & SC 0.15 0.35
NSLP/Pop. 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
NSBP/Pop. 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03
Obs. 248,633 70,007 74,134 552,725
Note: Individual weights used.
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Table 3.4: Impact of Unemployment on ln(Beneficiaries/Pop.): FY1999-FY2015
MC
(1)
SC
(2)
MC
(3)
SC
(4)
MC
(5)
SC
(6)
Unemp 0.063∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.008 −0.079∗∗ −0.002 −0.076∗∗
(0.008) (0.033) (0.010) (0.032) (0.008) (0.032)
FMAP 0.006 0.006
(0.005) (0.011)
Gov. Dem. 0.021 0.098
(0.014) (0.099)
%∆Emp.Pop. −0.211 −0.369
(0.373) (2.688)
NSLP/Pop. 2.852 −5.108
(2.438) (9.349)
NSBP/Pop. 0.604 −11.044
(3.165) (8.435)
State FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 914 857 914 857 896 840
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
MC represents the natural log of child Medicaid enrollment per person, SC represents the
natural log of SCHIP enrollment per person.
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Table 3.5: Impact of Unemployment on Enrollment
MC
(1)
SC
(2)
Unemp 0.004∗∗ 0.002
(0.002) (0.003)
Age −0.007∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Black 0.230∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.004)
Other Race 0.084∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.004)
Hispanic 0.186∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.006)
Married −0.169∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006)
High School 0.080∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.002)
College −0.184∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.003)
# <18 in Fam 0.044∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001)
FMAP 0.003∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Pop. 0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Min Wage 0.011∗∗ 0.002
(0.004) (0.005)
Dem. Gov. 0.000 −0.002
(0.004) (0.004)
NSLP/Pop. −0.261 −1.303∗
(0.604) (0.699)
NSBP/Pop. −0.633 0.370
(0.716) (0.794)
Obs. 867,850 867,850
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
All models include state and year fixed effects. MC represents the probability a child is
enrolled in Medicaid, SC represent the probability a child is enrolled in SCHIP.
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Table 3.6: Transitions Among Insurance States
MC
(1)
SC
(2)
Unins.
(3)
MC
(4)
SC
(5)
Unins.
(6)
SCHIPij(t−1) 0.484∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗
(0.026) (0.035) (0.012)
Medicaidij(t−1) 0.598∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗
(0.016) (0.025) (0.007)
Unemp 0.006∗∗ −0.000 0.003∗ 0.001 −0.005∗∗ 0.004∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
SCHIPij(t−1)× Unemp −0.001 0.014∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.002)
Medicaidij(t−1)× Unemp 0.002 0.018∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.005) (0.001)
Obs. 150,612 150,612 150,612 155,846 155,846 155,846
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level. Controls include FMAP, race, sex, age, education,
ethnicity, marital status, state population, state min. wage, free school lunch recipients per person,
free school breakfast recipients per person, governor party affiliation, and state and year fixed effects.
* p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. MC represents the probability a child is enrolled in Medicaid,
SC represent the probability a child is enrolled in SCHIP.
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Table 3.7: Impact of State Expenditure on Enrollment
MC
(1)
SC
(2)
-ln(Exp/Pop) −0.028 −0.058∗∗
(0.026) (0.022)
Unemp 0.005∗∗ 0.003
(0.002) (0.003)
Age −0.007∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Black 0.230∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.004)
Other Race 0.086∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.004)
Hispanic 0.186∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.006)
Married −0.176∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006)
High School 0.081∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003)
College −0.173∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.004)
# <18 in Fam 0.044∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001)
FMAP 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Pop. 0.000 −0.000∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Min Wage 0.012∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.004) (0.005)
Dem. Gov. 0.001 −0.002
(0.004) (0.004)
NSLP/Pop. −0.121 −1.191
(0.621) (0.757)
NSBP/Pop. −0.832 0.203
(0.778) (1.035)
Obs. 829,869 829,869
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
All models include state and year fixed effects. MC represents the probability a child is
enrolled in Medicaid, SC represent the probability a child is enrolled in SCHIP.
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Table 3.8: Transitions Among Insurance States
MC
(1)
SC
(2)
Unins.
(3)
MC
(4)
SC
(5)
Unins.
(6)
SCHIPij(t−1) 0.349∗∗∗ 0.093 0.061
(0.074) (0.085) (0.036)
Medicaidij(t−1) 0.483∗∗∗ −0.187∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗
(0.053) (0.069) (0.021)
-ln(Exp/Pop) −0.027 −0.038∗∗ 0.013 −0.021 −0.008 0.008
(0.029) (0.017) (0.017) (0.023) (0.020) (0.018)
SCHIPij(t−1)× -ln(Exp/Pop) −0.064∗ −0.135∗∗∗ 0.029
(0.035) (0.042) (0.018)
Medicaidij(t−1)× -ln(Exp/Pop) −0.065∗∗ −0.189∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗
(0.026) (0.037) (0.010)
Unemp 0.007∗∗ 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Obs. 150,522 150,522 150,522 155,756 155,756 155,756
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level. Controls include FMAP, race, sex, age, education, ethnicity,
marital status, state population, state min. wage, free school lunch recipients per person, free school breakfast
recipients per person, governor party affiliation, and state and year fixed effects. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, ***
p <0.01. MC represents the probability a child is enrolled in Medicaid, SC represent the probability a child
is enrolled in SCHIP.
Table 3.9: Effect of Unemployment Rate on Probability of Switching
(1) (2) (3)
Medicaidijt−1 0.149∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.018)
SCHIPijt−1 0.664∗∗∗ 0.618∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.022)
Unemp −0.007∗∗∗ 0.002 −0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Medicaidijt−1× Unemp 0.027∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.004)
SCHIPijt−1× Unemp 0.009∗∗∗ −0.000
(0.003) (0.004)
Obs. 155,846 150,612 150,612
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level. Controls include FMAP, race, sex, age,
education, ethnicity, marital status, state population, state min. wage, free school lunch
recipients per person, free school breakfast recipients per person, governor party affiliation,
and state and year fixed effects. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
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Table 3.10: Effect of State Expenditure on Probability of Switching
(1) (2) (3)
Medicaidijt−1 −0.206∗∗ −0.120∗∗
(0.085) (0.050)
SCHIPijt−1 0.542∗∗∗ 0.651∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.093)
-ln(Exp/Pop) 0.034∗ −0.008 0.013
(0.020) (0.012) (0.012)
Medicaidijt−1× -ln(Exp/Pop) −0.266∗∗∗ −0.131∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.028)
SCHIPijt−1× -ln(Exp/Pop) −0.089∗∗ 0.019
(0.039) (0.047)
Obs. 155,756 150,522 150,522
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level. Controls include FMAP, race, sex, age,
education, ethnicity, marital status, state population, state min. wage, free school lunch
recipients per person, free school breakfast recipients per person, governor party affiliation,
and state and year fixed effects. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
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Table 3.11: Determinants of Entry
Medicaidijt
(1)
SCHIPijt
(2)
Uninsijt
(3)
Priv.ijt
(4)
Medicaidijt−1 0.073∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.014) (0.011)
SCHIPijt−1 0.380∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.019) (0.017)
Unins.ijt−1 0.179∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.015) (0.017)
Priv.ijt−1 0.058∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009)
Unemp. 0.001 −0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗ −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Medicaidijt−1× Unemp. 0.012∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗ −0.004∗∗
(0.004) (0.001) (0.002)
SCHIPijt−1× Unemp. −0.008∗ −0.004∗ −0.008∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Unins.ijt−1× Unemp. 0.004∗ 0.013∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Privijt−1× Unemp. 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Obs. 159,180 159,180 159,180 159,180
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level. Controls include FMAP, race, sex, age,
education, ethnicity, marital status, state population, state min. wage, free school lunch
recipients per person, free school breakfast recipients per person, governor party affiliation,
and state and year fixed effects. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
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Chapter 4: The Minimum Wage and Program Interaction
4.1 Introduction
Questioning the role and effectiveness of the minimum wage is not a new topic,
with studies on the impacts of the minimum wage going back at least 100 years.
Grounding the idea in basic economic theory is relatively simple; a binding price
floor on labor should both increase the quantity supplied of labor and decrease the
quantity demanded. In the real world, this suggests we should see more workers
looking for jobs, but having a more difficult time finding them. Moreover, theory
tells us that, depending on the marginal rate of technical substitution, we may see
employers shifting away from low-wage labor towards capital in an attempt to lower
costs.
While theory suggests detrimental effects from the minimum wage, recent policy
has been moving the needle forward on minimum wage increases. From 1997 to 2007,
the nominal federal minimum wage was $5.15 per hour. The Fair Minimum Wage
Act of 2007 raised the minimum wage by over 40% between 2007 and 2009, with a
current nominal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour. Many large increases at the state
and local level have been enacted recently as well. Los Angeles recently increased
its minimum wage to $15 per hour, with the rest of California to follow suit in the
coming years.1 Seattle also recently passed an ordinance to increase the minimum
wage to $15 per hour.2
If theory suggests negative employment consequences, why then has the minimum
wage seen a resurgence as a policy prescription to address income inequality and
poverty? While the basic theory is clean and neat, the empirical research surrounding
1http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/California-Minimum-Wage-374470051.html
2http://www.seattle.gov/laborstandards/minimum-wage
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the observed effects of the minimum wage can get muddy. In a broad overview,
Neumark et al. (2007) show that the estimates of the effect of the minimum wage on
employment can vary significantly, but that overall, a majority of the work covered
suggests that economic theory holds true, finding a decrease in the overall level of
employment for low wage workers. Recent studies by Dube et al. (2016) find that
the minimum wage reduces both hiring and turnover rates for affected workers, with
little overall change in the stock of labor, while Jardim et al. (2017) find substantial
negative effects from the large minimum wage increases in Seattle, both in terms of
employment and overall earnings.
While the discussion surrounding the minimum wage often revolves around the
employment effects of the minimum wage, at its heart the minimum wage is an
anti-poverty policy tool. Gramlich et al. (1976) note that the minimum wage is
“basically an attempt to alter the distribution of family income.” This concept has
driven a wide literature on the effect of the minimum wage on poverty and inequality
(Dube, 2017; MaCurdy, 2015; Sabia and Nielsen, 2015; Sabia et al., 2012; Neumark
et al., 2005; Neumark and Wascher, 2002). However, Gramlich et al. (1976) also
note that the minimum wage has broad interactions in the wider economy, and that
these interactions are understudied in the minimum wage literature, specifically, the
interaction of minimum wage policy with the transfer system. And though these
shortcomings were noted in 1976, more than 40 years later, we are still relatively
uninformed about how minimum wages and public assistance programs interact.
Recent literature has made an attempt to study the broader implications of the
minimum wage for the social safety net and poverty, however, the question remains
about the overall efficacy of the minimum wage as one of many potential policy tools
available. This paper is an attempt to address this shortcoming, and to understand
the direct and indirect consequences of minimum wage policy on poverty and the
safety net. Using data from the 1995-2016 Annual Social and Economic Supplement
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of the Current Population Survey (CPS ASEC or March CPS), I examine the effect
of the minimum wage on welfare, food, and tax benefits, as well as the effect of the
minimum wage on poverty. I limit my analysis to working age, citizen, heads of
households less than 300% of the federal poverty line to capture the effect on primary
wage earners, utilizing variation in state and federal minimum wages as well as vari-
ation in the self-reported dollar value of benefits received. I find that the minimum
wage reduces the self-reported dollar value of safety net benefits received, with a 1%
increase in the minimum wage reducing the dollar value of total reported benefits
by approximately 0.24%. If I disaggregate these results, I find a 1% increase in the
minimum wage reduces the self-reported dollar value of food stamp or Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits by 0.03%, the dollar value of Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or Temporary Assistance to Needy Fam-
ilies (TANF) (depending on year of observation) benefits by 0.27%, Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) benefits by 0.42%, and Earned Income Tax Credit Benefits by
0.43%. I then use these results to estimate the total effect of a change in the minimum
wage on the income to poverty ratio, finding an own effect of a 1% increase in the
minimum wage reduces the ratio by 0.55 percentage points. However, if I consider
the joint impact of the minimum wage on the income to poverty ratio and benefits,
I find that this effect attenuates by about 30% to 0.39 percentage points.
These results suggest that the minimum wage may be a blunt instrument when
fighting poverty. While I find positive overall effects of the minimum wage on poverty,
these effects are small and diminished by the mechanical relationship between means-
tested programs and wages. This, coupled with the broad literature that typically
finds negative employment effects of the minimum wage suggests that, if the goal of
the minimum wage is to reduce poverty, there may be more efficient avenues for doing
so. Studies such as those by Neumark and Wascher (2001), Tiehen et al. (2015), and
Schmidt et al. (2015) suggest that portions of the safety net are making large strides
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in addressing the needs of America’s poor. This paper provides evidence that suggests
a more targeted, safety net based approach to poverty could be more effective than
broad measures such as the minimum wage.
4.2 Background and Motivation
While the basic theory surrounding the effects of the minimum wage on employ-
ment are relatively straightforward, the theoretical predictions of the effect of the
minimum wage on poverty are ambiguous. For low-income families, there are po-
tentially offsetting effects from gains in wage income, employment losses, and losses
in transfer income (be it in-kind or cash). Workers who see increased earnings from
minimum wage increases could potentially be made better off. However, the loss
in transfer income may reduce the benefit from increased wages. Workers who lose
their jobs due to a minimum wage increase will experience higher rates of poverty.
Here, these losses could be mitigated or aggravated by changes in transfer income. If
transfer program assistance is provided with a work stipulation, these losses in wage
income could be compounded by losses in transfer income. However, if no work re-
quirement is present, the losses in wage income may be offset by increases in transfer
income.
The following simple model describes the joint effect of the minimum wage and
transfer program benefits on poverty. The first equation very generally models bene-
fits, letting
Benefitijt = Gijt − τjt(wijtHijt(wijt)−Dijt) (4.1)
where G is the maximum benefit for family i in state j at time t, wijtHijt(wijt) is
work income (where hours are a function of wages), Dijt is deductions, and τjt is a
potentially complex marginal tax rate. Let us slightly complicate the benefit formula
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by including work requirements, such that
Benefitijt = P (Hijt(wijt) > k)[Gijt − τjt(wijtHijt(wijt)−Dijt)] (4.2)
where k is some arbitrary work requirement threshold. Thus, if we wish to find the
marginal effect of a change in wages, we have
∂Benefitijt
∂wijt
=P (Hijt(wijt) > k)[−τjtHijt(wijt)− τjtwijt∂Hijt(wijt)
∂wijt
]
+ ∂P (Hijt(wijt) > k)
∂wijt
[Gijt − τjt(wijtHijt(wijt)−Dijt)]
(4.3)
Here, if we are completely general, the ambiguity of the direction of the response
of hours to wages makes the general sign of equation (4.3) ambiguous. For simplicity,
I will assume equation (4.3) refers to minimum wage workers, and that, as is widely
found in the literature, the probability of employment decreases in response to an
increase in the minimum wage (see Neumark et al. (2007) for an overview). I will
also assume an upward sloping labor supply curve, with hours increasing as wage
increases. This implies that ∂Hijt(wijt)
∂wijt
> 0. While a significant literature exists on the
extensive margin of labor supply, the literature on the intensive margin is somewhat
thinner. Couch and Wittenburg (2001) and Zavodny (2000) study the effect of the
minimum wage on hours of work for teenagers, finding either negative or null effects.
This, coupled with the literature on the extensive margin of labor supply, implies
∂P (Hijt(wijt)>k)
∂wijt
< 0. Since we know that public assistance benefits are non-negative,
the second term in (4.3) is unambiguously non-negative. Furthermore, assuming an
upward sloping labor supply curve implies the first term is unambiguously negative
as well, suggesting that any empirical estimates of the effect of the minimum wage
on means-tested benefits should be negative (∂Benefitijt
∂wijt
< 0).
In this paper I will consider benefits from food stamps/SNAP, AFDC/TANF, SSI,
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and the EITC. The Food Stamp Program, now known as SNAP, is an in-kind food
assistance program that provides food purchasing assistance to low-income families.
The 2008 farm bill renamed the Food Stamp Program as the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program. Since this occurs in the middle of the time frame I study, I
will use both names interchangeably. The role of SNAP has grown substantially in
recent years, becoming one of the largest public assistance programs in the US (5th
by expenditure, 3rd by recipients).
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) was a cash assistance wel-
fare program, and was reformulated into Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF) by the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996 (PRWORA). PRWORA gave states more flexibility in designing their welfare
programs, and also changed the fiscal structure of welfare from a federal matching
grant to a block grant. Subsequently, the real value of funding, as well as caseloads,
have decreased in recent years. Since the reformulation took place in the middle of
the time period I study, I will also use AFDC and TANF interchangeably.
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) is a means-tested program that provides cash
assistance to low-income individuals who are either aged 65 or older, blind, or dis-
abled (children included), often referred to simply as disability (although not the only
disability program in the US). Spending on SSI has grown from $27 billion in 1995 to
nearly $55 billion in 2016, an increase of 104%, making it one of the fastest growing,
means-tested programs in the US.
Finally, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is a refundable tax credit for low-
income individuals, providing a sliding subsidy depending on earned income. Key to
the EITC is that it is only available for working tax filers. Spending on the EITC has
grown from just over $30 billion in 1995 to nearly $60 billion in 2015, an increase of
nearly 100%. Some states also have a state level EITC, providing a state level boost
to federal assistance. Together, these programs make up a large portion of the social
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safety net.
Next, consider the following equation of the effect of the minimum wage on the
income to poverty ratio, a measure which compares family incomes to poverty thresh-
olds defined by the US Census Bureau3 and which vary based on year and family size
Income
Poverty ijt
= κ0 + κ1Minimum Wagejt + κ2Benefitsijt + κ3Xijt + εijt (4.4)
where Min. Wagejt is the minimum wage in state j at time t, Benefitsijt is the value
of safety net benefits, and X is some vector of individual and state level controls. If
we are interested in the marginal effect of the minimum wage on poverty, we would
have
∂Inc./Pov.ijt
∂Min. Wagejt
= κ1 + κ2
∂Benefitsijt
∂Min. Wagejt
(4.5)
From equation (4.3) we know that ∂Benefitsijt
∂Min. Wagejt
< 0. This means that regardless of
the own effect of the minimum wage on poverty (of which there is no consensus), the
total effect, taking into account the change in program benefits, should be less than
the own effect.
Much of the literature surrounding the minimum wage focuses on the employment
effects of minimum wages. Gramlich et al. (1976) provide much of the foundation for
minimum wage analysis, and Neumark et al. (2007) provide an in-depth overview of
much of the minimum wage literature from 1990s and 2000s. Generally, there is no
consensus on the effect of the minimum wage on employment, however, as Neumark
et al. (2007) note, most studies find negative employment elasticities (Neumark, 2017;
Aaronson et al., 2017; Jardim et al., 2017; Neumark, 2016; Meer and West, 2015;
3https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/historical-poverty-
thresholds.html
109
Sabia et al., 2012). However, a seminal study by Card and Krueger (1994) compares
employment at fast-food restaurants along the borders of New Jersey (where the
minimum wage had risen) and Pennsylvania, and finds no decline in employment.
More recent studies from Dube et al. (2016) and Giuliano (2013) also fail to find
negative associated employment effects of the minimum wage.
While the employment effects of the minimum wage are crucial to understand,
as noted by Gramlich et al. (1976), the goal of the minimum wage is often seen as
reducing poverty and inequality. The literature on the effect of the minimum wage on
poverty and inequality generally fails to find consensus. MaCurdy (2015) simulates
the consequences of a minimum wage increase using the first three waves of the 1996
SIPP panel, and finds a small redistributional effect from the minimum wage, however,
he notes that increases in the minimum wage result in higher prices as well. He finds
that 3 in 4 low-income families are actually net losers from changes in the minimum
wage. MaCurdy (2015) notes, however, that the increased earnings due to increases in
the minimum wage of the poorest families are only slightly higher than the increased
earnings of the wealthiest families, with families in the top fifth and bottom fifth
of the income distribution almost equally likely to have a low wage worker. Often
this is associated with teenagers in higher income households earning the minimum
wage. However, Dube (2017) finds that increased minimum wages reduce the poverty
rate, with strong earnings gains in the lowest portions of the income distribution.
Bárány (2016) finds that the minimum wage can affect the optimal choice of education
across the income distribution and change the skill distribution of the workforce, thus
impacting inequality through more than just the earnings of young people.
Figure 4.1 further examines the relationship between minimum wages and poverty,
depicting the income to poverty ratio for minimum wage earners over time.4 Here,
4Author’s calculations from the CPS ASEC. A minimum wage earner is someone whose yearly
earnings to yearly hours ratio falls below the effective minimum wage for that state.
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during the time period examined by MaCurdy, I show that minimum wage earners
were gaining in terms of the income to poverty ratio. In the mid to late 1990s, the
average income to poverty ratio for minimum wage earners was below 200% FPL,
with the upward trend in the income to poverty ratio beginning prior to the federal
increases of 1997, and the downward trend in the ratio beginning slightly before
the Great Recession. However, the decline in the ratio was relatively mild during
the Great Recession, suggesting the minimum wage hikes of 2007-2009 may have
mitigated downward macroeconomic pressure.
Many other authors have also examined the effect of the minimum wage on poverty.
Neumark and Wascher (2002) and Neumark et al. (2005) both examine how the min-
imum wage influences low-income families, generally finding that the minimum wage
increases movement both into and out of poverty. This reflects both the income
boost the minimum wage provides to low-income families, as well as the disemploy-
ment effects of increased minimum wages. Lee and Saez (2012) suggest that this
redistribution among low-income families may be desirable if the minimum wage is
properly targeted, with employment effects concentrated among those with low work
attachment. Neumark et al. (2004) also find an overall negative effect of the min-
imum wage on inequality, with an overall decrease in earned income for low wage
workers. However, not all studies find negative effects on incomes from the minimum
wage. Dube et al. (2010) finds consistently positive effects of the minimum wage on
earnings, even when limiting analysis to contiguous border county-pairs, attributing
many of the negative effects found in other studies to insufficient geographic and
temporal trend controls. Autor et al. (2016) also find that increases in the minimum
wage reduced inequality, again citing inadequate measurement of trends, along with
the time window of previous analyses.
Many of these analyses fail to fully account for the interaction between program
benefits and changes in the minimum wage. As shown in equation (4.3) this effect is
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likely negative, and could potentially be important for an analysis of the relationship
between the minimum wage and poverty. Moffitt et al. (1998) examine the interplay
between wage inequality and social safety net benefits from 1969 to 1992. They find
that there is a positive correlation between wage rates at the bottom end of the income
distribution and the demand for welfare benefits. Using a state-level panel of wages
and the demand for AFDC benefits, the authors find a positive correlation between
low-income wages and the demand for AFDC benefits. What is especially interesting
with their analysis is the lack of work requirements under AFDC. This could mute
or negate the relationship shown in equation (4.3).
Some other studies have begun examining the role of program benefits as they
relate to changes in the minimum wage. Dube (2017) examines the effect of the
minimum wage on traditional poverty measures which exclude benefits from their
calculations, as well as an expanded income definition which includes SNAP and EITC
benefits. Dube finds generally significant poverty rate elasticities of between -0.22 and
-0.55 for the minimum wage, similar to results presented in this paper. However, he
also finds that including other program benefits in the definition of income reduces
the magnitude of the results by approximately 28%. While Dube does account for
benefits in his definition of income in some specifications, he does not explicitly model
the relationship between the minimum wage and program benefits.
Clemens (2016) examines how changes in the minimum wage affect program re-
ceipt by comparing states that are bound by federal minimum wage increases to states
that are unbound, finding income losses associated with minimum wage increases, and
no changes in the value of safety net benefits. Using difference in differences method-
ologies, Sabia and Nielsen (2015) examine how minimum wages may impact various
aspects of poverty from 1996-2007. They find relatively few statistically significant
effects, and generally conclude that there is little evidence that the minimum wage
reduced poverty or receipt of public benefits. While the authors do not conduct any
112
explicit distributional analyses, they do look among varying populations that may be
more or less sensitive to changes in the minimum wage, and find small redistributional
effects among low-skilled individuals. Sabia and Nguyen (2017) also find little effect
of minimum wage increases on reducing program benefits, examining SNAP/food
stamps, housing assistance receipt, AFDC/TANF, and the Special Supplemental Nu-
trition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC). However, many of these
studies do not account for differential effects on programs based on employment status
nor the fact that program benefits are targeted at low-income families.
Another group of studies focuses specifically on program take up and the min-
imum wage. Reich and West (2015) examine the response of SNAP to changes in
the minimum wage, and using the CPS ASEC, find a 10% increase in the minimum
wage would reduce SNAP enrollment by roughly 2-3%, and reduce SNAP expendi-
ture by roughly 2%. The authors use state level heterogeneity in SNAP policies and
minimum wages over time, and estimate linear probability models to capture the ef-
fects. Contrarily, Page et al. (2005) find that increasing the minimum wage actually
increases welfare caseloads. Page et al. look at state level variation in caseloads,
and tentatively attribute this increase to changes in employment probabilities associ-
ated with minimum wage increases. Two studies by Neumark and Wascher examine
how the minimum wage interacts with the EITC. Neumark and Wascher (2001) use
the minimum wage as a baseline to compare how the EITC affects poor and low-
income families, finding that the EITC is more effective at raising families above the
poverty threshold than the minimum wage. Neumark and Wascher (2011) extend this
study by explicitly examining the interactions between the EITC and the minimum
wage, remarking that arguments can be made for the minimum wage enhancing the
effectiveness of the EITC. Merging state-level policy data with the CPS Annual De-
mographic Files, the authors use a few reduced form specifications to find that the
interaction between the EITC and the minimum wage can produce a boost in employ-
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ment and earnings for single women with children, but actually reduce employment
and earnings for low-skill and childless minority individuals. Thus, it seems there is
no clear impact of the minimum wage on program benefits, with results for take up
and wage/employment effects that differ across program and family structure.
The studies mentioned above outline a few gaps that this paper attempts to fill.
The first is examining how the minimum wage affects safety net benefits. As noted
by Schmidt et al. (2015), program benefits are targeted at low-income individuals,
and failing to account for this targeting could bias results towards zero. Much of the
previous research on the minimum wage and the safety net either focuses on a single
program or fails to account for this targeting. The second gap this paper attempts
to fill is understanding the joint effect of minimum wages and program benefits on
poverty. By separating these effects, rather than simply combining program benefits
into a broad measure of income, I am able to examine the magnitudes of the joint
effect both as a whole and program by program. Finally, this paper contributes to
the ongoing literature regarding minimum wages and poverty, suggesting a broader
approach may be helpful when thinking about antipoverty policy.
4.3 Model
I begin by examining the effect of the minimum wage on the value of program
benefits. However, many individuals report no program benefits, creating censoring
from below at zero. Thus, I estimate a Tobit model of the form
Benefitijt =
Benefit
∗
ijt if Benefit∗ijt > 0
0 if Benefit∗ijt ≤ 0
(4.6)
with
Benefit∗ijt = β0 + β1ln(Min. Wagejt) + β2Xijt + δj + δt + tδd + εijt (4.7)
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where Benefitijt represents the dollar value of self-reported program benefits received
for person i in state j at time t, and Benefit∗ijt is the latent value of benefits observed
only if Benefit∗ijt > 0. Equation (4.6) shows that I do not observe anyone with
negative benefits, which conceptually could be viewed as an individual willing to pay
to stay out of the safety net in order to avoid any associated costs, such as stigma,
transaction, or information costs. Thus, failing to account for this censoring could
potentially bias my results.
In this paper, I will consider benefits from four of the largest means-tested pro-
grams in this time period—food stamps (or SNAP), AFDC/TANF, the EITC, and
SSI, both individually and as the summed value of total benefits. ln(Min. Wagejt) is
the natural log of the higher of state or federal minimum wages, and Xijt is a vector
of state and individual level controls including sex, a quartic in age, race, ethnicity,
marital status, education, family size, governor party affiliation, the unemployment
rate, the 25th percentile of income, the log of the 50/10 income ratio, the employment
to population ratio, and per capita income. With the addition of governor party af-
filiation, which is included to capture any systematic difference in benefit generosity
based on state political climate, and the 25th percentile of income, the log of the
50/10 income ratio, and the employment to population ratio, which are included to
more thoroughly capture changes in the macroeconomic circumstances of those at the
lower end of the income distribution, these are the same controls used by Dube (2017)
in his analysis of the minimum wage. I also include the canonical state and year fixed
effects (δj and δt), as well as Census division by year fixed effects (tδd) to capture
minimum wage trends by region, as recommended by Dube (2017). Per Schmidt et al.
(2015), I will limit the analysis to citizen family heads between the ages of 16 and
64 who are less than 300% of the federal poverty line. The Tobit model assumes
the normality of the standard errors, εijt, thus, I will also estimate (4.7) via a linear
probability model (LPM). While the LPM does not require the strong assumptions
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of the Tobit model, it also does not account for the censoring of benefits. Thus, I
consider the LPM a check on the Tobit specification.
The parameter of interest in equation (4.6) is β1, the effect of the minimum wage on
the value of means-tested program benefits. This is the empirical analog of equation
(4.2), and from equation (4.3), we know β1 should be negative if work requirements are
in place and if labor supply slopes upward. For the benefits I examine, TANF5 and the
EITC are the two with the strongest ties to work, thus, I expect the strongest results
for these two benefits. Since SNAP and SSI do not have uniform work requirements,
the negativity of β1 relies on the assumption of upward sloping labor supply. If
individuals cannot find work, or wish to reduce hours in a response to an increase in
the minimum wage, I may not find β1 < 0.
I then use the results from equation equation (4.6) to estimate the empirical analog
to equation (4.4)
Inc.
Pov. ijt
= γ0 + γ1ln(Min. Wagejt) + γ2Benefitijt + γ3Xijt + δj + δt + tδd + ηijt (4.8)
where Benefitijt is either the total value of benefits or a vector of self-reported benefits
for SNAP, AFDC/TANF, SSI, and the EITC, and all other variables are defined as
before. From equation (4.5) we know that the total marginal effect from a change in
the minimum wage will be ∂Inc./Pov.ijt
∂ln(Min. Wagejt)
= γ1 + γ2× β1, here letting β1 be either the
marginal effect for total benefits or the vector of marginal wage effects for all benefits.
I may be hindered in estimating γ2 due to the endogeneity of benefits. Mechani-
cally, receiving cash or near cash benefits should increase the income to poverty ratio,
unless the disemployment effects from SNAP or SSI outweigh any positive effect.
Thus, I expect γ2 to be positive. However, individuals who participate in the safety
5Means-tested cash welfare changes from AFDC to TANF in the third year of my sample.
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net may be systematically different than those who do not. Furthermore, there is also
mechanical endogeneity due to benefits being means-tested. Schmidt et al. (2015)
note this endogeneity, and use a simulated eligibility instrumental variables approach
where exogenously generated simulated benefits are used to capture the effect of own
benefits. Here, I will present another approach to account for this endogeneity.
First, I will implement a control function approach. In order to identify (4.7)
off of more than the functional form assumptions of the Tobit model, I will include
the maximum benefit guarantees for food stamps/SNAP, AFDC/TANF, SSI, and the
EITC, which will vary across family size, state (for all except SNAP) and year. With
this approach, I assume that these program parameters only affect the income to
poverty ratio through benefit levels, and not any other means. Thus, (4.7) will take
the form
Benefit∗ijt = β0 + β1ln(Min. Wagejt) + β2Xijt + β3Zijt + δj + δt + tδd + εijt (4.9)
where the maximum benefit guarantees are captured by the vector Zijt. I then utilize
the method outlined in Vella (1998) to compute the generalized Tobit residuals, with
ˆεijt = [1− 1(Benefitijt > 0)]× −φ(X
′βˆ)
1− Φ(X ′βˆ)
+ 1(Benefitijt > 0)× (Benefitijt −X ′βˆ)
(4.10)
where X ′βˆ represents the estimated value of benefits from equation (4.9), and φ()
and Φ() represent the normal distribution and cumulative normal distribution, re-
spectively. I then re-estimate equation (4.8) including the residuals estimated by
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(4.10)
Inc.
Pov. ijt
=α0 + α1ln(Min. Wagejt) + α2Benefitijt+
α3Xijt + α4 ˆεijt + δj + δt + tδd + νijt
(4.11)
Here, the goal is for ˆεijt to capture the endogeneity of benefits, allowing α2 to capture
the effect of program benefits on the income to poverty ratio, with the implied total
marginal effect of the natural log of the minimum wage on the income to poverty ratio
for low-income individuals being α1+α2×β1. I utilize this method for both the Tobit
model and LPM, where the control function approach for the LPM is equivalent to
a traditional instrumental variables approach with the maximum benefit guarantees
used as the exogenous instruments. When using the LPM, I will also consider a fixed
effects approach. While individual fixed effects would account for any time invariant
heterogeneity, the nature of the data I use makes this approach unattractive for a few
reasons which will be discussed in the next section.
4.4 Data
Individual characteristics, including information about the 50/10 income ratio, the
25th percentile of income, participation in public assistance programs, and the value
of public assistance benefits come from the 1995-2016 waves of the Annual Social and
Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS ASEC or March CPS).
The ASEC collects information on the receipt of many programs, of which I utilize in-
formation on the value of benefits from public assistance or welfare (AFDC/TANF)),
the value of food stamp or SNAP Benefits, and SSI benefits. Over the time period
considered in this paper, these programs are three of the largest programs in terms
of means-tested program expenditure. The ASEC provides information on age, sex,
race, marital status, educational attainment, family size, and family structure.
The sample design of the ASEC also allows for some individuals to be tracked over
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time. Madrian and Lefgren (2000) document the panel structure of the ASEC. House-
holds are divided into 8 representative rotation groups, where they are interviewed for
4 consecutive months, followed by an 8 month break, and then interviewed again for
4 consecutive months. Since the ASEC is fielded every March, it is possible to match
households interviewed in their first four months in sample in the subsequent year.
Following the recommended Census procedure, I first match individuals on the basis
of month in sample (months 1-4 for year 1, months 5-8 for year 2), sex, household
identifier, household number, and line number of the individual in the household. I
then check for consistency in race, age, and state of residence. If the race or state
of residence changes, or the age attributed to the record changes by more than two
years (as a result of the staggered timing of the initial and final interviews) I consider
those records unique individuals. This procedure is also used in Hardy et al. (2017),
Burns and Ziliak (2017), Ziliak and Gundersen (2016), and others. This results in
approximately one-half of individuals being observed in multiple years. Observing
individuals across time provides both benefits and drawbacks. Being able to account
for latent, time invariant heterogeneity allows me to somewhat address the selection
issue with families and public assistance programs. However, since the matching pro-
cedure requires individuals to remain in the same residence, and since I am only able
to construct two year panels, any identifying variation in the minimum wage must
come from within state changes. Since these changes are relatively infrequent, I may
have difficulty identifying any effects from minimum wage changes in any fixed effect
type model. I also remove individuals with imputed values of earnings, hours, and
program benefits.
One of the fastest growing means-tested public assistance programs in this time
period is the EITC. While the ASEC does include self-reported measures of tax credit
receipt, I use NBER’s TAXSIM program to estimate the value of the EITC. This
provides a few benefits over using self-reported measures. The first is that any error in
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recall for the specific value of the credit is avoided, and the second being consistency in
the measurement of the EITC across time. However, estimating EITC transfers using
TAXSIM does assume that take-up is universal for eligibles. Moreover, some items
used to compute tax burden are not available in the ASEC, such as mortgage interest
paid and child care expenses. I collect monthly, seasonally adjusted unemployment
data, as well as employment and population data, from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
Local Area Unemployment Statistics collapsed to the interview frame of the ASEC
(March to March). I use data on the minimum wage, maximum benefit guarantees,
and the party affiliation of the state’s governor from the University of Kentucky Center
for Poverty Research National Welfare Database. The minimum wage is calculated as
the greater of the state and federal minimum wages. I use governor party affiliation
to adjust for any program characteristics that might be associated with state level
political climate, ensuring I am not simply capturing the effect of overall state level
generosity over and above a state fixed effect.
Table 4.1 presents weighted6 summary statistics for the heads of families. Here,
I follow Schmidt et al. (2015) and limit the scope of my analysis to heads of families
who are citizens, and whose family income places them at less than 300% of the
federal poverty line. This is to more closely identify the population that is likely to
receive benefits. I also break out the summary statistics by whether the prevailing
minimum wage in the state is the federal minimum wage (covered), or some higher,
state minimum wage (uncovered). Here, over the entire time period, we see that take-
up rates, even among relatively poor families, are low for both SSI and AFDC/TANF.
SNAP take up rates are significantly higher, at 21-22% of families.
Uncovered states are much more likely to have a Democrat as governor, and
6I adjust the CPS survey weights via inverse probability weighting based on whether the indi-
vidual was removed from the sample due to having imputed values of income or hours. Also, per
Census recommendation, I drop individuals who did not participate in the redesigned ASEC in 2014.
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to have more liberal social policies, with higher levels of total benefits, as well as
higher SNAP, AFDC/TANF, and SSI benefits, and more likely to have a state EITC
program. They have a higher threshold for the 25th percentile of income, and a lower
50/10 income ratio, suggesting the poorest individuals in these states have relatively
higher incomes compared with covered states. These states are also more likely to
have a higher proportion of White residents compared to other racial categories, more
Hispanic residents, have higher levels of eduction, and higher unemployment rates.
Many of the differences between the two groups can be explained by geopolitical
differences in the U.S. As noted by Dube (2017), minimum wage policy is highly
regionally concentrated, with states in the Northeast, Midwest, and on the West Coast
more likely to have higher minimum wages. Figures 4.2-4.4 show changes in the value
of the real minimum wage across states from 1995-2015. Early in my sample period,
the prevailing minimum wage in most states was the federal minimum wage. By
2005, the geopolitical patterns displayed in minimum wage policy are present. These
patterns hold true in 2015 as well. Even though many more states were providing
higher minimum wages than the federal minimum wage, those states in the Northeast,
Midwest, and on the West Coast were systematically higher. Thus, following Dube
(2017), I include Census division by year trends to capture the systematic difference
between regions over time.
Figure 4.5 shows the variation in the number of changes in the minimum wage
over the course of my sample. We see that some states had minimum wages that
were never higher than the federal minimum wage,7 with some states having slightly
more changes in the state minimum wage than federal changes (5). However, this
does not necessarily mean these states were providing consistently higher minimum
wages, rather, they may have just been easing the transition between federal in-
7Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Dakota, Okla-
homa, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming
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creases. Among those states with the highest number of minimum wage changes are
Connecticut, Vermont, Oregon, and Washington. These are also states that, geopo-
litically, reside in areas with systematically higher minimum wages. Thus, figure 4.5
shows that there is significant variation in the minimum wage across states and over
time in this sample period, providing the variation I will need to identify the impact
of the minimum wage.
Figures 4.6 and 4.7 show how the distribution of the minimum wage has changed
across states over time. Figure 4.6 shows that the bottom two quintiles of states in
terms of the value of the minimum wage have been exactly equal during this period,
with the third lowest quintile differing only slightly. Prior to the federal minimum
wage increases in the mid 2000s, the real value of the minimum wage in these 30
states decreased sharply. After the federally mandated increases, the real value has
eroded, such that for the bottom 20 states, the real value of the minimum wage is
only approximately 25 cents higher in 2016 than it was in 2000. States at the second
highest quintile have seen moderate growth in the real minimum wage over this time
frame, with states in the upper quintile seeing moderate growth prior to the Great
Recession of the late 2000s, and much faster growth after the Great Recession.
Figure 4.7 shows that the distribution of minimum wages was much more concen-
trated in the early years of my sample, but has become much more dispersed over
time. In 1995, for any given quintile of the minimum wage, the difference between
that quintile and the one above or below it was approximately 25 cents. At the ex-
treme, the average of the top quintile of the minimum wage was approximately $7.00,
the average of the bottom quintile was $5.50, for a difference of $1.50 in 1995. In
2016, the dispersion is not only greater, but more varied across quintiles, with some
being more tightly clustered than others. At the extremes, the difference in the top
and bottom quintiles was approximately $2.60. These figures show that, even among
low wage earners, inequality in earnings has increased.
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4.5 Results
Here, I first present graphical analysis depicting the relationship between the
minimum wage and program benefits. I then present first stage results of the effect
of the minimum wage on program benefits using the Tobit, followed by second stage
results for the joint effect of the minimum wage and benefits on the income to poverty
ratio. Finally, I present results from linear probability models as an additional check
on the Tobit specification. All models include the controls mentioned above, as well
as state, year, and division by year fixed effects. All models are weighted by adjusted
CPS person weights, and all standard errors are clustered at the state level.
4.5.1 Main Specification: Tobit
First, I examine how the value of benefits change as the minimum wage changes.
Figure 4.8 depicts changes in the average yearly value of SNAP or food stamp,
AFDC/TANF, SSI, and EITC benefits on the left axis, and the average real value of
the minimum wage on the right axis. In the early years of my sample, food stamps
and AFDC were the largest means-tested transfer programs by the value of benefits.
Following the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996 (PRWORA), which reformulated AFDC into TANF, the value of cash-welfare
benefits began a substantial decline, from which it never recovered. Important to
note is that PRWORA also implemented work requirements for cash-welfare benefits,
which could play a potentially large role in TANF’s responsiveness to minimum wage
shocks. While the value of food stamp benefits declined in the late 1990s, the level
of benefits ultimately became the largest of the means-tested programs I consider,
at approximately $1,100 yearly. This trend in the increase of SNAP is also noted by
Ziliak (2015).
Barring the EITC expansions associated with the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief
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Reconciliation Act of 2003,8 the real value of the EITC has remained relatively con-
stant over the course of my sample, at about $200 per year. The real value of SSI
benefits has been slowly increasing in this time frame, from approximately $150 in
1995 to $250 in 2015. This shows how safety net policy has been changing the land-
scape of benefits, diminishing the role of some facets of the safety net and highlighting
the role of others.
I contrast this with changes in the minimum wage. The average real value of
the minimum wage was roughly $6.00 per hour in 1995, and approximately $7.50 in
2015. The minimum wage expansions of the late 2000s began a sharp increase in the
real value of the minimum wage, which has somewhat eroded in subsequent years.
Figure 4.8 does not depict any striking relationship between the minimum wage and
benefits. While the increase in the minimum wage in the late 2000s roughly tracked
the increase in SNAP and SSI benefits, the downturn in benefit levels in the early
2010s saw, if anything, a slight increase in the real value of the minimum wage.
Figure 4.9 shows the percent of recipients of benefits and those earning the mini-
mum wage living under 100%, 200%, and 300% of the federal poverty line. AFDC/TANF
recipients are by far the most likely to live under 100% of the federal poverty line, with
nearly 80% of recipients falling below this threshold. Moreover, nearly all recipients
of AFDC/TANF fall below 300% FPL, suggesting almost all recipients experience a
substantial degree of poverty. While food stamp or SNAP recipients are much less
likely to fall below 100% FPL than are cash-welfare recipients, they are nearly as
likely to fall below 300% FPL. This suggests that the depth of poverty might not be
as extreme for SNAP recipients. SSI and EITC beneficiaries experience a substantial
degree of poverty (approximately 90% of recipients fall below 300% FPL), however,
not at the same level as those receiving other benefits. Minimum wage earners seem
8An additional $4,300 was made available to taxpayers with two or more qualifying children.
For more information, see Kalinka (2003) and Crandall-Hollick (2018).
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the most insulated from poverty, with only 35% falling below 100% FPL, and 70%
falling below 300% FPL. As noted by MaCurdy (2015), many minimum wage earners
lie in the upper tail of the income distribution, representing earnings by young people.
While the figures here focus on family heads, many young heads of families may also
receive additional support from other family members.
Table 4.2 uses the insights from figure 4.9, as well as Schmidt et al. (2015), to
estimate equation (4.9) for citizen heads of families between the ages of 16 and 64 who
are also less than 300% FPL. Here, I show the marginal effects of the Tobit model,
at means, for the effect of the natural log of the minimum wage on total benefits,
as well as on the individual programs as well. I find a 1% increase in the minimum
wage reduces total benefits by $2.93, and reduces the value of self-reported program
benefits received by $0.20 for food stamps/SNAP, $0.47 for AFDC/TANF, $0.98 for
SSI, and $1.08 for the EITC.9 These results validate the predictions in equation (4.3),
showing that increasing the minimum wage for low-income workers reduces the value
of received benefits. This implies that using the minimum wage as an anti-poverty
tool could be a double-edged sword, increasing wages at the expense of safety net
benefits. Using the means reported in table 4.1, I find minimum wage elasticities for
total reported benefits to be -0.24. For individual programs, I find minimum wage
elasticities of -0.03 for SNAP, -0.27 for AFDC/TANF, -0.42 for SSI, and -0.43 for the
EITC.
Tables A.11-A.15 in the appendix perform the McDonald-Moffitt decomposition
per McDonald and Moffitt (1980), which decomposes the total marginal effect into
the marginal effect at the intensive margin of benefits vs. the extensive margin
of benefits. Here we can see that the marginal effect at the extensive margin is
9Benefits are reported at a yearly level. If the average minimum wage is $7.75 an hour, then a
1% increase in the minimum wage results in a $161.20 increase in total yearly wages for a full-time,
minimum wage earner. Thus, this $161.20 increase in total wages results in a $2.93 decrease in
benefits.
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much larger than the marginal effect at the intensive margin. This suggests that
work requirements may play a large roll in the response of benefits to changes in
the minimum wage. As discussed previously, many studies find that increases in
the minimum wage decrease overall levels of employment, especially for low income
workers. If benefits are provided with a work requirement, this loss of employment
could decrease overall program participation, producing the relatively large, negative
marginal effects at the extensive margin.
Next, I estimate equation (4.11) to determine the effects of the minimum wage and
program benefits on the income to poverty ratio. I present these results in table 4.3.
Column (1) sums the dollar value of self-reported benefits for food stamps/SNAP,
AFDC/TANF, SSI, and the EITC into total benefits, while column (2) breaks out
the value of benefits for individual programs. I then calculate the total marginal
effect (α1 +α2×β1), which takes into account the changes in benefits due to changes
in the minimum wage, and include it at the bottom of the table. In column (1), I
find a positive, significant effect of the minimum wage on the income to poverty ratio,
with a 1% increase in the minimum wage increasing the income to poverty ratio by
0.55 percentage points. In column (2), this result becomes negative and statistically
insignificant.
However, I do find a strong relationship between program benefits and the income
to poverty ratio for individuals less than 300% FPL, with a $1 increase in total
benefits reducing the income to poverty ratio by about 0.05 percentage points. Once
again, using the means presented in table 4.1, this suggests a 1% increase in the dollar
value of self-reported benefits increases the income to poverty ratio by 0.64 percentage
points, slightly higher than the effect for the minimum wage. Column (2) suggests
that SSI and the EITC have significantly positive relationships with the income to
poverty ratio, while SNAP has a statistically significant negative relationship and
AFDC/TANF has no relationship. These negative results could be due to the differing
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nature of the programs, but are more likely related to the identifying power of the
control function approach for the given programs.
I find the range of elasticities for the minimum wage on the income to poverty ratio
to be between -0.06 to 0.55, similar to the -0.22 to -0.55 poverty rate elasticity range
found by Dube (2017). The total marginal effects in table 4.3 show how the joint
effect of the minimum wage and program benefits influence the income to poverty
ratio. Here, the relationship discussed in equation (4.11) becomes quite clear; even if
the minimum wage improves poverty, the negative effects of the minimum wage on
benefits reduce its effectiveness as an antipoverty tool. Column (1) shows that the
small positive effect of the minimum wage decreases by about 30% when accounting
for benefit decline, from 0.55 percentage points to 0.39 percentage points. Column
(2) shows the small negative effect of the minimum wage on poverty becomes more
negative by approximately 20%.
The main finding of this paper is that the minimum wage, in essence, works
against itself as an antipoverty policy tool. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show that the minimum
wage works against many of the largest components of the social safety net, reducing
benefits while trying to lift wages. The results in table 4.3 suggest only modest
improvements to poverty from the minimum wage, and even these small gains are
significantly offset by losses in benefit income for low-income families. These losses
in benefit income suggest that the minimum wage may be less effective than other
studies, which do not account for transfer income, find.
4.5.2 Alternative Specifications: Linear Probability Models
I now examine the linear probability analogs of the earlier Tobit findings. These
results have the benefit of relaxing the functional form assumptions of the Tobit
models, however, they do not account for the censoring of benefits at zero. Table 4.4
shows the corresponding estimates to table 4.2 for linear probability models. Each
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entry in table 4.4 represents βˆ1 from equation (4.9), with the dependent variable
listed in the leftmost column. Using the LPM allows me to estimate equation (4.8)
for both the level and natural log of benefits. Using the natural log requires that I
drop all zero entries, which could potentially bias my results upwards. I also estimate
equation (4.9) using individual fixed effects, presented in column (2). As previously
noted, the short windows and lack of variation could make identification difficult in
the fixed effects models.
Column (1) of table 4.4 gives a negative point estimate for all values of the level
of benefits, and most of the point estimates for the natural log of benefits, suggesting
the results derived in equation (4.3) hold, and that increasing the minimum wage
reduces the overall value of benefits. Interpreting the coefficients for the levels of
benefits, I find a 1% increase in the minimum wage decreases the dollar value of self-
reported total benefits by $5.95, SNAP or food stamp benefits by $0.95, the value
of AFDC/TANF benefits by $2.44, the value of SSI benefits by $0.65, and the value
of EITC benefits by $2.43, with the elasticity of benefits with respect to the min-
imum wage being -0.49 for total benefits, -0.16 for SNAP, -1.41 for AFDC/TANF,
-0.28 for SSI, and -0.98 for the EITC. While I obtain negative point estimates for all
benefits examined, only total benefits, AFDC/TANF and EITC benefits are statisti-
cally significant. This suggests that the negative relationship between the minimum
wage and benefits is strongest when strong work requirements are present, once again
confirming the intuition presented in equation (4.3).
Table 4.5 presents the corresponding linear probability second stage estimates,
using the residuals from the models in table 4.4 to capture the endogeneity of pro-
gram benefits. This methodology is equivalent to an instrumental variables approach.
Columns (1), (2), and (4) present models that do not account for the endogeneity
of benefits. In column (1), I include no benefits in the regression equation, and find
the minimum wage reduces the income to poverty ratio by 0.89 percentage points. In
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column (2), I include total benefits but do not account for the endogeneity of benefits.
Here, the coefficient on both the minimum wage and total benefits are negative and
statistically significant. The negative coefficient on total benefits suggests the bias
is large enough to flip the sign on total benefits, implying receiving additional funds
from the safety net actually reduces the income to poverty ratio. Column (3) accounts
for this bias, and shows a negative and statistically insignificant coefficient for the
natural log of the minimum wage, and a positive and weakly significant coefficient
for total benefits. This suggests that the minimum wage has little effect on poverty,
but that this weak, negative effect is deepened through the reduction in benefits,
with the total marginal effect suggesting a 1% increase in the minimum wage actually
decreases the income to poverty ratio by 0.92 percentage points. Columns (3) and
(4) break out the individual programs, telling a similar story to that of total benefits.
However, here we see the strongest relationship between the safety net and the income
to poverty ratio in the coefficient on SNAP, suggesting an additional dollar of SNAP
benefits increases the income to poverty ratio by 0.024 percentage points.
These results compliment the earlier Tobit models, suggesting the results above
are not driven purely through functional form assumptions. In the appendix, I in-
clude both fixed effects results using the short, two year panels in the ASEC, as well
as results using the natural log of benefits, which drops those with zero dollars in
benefits. These results show that the fixed effects approach is insufficient to deal
with the endogeneity of program benefits, and that those with zero dollars in benefits
contribute to the overall estimation procedure.
4.6 Conclusion
As noted by Gramlich et al. (1976) the minimum wage is “basically an attempt
to alter the distribution of income,” thereby attempting to reduce poverty and pro-
mote the well-being of low-income individuals. However, the social safety net is also
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designed to serve this function by providing cash or in-kind assistance to low-income
families. While different safety net programs may differ in their administration or
specific goals, ultimately, they are tools designed to reduce poverty and improve the
well-being of low-income families. A large literature has developed attempting to
understand the minimum wage’s role in reducing poverty and inequality, and has
generally failed to find consensus in the last 40 years.
In this paper, I examine the minimum wage through the lens of the traditional
safety net, not only accounting for the effect of the minimum wage on poverty, but also
analyzing how it changes the traditional social safety net. I find that the minimum
wage has a small, positive effect on the income to poverty ratio, but also reduces the
value of program benefits. This joint effect attenuates the own effect of the minimum
wage by approximately 30%, suggesting that even those studies finding a positive
effect of the minimum wage on poverty and inequality may be overstating their case
if they do not adequately account for changes in the safety net.
This analysis could provide invaluable insight for policy makers looking for tools
to move the needle on poverty. Many studies find the minimum wage to be a blunt
instrument, doing more harm than good with respect to poverty. Regardless, many
large increases in the minimum wage have been enacted, especially at local levels
(Jardim et al., 2017). These large local increases also fall outside the ranges typically
analyzed, potentially producing effects larger than previously estimated. Thus, it
is important for both policy makers and researchers to take a broad view of the
minimum wage as they study its effects in the economy.
This paper suggests that the minimum wage may be an imprecise tool to address
poverty. Compounding the negative employment effects and the increase in price
levels found in previous studies, the results here suggest the minimum wage could have
larger negative consequences outside of those previously identified. If the minimum
wage works against the traditional safety net in fighting poverty, policy makers may
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want to reassess whether the minimum wage is the most effective tool for the job.
Moving forward, these results provide a basis for discussing broad tools to address
poverty, rather than considering the effect of the minimum wage alone.
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Figure 4.1: The Minimum Wage and Poverty
Figure 4.2: Real Minimum Wage: 1995
132
Figure 4.3: Real Minimum Wage: 2005
Figure 4.4: Real Minimum Wage: 2015
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Figure 4.5: Number of Changes in the Minimum Wage
Figure 4.6: Average of Minimum Wage by Quintile of State
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Figure 4.7: Average of Quintile of Minimum Wage
Figure 4.8: Safety Net Benefits Over Time
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Figure 4.9: Benefits and Poverty
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics by Covered Status
All Ind. Uncovered Covered
Total Benefits 1213.42 1353.95 1160.18
SNAP 0.21 0.22 0.21
SNAP Ben. 600.03 663.00 576.17
AFDC/TANF 0.05 0.06 0.05
AFDC/TANF Ben. 172.66 232.46 150.01
SSI 0.04 0.04 0.04
SSI Ben. 231.43 268.03 217.57
Tot. EITC 248.10 228.29 255.49
Min Wage 6.59 7.39 6.28
White 0.75 0.80 0.74
Female 0.56 0.59 0.55
Age 38.87 39.37 38.68
Black 0.21 0.15 0.23
Other Race 0.04 0.05 0.03
Hisp. 0.10 0.15 0.09
Married 0.52 0.50 0.53
High School 0.40 0.37 0.41
Some College 0.32 0.36 0.31
College 0.12 0.14 0.11
Num. Child 1.49 1.48 1.50
Dem. Gov. 0.41 0.62 0.33
State EITC 0.04 0.06 0.03
Unemp. 6.00 6.72 5.73
Per Cap. Inc. 0.05 0.06 0.05
ln(50/10) 1.70 1.65 1.72
25th pctile 15131.73 16355.88 14667.97
Emp./Pop. 0.47 0.47 0.47
Obs. 249,200 74,311 174,889
Note: adjusted survey weights used.
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Table 4.2: Effect of ln(Minimum Wage) on the Value of Benefits: Tobit
Total
(1)
SNAP
(2)
AFDC/TANF
(3)
SSI
(4)
EITC
(5)
ln(Min. Wage) −292.527∗∗∗ −20.393∗∗∗ −47.421∗∗∗ −98.188∗∗∗ −107.573∗∗∗
(3.062) (0.316) (3.522) (3.541) (1.390)
Max SNAP 173.173∗∗∗ 46.657∗∗∗ −8.199∗∗∗ 8.248∗∗∗ 81.102∗∗∗
(2.161) (1.023) (0.598) (0.370) (1.158)
Max TANF −106.969∗∗∗ −39.184∗∗∗ −1.702∗∗∗ −23.928∗∗∗ −27.213∗∗∗
(1.163) (0.798) (0.121) (0.873) (0.351)
Max SSI −0.040∗∗∗ −0.280∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗ −0.162∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001)
Max EITC 0.104∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Obs. 105,037 105,037 105,037 105,037 88,196
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level. Controls include sex, quartic in age, race,
ethnicity, marital status, education, family size, governor party affiliation, unemployment
rate, the log of the 50/10 income ratio, the 25th percentile of income, the employment to
population ratio, and per capita income as well as state, year, and division by year fixed
effects. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
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Table 4.3: Effect of Minimum Wage and Benefits on Income to Poverty Threshold:
Tobit
(1) (2)
ln(Min. Wage) 54.539∗∗ −6.341
(25.287) (8.373)
Total Ben 0.053∗∗∗
(0.002)
SNAP −0.009∗∗∗
(0.000)
AFDC/TANF −0.000
(0.001)
SSI 0.005∗∗∗
(0.000)
EITC 0.009∗∗∗
(0.001)
Total ME 39.129 −7.622
Obs. 270,286 85,371
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level. Controls include sex, quartic in age, race,
ethnicity, marital status, education, family size, governor party affiliation, unemployment
rate, the log of the 50/10 income ratio, the 25th percentile of income, the employment to
population ratio, and per capita income as well as state, year, and division by year fixed
effects. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
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Table 4.4: Effect of ln(Minimum Wage) on the Value of Benefits
(1) (2)
Total −594.504∗ 480.327
(299.892) (315.489)
ln(Total) −0.696∗ −0.010
(0.348) (0.438)
SNAP −94.882 147.712
(178.371) (176.473)
ln(SNAP) −0.092 0.160
(0.347) (0.301)
AFDC/TANF −244.334∗∗ −214.117
(103.700) (182.217)
ln(AFDC/TANF) −0.023 −0.837
(0.414) (0.823)
SSI −64.884 537.705∗∗
(114.073) (252.361)
ln(SSI) 0.178 −2.122∗∗
(0.449) (0.869)
EITC −243.127∗∗∗ 13.911
(71.354) (128.966)
ln(EITC) −0.630∗ −0.502
(0.331) (0.632)
FE No Yes
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level. Controls include sex, quartic in age, race,
ethnicity, marital status, education, family size, governor party affiliation, unemployment
rate, the log of the 50/10 income ratio, the 25th percentile of income, the employment to
population ratio, and per capita income as well as state, year, and division by year fixed
effects. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
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Table 4.5: Effect of Minimum Wage and Benefits on Income to Poverty Threshold
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(Min. Wage) −8.936 −13.114∗∗ −4.822 −15.301∗ 63.914
(6.264) (6.258) (6.424) (8.942) (56.557)
Total Ben −0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗
(0.000) (0.004)
SNAP −0.014∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.007)
AFDC/TANF −0.002∗∗∗ 0.280
(0.001) (0.179)
SSI −0.001∗∗∗ −0.099
(0.000) (0.073)
EITC −0.018∗∗∗ 0.037
(0.001) (0.078)
Total ME −8.677 −9.19 −9.009 −9.310
Control Function No No Yes No Yes
Obs. 105,037 105,037 105,037 88,196 88,196
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level. Controls include sex, quartic in age, race,
ethnicity, marital status, education, family size, governor party affiliation, unemployment
rate, the log of the 50/10 income ratio, the 25th percentile of income, the employment to
population ratio, and per capita income as well as state, year, and division by year fixed
effects. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
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Chapter 1 Appendix
Figure A.1
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Table A.1: Ordered Probit Coefficients and Marginal Effects
Coeffs.
(1)
Marginal FS
(2)
Low FS
(3)
Very Low FS
(4)
ACA −0.221∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005)
SNAP 0.609∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
ACA × SNAP 0.136∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
Obs. 284,804 284,804 284,804 284,804
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Ordering for probit is 0—fully food secure, 1—marginal food security, 2—low food secu-
rity, 3—very low food security. Household survey weights used. Controls include gender,
household size, number of children, marital status, age, age squared, disability status, race,
education, urban/rural status, number of medicaid beneficiaries in the state, governor party
affiliation, the 50/10 income ratio, the 25th percentile of income, and the unemployment
rate
Table A.2: Triple Differece: LPM
Food Insecure
(1)
Marginal FI
(2)
Very Low FI
(3)
ACA −0.064∗∗∗ −0.108∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.011) (0.005)
SNAP 0.219∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ACA × SNAP 0.039∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.013
(0.010) (0.011) (0.008)
Obs. 284,804 284,804 284,804
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Household survey weights used. Controls include gender, household size, number of children,
marital status, age, age squared, disability status, race, education, urban/rural status,
number of medicaid beneficiaries in the state, governor party affiliation, the 50/10 income
ratio, the 25th percentile of income, and the unemployment rate
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Table A.3: Alternative Measures of Food Hardship: LPM
FI Gap
(1)
FI Gap Squared
(2)
Inc. Gap
(3)
ACA −0.018∗∗∗ −0.002 −1.535∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.004) (0.375)
SNAP 0.111∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 8.823∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.269)
ACA × SNAP −0.009 −0.032∗∗∗ 0.697
(0.006) (0.005) (0.701)
Obs. 194,565 194,565 264,521
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Household survey weights used. Controls include gender, household size, number of children,
marital status, age, age squared, disability status, race, education, urban/rural status,
number of medicaid beneficiaries in the state, governor party affiliation, the 50/10 income
ratio, the 25th percentile of income, and the unemployment rate
Table A.4: Real Average Weekly Food Expenditure 2011-2016: OLS
OLS Avg. Weekly
Spending
ACA −1.468
(1.031)
SNAP −0.778
(0.969)
ACA × SNAP −0.737
(1.533)
Obs. 96,522
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Household survey weights used. Controls include gender, household size, number of children,
marital status, age, age squared, disability status, race, education, urban/rural status,
number of medicaid beneficiaries in the state, governor party affiliation, family income, the
50/10 income ration, the 25th percentile of income, and the unemployment rate.
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Chapter 2 Appendix
Table A.5: Federal Medical Assistance Percentages, FY1999 & FY2015
State FMAP 1999 FMAP 2015 EFMAP 1999 EFMAP 2015
Alabama 69.27 68.99 78.49 78.29
Alaska 59.80 50.00 71.86 65.00
Arizona 65.50 68.46 75.85 77.92
Arkansas 72.96 70.88 81.07 79.62
California 51.55 50.00 66.09 65.00
Colorado 50.59 51.01 65.42 65.71
Connecticut 50.00 50.00 65.00 65.00
Delaware 50.00 53.63 65.00 67.54
District of Columbia 70.00 70.00 79.00 79.00
Florida 55.82 59.72 69.07 71.80
Georgia 60.47 66.94 72.33 76.86
Hawaii 50.00 52.23 65.00 66.56
Idaho 69.85 71.75 78.89 80.23
Illinois 50.00 50.76 65.00 65.53
Indiana 61.01 66.52 72.71 76.56
Iowa 63.32 55.54 74.32 68.88
Kansas 60.05 56.63 72.03 69.64
Kentucky 70.53 69.94 79.37 78.96
Louisiana 70.37 62.05 79.26 73.44
Maine 66.40 61.88 76.48 73.32
Maryland 50.00 50.00 65.00 65.00
Massachusetts 50.00 50.00 65.00 65.00
Michigan 52.72 65.54 66.91 75.88
Minnesota 51.50 50.00 66.05 65.00
Mississippi 76.78 73.58 83.75 81.51
Missouri 60.24 63.45 72.17 74.42
Montana 71.73 65.90 80.21 76.13
Nebraska 61.46 53.27 73.02 67.29
Nevada 50.00 64.36 65.00 75.05
New Hampshire 50.00 50.00 65.00 65.00
New Jersey 50.00 50.00 65.00 65.00
New Mexico 72.98 69.65 81.09 78.76
New York 50.00 50.00 65.00 65.00
North Carolina 63.07 65.88 74.15 76.12
North Dakota 69.94 50.00 78.96 65.00
Ohio 58.26 62.64 70.78 73.85
Oklahoma 70.84 62.30 79.59 73.61
Oregon 60.55 64.06 72.38 74.84
Pennsylvania 53.77 51.82 67.64 66.27
Rhode Island 54.05 50.00 67.83 65.00
South Carolina 69.85 70.64 78.89 79.45
South Dakota 68.16 51.64 77.71 66.15
Tennessee 63.09 64.99 74.16 75.49
Texas 62.45 58.05 73.72 70.64
Utah 71.78 70.56 80.25 79.39
Vermont 61.97 54.01 73.38 67.81
Virginia 51.60 50.00 66.12 65.00
Washington 52.50 50.03 66.75 65.02
West Virginia 74.47 71.35 82.13 79.95
Wisconsin 58.85 58.27 71.20 70.79
Wyoming 64.08 50.00 74.86 65.00
Source: https://aspe.hhs.gov/federal-medical-assistance-percentages-or-federal-financial\
-participation-state-assistance-expenditures
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Table A.6: Years With Missing Enrollment
State Year Child MC Enrollment SCHIP Enrollment
Hawaii 1999 89,211
Washington 1999 504,099
Wyoming 1999 25,236
Minnesota 2002 310,002
Tennessee 2002 705,850
Arkansas 2003 356,710
Tennessee 2003 685,027
Tennessee 2004 670,246
Tennessee 2005 678,144
Tennessee 2006 703,138
Massachusetts 2009 143,044
Utah 2009 59,806
Wisconsin 2009 153,917
Maine 2011 35,986
Table A.7: Impact of Unemployment on ln(Beneficiaries/Pop.): FY1999-FY2015
MC
(1)
SC
(2)
MC
(3)
SC
(4)
MC
(5)
SC
(6)
Unemp 0.030∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗ 0.034∗∗ 0.015 0.032∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗
(0.004) (0.019) (0.015) (0.059) (0.008) (0.030)
FMAP 0.002 −0.014 0.003 0.016 0.001 0.006
(0.006) (0.013) (0.003) (0.025) (0.003) (0.023)
Gov. Dem. 0.042∗∗∗ 0.224∗ 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.062
(0.015) (0.116) (0.027) (0.100) (0.027) (0.111)
%∆Emp.Pop. 1.111∗∗∗ 0.627 −0.289 2.414 0.714 2.240
(0.334) (1.749) (0.931) (3.186) (0.622) (2.178)
NSLP/Pop. −4.485∗∗ −12.837 −0.649 −6.429 −1.290 −5.667
(1.899) (11.452) (1.350) (10.140) (1.208) (9.533)
NSBP/Pop. 15.696∗∗∗ 32.622∗∗∗ 12.630∗∗∗ 8.701 14.845∗∗∗ 15.372∗∗
(1.589) (7.211) (1.928) (9.070) (1.443) (7.164)
State FE Yes Yes No No No No
Year FE No No Yes Yes No No
Obs. 896 840 896 840 896 840
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
MC represents the natural log of child Medicaid enrollment per person, SC represents the
natural log of SCHIP enrollment per person.
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Misclassification Bias
Receipt of public health insurance is systematically under-reported in the CPS
ASEC. Figure 3.8 shows that weighted child enrollment falls below administrative
reported enrollment for all years. Davern et al. (2009) have shown that reporting of
overall Medicaid enrollment was 43% lower than administrative reporting, and that
even after correcting for this under-reporting using matched MSIS/CPS data, the
partially adjusted estimates still do not fully correct for under-reporting.
Meyer and Mittag (2017) show that misclassification can bias estimates, but that
there is a tendency for misclassification to attenuate results. Misreports can come in
two types, the first is a “false negative” where the respondent states they do not receive
public health insurance when in fact they do, and the second is a “false positive” where
the respondent states they receive public health insurance when in fact they do not.
Adjusting for this misclassification bias is not straightforward, especially with regard
to binary dependent variables. I follow an approach similar Hausman et al. (1998)
and assume that misreporting is independent of model covariates for all individuals
in a given state and year. This implies
∂Pr(Inspijt = 1|x)
∂x
= (1− α0pjt − α1pjt)β (A.1)
where Pr(Inspijt = 1|x) is the conditional probability a child participates in program
p. α0pjt is the false positive reporting rate in state j at time t for program p and α1jt is
the false negative reporting rate in state j at time t for program p. To construct these
false positive and false negative rates, I compare administrative enrollment records
with the total weighted enrollment from the CPS in a given state year. If the weighted
number of CPS recipients is greater than the administrative number, I construct the
147
false positive rate as
α0pjt =
CPS Enrollmentpjt − Administrative Enrollmentpjt
CPS Enrollmentpjt
(A.2)
If the weighted number of CPS recipients is less than the administrative number, I
construct the false negative rate as
α0pjt =
Administrative Enrollmentpjt − CPS Enrollmentpjt
Administrative Enrollmentpjt
(A.3)
In this specification, either the false positive rate or the false negative rate will be
zero for a given state in a given year, depending on whether the weighted count of
CPS enrollment is larger or smaller than administrative enrollment. If the CPS count
is larger, the false negative rate will be zero. If the CPS count is smaller, the false
positive rate will be zero. I then rescale all right hand side variables by this correction.
I present analogous results from tables 3.5 and 3.7 in table A.8, analogous results
from table 3.6 in table A.9, and analogous results from table 3.8 in table A.10. Overall,
the conclusion from Meyer and Mittag (2017) holds—the interpretation of the results
remains the same, with SCHIP, the block grant program, responding more poorly
to business cycles and being overall more variables. The results from adjusting for
misclassification suggest that the results from the main specifications might be slightly
attenuated, but that the signs of the coefficients are valid.
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Table A.8: Enrollment Adjusted for Misclassification
MC
(1)
SC
(2)
MC
(3)
SC
(4)
-ln(Exp/Pop) −0.051 −0.069
(0.037) (0.049)
Unemp 0.007∗∗ 0.003 0.008∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
Age −0.009∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Black 0.285∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.006) (0.012) (0.006)
Other Race 0.104∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.007) (0.019) (0.007)
Hispanic 0.226∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.009) (0.013) (0.009)
Married −0.213∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗ −0.213∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
High School 0.099∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
College −0.210∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗ −0.210∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006)
# <18 in Fam 0.054∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
FMAP 0.003∗∗ 0.003 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Pop. −0.000 −0.000∗ −0.000 −0.000∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Min Wage 0.013∗∗ 0.003 0.013∗∗ 0.003
(0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.010)
Dem. Gov. 0.006 −0.001 0.005 −0.001
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008)
NSLP/Pop. −0.205 −2.033 −0.274 −2.084
(0.823) (2.008) (0.821) (2.008)
NSBP/Pop. −0.302 0.046 −0.287 0.028
(1.047) (2.095) (1.042) (2.108)
Obs. 829,869 829,869 829,869 829,869
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
All models include state and year fixed effects. MC represents the probability a child is
enrolled in Medicaid, SC represent the probability a child is enrolled in SCHIP.
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Table A.9: Transitions Adjusted for Misclassification
MC
(1)
SC
(2)
MC
(3)
SC
(4)
SCHIPij(t−1) 0.615∗∗∗ 0.386∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.052)
Medicaidij(t−1) 0.759∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.035)
Unemp 0.009∗∗∗ −0.001 0.004∗ −0.007
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
SCHIPij(t−1)× Unemp −0.006 0.023∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.007)
Medicaidij(t−1)× Unemp −0.002 0.025∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.006)
Obs. 150,522 150,522 155,756 155,756
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level. Controls include FMAP, race, sex, age,
education, ethnicity, marital status, state population, state min. wage, free school lunch
recipients per person, free school breakfast recipients per person, governor party affiliation,
and state and year fixed effects. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. MC represents the
probability a child is enrolled in Medicaid, SC represent the probability a child is enrolled
in SCHIP.
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Table A.10: Transitions Adjusted for Misclassification
MC
(1)
SC
(2)
MC
(3)
MC
(4)
SCHIPij(t−1) 0.472∗∗∗ −0.017
(0.123) (0.148)
Medicaidij(t−1) 0.642∗∗∗ −0.286∗∗∗
(0.099) (0.102)
-ln(Exp/Pop) −0.038 −0.031 −0.034 0.016
(0.039) (0.042) (0.031) (0.046)
SCHIPij(t−1)× -ln(Exp/Pop) −0.051 −0.279∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.078)
Medicaidij(t−1)× -ln(Exp/Pop) −0.052 −0.286∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.053)
Unemp 0.009∗∗∗ 0.002 0.004∗ 0.000
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005)
Obs. 150,522 150,522 155,756 155,756
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level. Controls include FMAP, race, sex, age,
education, ethnicity, marital status, state population, state min. wage, free school lunch
recipients per person, free school breakfast recipients per person, governor party affiliation,
and state and year fixed effects. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. MC represents the
probability a child is enrolled in Medicaid, SC represent the probability a child is enrolled
in SCHIP.
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Chapter 3 Appendix
Table A.11: McDonald Moffitt Decomposition: Total
MFX
(1)
Int. Partial
(2)
Ext. Partial
(3)
Int. Margin
(4)
Ext. Margin
(5)
ln(Min Wage)−292.527 −262.353 −0.071 −75.998 −216.529
Max SNAP 173.173 155.310 0.042 44.990 128.183
Max TANF −106.969 −95.935 −0.026 −27.790 −79.179
Max SSI −0.040 −0.036 −0.000 −0.010 −0.030
Max EITC 0.104 0.093 0.000 0.027 0.077
Controls include sex, quartic in age, race, ethnicity, marital status, education, family size,
governor party affiliation, unemployment rate, the log of the 50/10 income ratio, the 25th
percentile of income, the employment to population ratio, and per capita income as well as
state, year, and division by year fixed effects. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. MFX
represents the total marginal effect, Int. Partial and Ext. Partial represent the partial
effects at the intensive and extensive margins, and Int. Margin and Ext. Margin are the
marginal effects at the intensive and extensive margins.
Table A.12: McDonald Moffitt Decomposition: SNAP
MFX
(1)
Int. Partial
(2)
Ext. Partial
(3)
Int. Margin
(4)
Ext. Margin
(5)
ln(Min Wage) −20.393 −30.476 −0.008 −3.672 −16.721
Max SNAP 46.657 69.728 0.019 8.401 38.256
Max TANF −39.184 −58.559 −0.016 −7.055 −32.128
Max SSI −0.280 −0.418 −0.000 −0.050 −0.229
Max EITC 0.014 0.021 0.000 0.003 0.011
Controls include sex, quartic in age, race, ethnicity, marital status, education, family size,
governor party affiliation, unemployment rate, the log of the 50/10 income ratio, the 25th
percentile of income, the employment to population ratio, and per capita income as well as
state, year, and division by year fixed effects. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. MFX
represents the total marginal effect, Int. Partial and Ext. Partial represent the partial
effects at the intensive and extensive margins, and Int. Margin and Ext. Margin are the
marginal effects at the intensive and extensive margins.
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Table A.13: McDonald Moffitt Decomposition: AFDC/TANF
MFX
(1)
Int. Partial
(2)
Ext. Partial
(3)
Int. Margin
(4)
Ext. Margin
(5)
ln(Min Wage) −47.421 −558.842 −0.022 −4.397 −43.024
Max SNAP −8.199 −96.621 −0.004 −0.760 −7.439
Max TANF −1.702 −20.060 −0.001 −0.158 −1.544
Max SSI −0.034 −0.405 −0.000 −0.003 −0.031
Max EITC 0.003 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.002
Controls include sex, quartic in age, race, ethnicity, marital status, education, family size,
governor party affiliation, unemployment rate, the log of the 50/10 income ratio, the 25th
percentile of income, the employment to population ratio, and per capita income as well as
state, year, and division by year fixed effects. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. MFX
represents the total marginal effect, Int. Partial and Ext. Partial represent the partial
effects at the intensive and extensive margins, and Int. Margin and Ext. Margin are the
marginal effects at the intensive and extensive margins.
Table A.14: McDonald Moffitt Decomposition: SSI
MFX
(1)
Int. Partial
(2)
Ext. Partial
(3)
Int. Margin
(4)
Ext. Margin
(5)
ln(Min Wage) −98.188 −470.067 −0.016 −11.374 −86.813
Max SNAP 8.248 39.486 0.001 0.955 7.292
Max TANF −23.928 −114.553 −0.004 −2.772 −21.156
Max SSI −0.162 −0.774 −0.000 −0.019 −0.143
Max EITC −0.024 −0.115 −0.000 −0.003 −0.021
Controls include sex, quartic in age, race, ethnicity, marital status, education, family size,
governor party affiliation, unemployment rate, the log of the 50/10 income ratio, the 25th
percentile of income, the employment to population ratio, and per capita income as well as
state, year, and division by year fixed effects. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. MFX
represents the total marginal effect, Int. Partial and Ext. Partial represent the partial
effects at the intensive and extensive margins, and Int. Margin and Ext. Margin are the
marginal effects at the intensive and extensive margins.
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Table A.15: McDonald Moffitt Decomposition: EITC
MFX
(1)
Int. Partial
(2)
Ext. Partial
(3)
Int. Margin
(4)
Ext. Margin
(5)
ln(Min Wage)−107.573 −114.743 −0.084 −23.959 −83.614
Max SNAP 81.102 86.507 0.063 18.063 63.038
Max TANF −27.213 −29.026 −0.021 −6.061 −21.152
Max SSI 0.014 0.015 0.000 0.003 0.011
Max EITC 0.008 0.009 0.000 0.002 0.006
Controls include sex, quartic in age, race, ethnicity, marital status, education, family size,
governor party affiliation, unemployment rate, the log of the 50/10 income ratio, the 25th
percentile of income, the employment to population ratio, and per capita income as well as
state, year, and division by year fixed effects. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. MFX
represents the total marginal effect, Int. Partial and Ext. Partial represent the partial
effects at the intensive and extensive margins, and Int. Margin and Ext. Margin are the
marginal effects at the intensive and extensive margins.
Table A.16: Effect of Minimum Wage and Benefits on Income to Poverty Threshold
(1) (2)
ln(Min. Wage) −1.162 12.511
(11.568) (14.688)
ln(Total Ben) −3.189∗∗∗ 16.941
(0.429) (13.629)
Total ME −8.677 −9.19
Control Function No Yes
Obs. 34,469 34,469
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level. Controls include sex, quartic in age, race,
ethnicity, marital status, education, family size, governor party affiliation, unemployment
rate, the log of the 50/10 income ratio, the 25th percentile of income, the employment to
population ratio, and per capita income as well as state, year, and division by year fixed
effects. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
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Table A.17: Effect of Minimum Wage and Benefits on Income to Poverty Threshold:
Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(Min. Wage) 9.626 9.852 28.990∗∗∗ 5.188 1.466
(9.771) (9.788) (10.221) (8.627) (21.723)
Total Ben −0.000∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.007)
SNAP −0.004∗∗∗ 0.019
(0.001) (0.030)
AFDC/TANF 0.003∗∗∗ 0.022
(0.001) (0.046)
SSI 0.001∗∗∗ 0.010
(0.000) (0.037)
EITC −0.012∗∗∗ −0.134∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.033)
Total ME −8.677 −9.19 −9.009 −9.310
Control Function No No Yes No Yes
Obs. 105,037 105,037 105,037 88,196 88,196
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level. Controls include sex, quartic in age, race,
ethnicity, marital status, education, family size, governor party affiliation, unemployment
rate, the log of the 50/10 income ratio, the 25th percentile of income, the employment to
population ratio, and per capita income as well as state, year, and division by year fixed
effects. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Table A.18: Effect of Minimum Wage and Benefits on Income to Poverty Threshold:
Fixed Effects
(1) (2)
ln(Min. Wage) 5.390 5.008
(19.846) (19.988)
ln(Total Ben) −0.462 −29.715∗
(0.514) (14.835)
Total ME −8.677 −9.19
Control Function No Yes
Obs. 34,469 34,469
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level. Controls include sex, quartic in age, race,
ethnicity, marital status, education, family size, governor party affiliation, unemployment
rate, the log of the 50/10 income ratio, the 25th percentile of income, the employment to
population ratio, and per capita income as well as state, year, and division by year fixed
effects. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
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